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1. INTRODUCTION 
Estonia is a multi-ethnic country with representatives of more 180 ethnicities. 
According to the latest population census conducted by Statistics Estonia 
(2011), the largest ethnic groups are Estonians (about 69%), and immigrants 
from former Soviet countries and their descendants (about 27%) who use 
Russian as their mother tongue or first language. Estonia has not always been a 
multi-ethnic country with considerable migrant-background populations. It was 
in fact largely mono ethnic until the Second World War, when Estonia was 
forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Union and coerced immigration from 
Russia and other Soviet republics began as a result of Soviet colonization 
policy. By 1991, Estonia had a Russian-speaking population1 consisting of 
about one third of the country’s total population. The immigrants had privileged 
position in many domains of social life – jobs, special housing arrangements, 
Russian-language education and media institutions. Although the Estonians 
knew Russian well and also used Russian language in inter-ethnic communica-
tions, most of the Russian-speaking immigrant population remain structurally 
segregated: residentially, in terms of labour market (employment in different 
sectors), culturally (schools with Russian language of instruction, media 
channels) (see e.g. Tammaru 1999, Marksoo 2005, Lagerspetz 2014, Soll 2015, 
Mägi 2018). On August 20th, 1991 Estonia regained independence and a new 
era of transition towards democracy and a market economy began. The transi-
tion process that started in Estonia in the 1990s was fast and radical. The chan-
ges that occurred in the political and economic system deepened the ethno-
linguistic segregation (Heidmets 1998, Pettai & Hallik 2002, Heidmets & Lau-
ristin 2002, Lauristin & Heidmets 2002, Lauristin 2010, Vetik 2012, Lagerspetz 
& Vogt 2013, Lagerspetz 2015, Lauristin & Vihalemm 2020) and built different 
pathways for the further involvement of the Russian speaking population in 
Estonian society.  
Significant international scholarly attention has been devoted to the identity 
(Melvin 1995, Kolstoe 2000) and future political perspectives (e.g. Linz & 
Stepan 1994, Smith & Graham 1997, Smith 1998, Laitin 1998) of the Russian-
speaking population in the context of Estonian nation-building. Most of these 
scholarly works capture the time period of the first decade after the collapse of 
Soviet Union and analyse the possibility for collective political mobilization of 
Russian-speaking population as a reaction to Estonian nation building. What 
previous studies have not paid much attention to, and is the focus of this thesis, 
                                                 
1  Although the migration of the majority of the Russian-speaking population to Estonia 
took place decades ago and currently 22% of them belong to the third generation which is, 
according to international definition, no longer considered as migrant population, their in-
volvement in Estonian society continues to be problematic in several aspects. Thus, the 
Russian-speaking migrant background population is a relevant term to use.  In this thesis, the 
terms Russian-speaking migrant background population, Russian-speaking population, Rus-
sian speakers and minority/minorities are all used interchangeably.  
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is the internal diversity of this group. This diversity stems from different path-
ways of adaptation with societal changes caused by the deep transformations of 
the host society among the population of migrant background. My studies show 
that although Russian speakers in Estonia are united by the common use of 
Russian language and linked social practices, such as following Russian lan-
guage media, deepening in-group distinctions still exist inside the Russian 
speaking population with immigrant background. While these distinctions 
started with post-Soviet nation building, they are carried on by current local, 
and international political, technological-economic and cultural developments.  
My research belongs to the long-term research project “Me. The World. The 
Media”, where researchers of the Institute of Social Studies at the University of 
Tartu offer a comprehensive analysis of the changes in the lifeworld of all 
Estonian population groups within various domains of social life (socioeco-
nomic conditions, civic, political and cultural participation, media and time use, 
collective memory etc.) over the last two decades (see Kalmus et al 2020, 
Vihalemm et al 2018, Vihalemm et al 2017, Kalmus et al 2004). This analysis is 
conducted by “witness-researchers” and reflects upon the “historical quasi-
experiment” of the quick transformative change after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. This experiment is one that “shakes a whole society – every social group 
and every societal domain’ and ‘in a relatively short time has resulted in the 
formation of new social and cultural agencies and relationships” (Masso et al 
2020: 3). The life changes of Soviet period immigrants and their descendants is 
part and parcel of this transformation process. In the beginning of my doctoral 
studies, I discovered that the explanations of immigrant adaptation, e.g. the 
relationship between language acquisition and labour market success, which 
worked in more stable societies do not work in the transformative social context 
(Study I). Thereby, a more sensitive and multi-dimensional approach is needed 
in order to capture the adaptation of migrant background populations within the 
transformations of a host society.  
Previous investigations have offered typologies of multidimensional social 
involvement in relation to the ownership of nation state specific capitals of the 
Russian speaking population in the integration monitoring reports (e.g. Lauristin 
2012, Rikman et al 2013). This thesis is a continuation of the empirical analysis 
of the multidimensionality of adaptation and works to elaborate on the initial 
model of in-group differentiation among the Russian speaking population based 
on the multi-domain clustering approach (Lauristin 2012). In my thesis I in-
vestigate the adaptive social agency of the Russian speaking population not only 
in relation to Estonian nation building, but also in the context of current inter-
national affairs (i.e. political tensions between Russia and the Western count-
ries), media market developments (transnational media corporations, persona-
lization and fragmentation of the media production/reception) and international 
mobility (EU citizenship, common labour market, English as lingua franca).  
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The ambition of this thesis is to explain theoretically and operationalize em-
pirically the concept of segmented integration among migrant background 
populations using the example of the Estonian Russian-speaking population. As 
the world has become more complex and dynamic in terms of human mobility 
and technology, there is a continuing need to examine the adaptative agency of 
migrant populations in host societies. Therefore, rather than being exclusive to 
the Estonian Russian-speaking case, this thesis is one of international interest 
and applicability. The “final station” of integration, if it exists at all, does not 
necessarily mean becoming more similar to a majority population; rather, it 
signifies an incorporation into different domains of social life of a host society. 
With this in mind, researchers and practitioners need to consider ongoing cross-
border relationships between migrant populations, and previous and present 
societies of their residence. The approach of adaptation as a unidirectional pro-
cess which can be measured with the help of certain indicators or outcomes (e.g. 
language competence, citizenship), cannot provide good solutions to today’s 
problems (Portes & Bach 1985, Glazer 1993, Nagel 2009, Treas 2014).  
I have approached the current research from the theoretical strand according 
to which immigrants’ incorporation is multidimensional and multidirectional 
(Treas 2014). Segmented assimilation theory2, proposed by Portes and Zhou 
(1993), offers an alternative to assimilation. According to this theory, different 
paths lead to different outcomes. These paths depend on the combinations of 
different resources available to populations with migrant backgrounds and host 
society population, as well as structural affordances and restrictions of the host 
society and its neighbours (see also Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Portes 2007, Alba 
& Nee 2003).  
I have operationalized this concept of segmented integration2 for an empi-
rical exploration of integration types of the Estonian Russian-speaking popula-
tions. Applying the theoretical concept of segmented integration enables this 
study to categorize the diversity in empirical findings into four main types of 
integration. Since this approach also illuminates groups, such as the “passive, 
weakly engaged group”, which may remain invisible in other empirical mea-
surements, it better enables officials to address integration problems in policy 
making.  
In the empirical measurement model, my analysis distinguishes the aspect of 
involvement in mediated transnationalism from other typologies created to 
characterize the Russian speaking migrant background population in Estonia 
(e.g. Lauristin 2012, Rikman et al 2013). Among the Estonian Russian-speaking 
population, common uniting practices are the following of Russian-origin and 
Russian-language media, and the existence a number of real-life or social media 
contacts abroad (Vihalemm 2008, Vihalemm 2011, Vihalemm & Leppik 2014, 
                                                 
2  Concepts of migrant adaptation have varied across time and space. Although assimilation 
is a concept more used in the USA and the concept of integration is more common in Europe 
(Modood 2005), they both refer to migrant adaptation. Therefore, in this thesis, instead of 
segmented assimilation, the term of segmented integration is used. 
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Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). According to the concept of transnationalism, some 
migrants and their descendants remain strongly influenced by their continuing 
ties to their home country or by social networks that stretch across national 
borders (Glick Schiller et al 1995). This means that individuals can be phy-
sically away but mentally present in geographically remote places or societies 
(Vertovec 2004a). The development and wide affordability of communication 
through technological devices makes mediated cross-border activities part of the 
everyday life and experience with ancestral countries or linguistic-cultural 
diasporic networks. In turn, these activities and experiences are acquired by 
younger generations. The possibilities for everyday mediated participation in 
remote societies challenge the processes of integration and assimilation. On the 
one hand, transnational practices may reinforce social integration in the host 
society (De Haas 2005, Gustafson 2002); on the other hand however, these 
practices may suppress the formation of a sense of belonging to the host society 
(Vasta 2010). 
At the same time, it is important to note that these everyday cross-border 
communications are not only characteristic to migrant communities, but also 
affect the native populations by challenging perceptions about the “local”, “us” 
and “them”. In Estonia, 61% of native Estonians (compared to 50% of Estonian 
residents from other ethnicities) have relatives or friends who have moved to 
work/study and live abroad during recent years. Additionally, 7% have them-
selves lived abroad recently and 43% (compared to 42% of Estonian residents 
from other ethnicities) communicate via social media with people who have 
emigrated from Estonia (“Me. The World. The Media” 2014, authors’ calcula-
tions). Thus, a considerable part of the native population has some personal 
experience with the cross-border communication networks and the role of the 
home country and people in the everyday life of migrants. Therefore, in this 
new situation (compared to the 1990s), it is appropriate to investigate how 
transnational (media) practices are associated with the ongoing segmented 
integration of Russian-speaking population in Estonia. 
The aim of my thesis is to explain the segmented integration process of the 
Estonian migrant-background, Russian-speaking populations and assess the role 
of transnational media use and cross-border communication (i.e. mediated 
transnationalism) in this process. I empirically operationalize the concept of 
segmented integration and mediated transnationalism and measure them based 
on a sample from the Estonian Russian-speaking population. I explain how 
mediated transnationalism contributes to different forms of segmented inte-
gration of the Russian-speaking population into Estonian society. From another 
angle, I also consider how local integration shapes transnational media related 
practices, particularly in times of geopolitical tensions between sending and 
receiving countries.  
Based on data from the Me. The World. The Media (2014) survey, I connect 
the empirical indicators of transnationalism (Study V) with the indicators of 
integration (see also Vihalemm & Leppik 2017, Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). 
Then, I describe the main types of segmented integration, characterize people 
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belonging to these patterns and explore their transnational media use (Study 
III, Study IV, Study V). By combining the quantitative data with the evidence 
from qualitative studies (Study III, IV), I give some insights into how trans-
national media use contributes to segmented integration. 
My thesis consists of three main research questions and related sub-ques-
tions:  
 
1. What are the main characterizing types of segmented integration among the 
Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations? (Study I, II, V) 
1.1. What are the main types of integration across domains of social life 
among the Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations?  
1.2. What is the socio-demographic characterization of integration types? 
 
2. How does media consumption relate to segmented integration among the 
Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations? (Study III, IV, V) 
2.1. What are universalities and peculiarities of the media use of main types 
of integration?  
2.2. How is political news concerning geopolitical conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine interpreted across the main types of integration and media use? 
 
3. How does the mediated transnationalism of the Estonian Russian-speaking 
migrant background populations is related to their segmented integration? 
(Study III, IV, V) 
3.1. How is mediated transnationalism related to main types of integration? 
3.2. How do local integration and transnational practice shape social agency? 
 
In the Estonian context, this approach is a novel one since the mutual modes of 
inter-connectedness have not, until now, been comprehensively analysed. In the 
earlier analyses (Dougherty & Kaljurand 2015, Liebich 2019) the role of Russia 
is considered to be, if not dangerous to, then definitely not supporting of, local 
social involvement. I argue that because of the widespread following of Russian 
and/or international media and via personal cross-border communications, the 
transnational media and communication practices of Russian speakers in Esto-
nia interact with the local integration in different ways. These different modes 
of interaction mean that local integration and mediated transnationalism can 
exist in mutually synergistic and competing relationships. Another novel aspect 
is that I look at transnationalism mainly through the lenses of media use and 
mediated interpersonal communication and not so much as a personal mobility 
related practice. The applied informative value of my work is the comprehen-
sive empirical analysis of media use within the various types of segmented 
integration. This offers explanation how media use interacts with participation 
in the labour market, political processes and public sphere.  
In addition to the cover article, this thesis consists of five studies. In Study I, 
I use the immigrant population survey from 2008 to compare assimilation and 
segregation strategies in order to find out which of these is more beneficial 
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when it comes to achieving certain subjective social status and mobility. Study 
II is based on a European social survey (different rounds) which focuses on 
young people’s political participation and their expectations of it. More speci-
fically, the article analyses what are the major predictors for the network-based 
and horizontal political practices. Study III focuses on the language skills and 
media-related practices of the Russian-speaking populations and combines 
quantitative data with focus-groups data in order to find out how multilingua-
lism and media related practices in times of geopolitical crisis are intercon-
nected. Study IV explores the connections between identity and media practices 
by relying on mostly qualitative data. The focus of this study was on the com-
parison of Estonian and Latvian Russian-speaking audiences and considering 
the connections between media use, trust strategies and identity development in 
the context of political (Ukrainian) crisis. Lastly, Study V explains the societal 
structures that shape people’s everyday practices and, vice versa, considers how 
specific ways of integration influence everyday life (based on Me. The World. 
The Media survey). Additionally, in Study V, the Russian speakers’ transnatio-
nal media use is analysed according to integration types in order to find out how 
integration types and cross-border media use and communication are connected.  
In addition to the first introductory chapter, my thesis consists of six more 
chapters. Chapters two and three define the theoretical concepts and empirical 
assumptions of the research. The fourth chapter gives an overview of the metho-
dological solutions used in the thesis and includes the ethical considerations. 
Chapter five provides an overview of the results and empirical findings in 
connection with the research questions. Chapter six discusses the findings 
within the wider scholarly context and practical implications in Estonian society 
and presents the conclusions structured according the research questions pro-
vided above in this chapter.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Migration has greatly shaped the world’s history, starting from Homo Erectus´s 
journey from Northern Africa to Europe and finishing with the current major 
and minor migration crises taking place today. As said by Ozkazanc-Pan 
(2019), migration has been a main driving force behind social transformations: 
increasing mobility of people might change the political, social, cultural and 
economic structure of the receiving societies (Castles et al 20143). Since people 
are crossing international borders every day, migration and subsequent prob-
lems or political crises have been intensively researched and hotly debated pub-
licly. Many researchers consider migration and the resulting diversity as one of 
the most prioritized and emotional topics in modern societies in the political 
field as well in the people’s everyday lives (Castles et al 2014, Green & 
Staerkle 2013). 
Migration and the mutual adaptation of newcomers and hosting societies are 
complex processes which are influenced by very different factors: what is the 
origin country, what has caused the migration (voluntary/involuntary, labour 
etc.), how big is the co-ethnic population in the destination country, what is the 
will and readiness to be involved in processes taking place in the destination 
country etc. The notion that mobile people can maintain different kind of 
relationships (economic, political etc.) in several countries or territories at the 
same time is challenging and expanding our understanding of theories of migra-
tion and the differences it brings with it. The aim of this theoretical chapter is to 
give a brief overview about different approaches to integration by considering 
both how the different meanings of migrant adaptation are handled and 
developed in time, and also how integration and transnationalism are intercon-
nected. The latter helps to contextualise the approach in order to explain the 
integration of the Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background population 
and related issues. 
 
  
2.1 Main concepts of integration and  
their development in time (and space) 
The adaptation of immigrants became topical in the early 20th century in the 
United States (U.S.). Hirschman and Mogford (2009, p.898) point out that the 
decades surrounding 1900 were the age of industrialization, accompanied by 
urbanisation and immigration: by 1920 over one third of the U.S. population 
belonged to an immigrant community. Most of the migrants at that time came 
from Europe – Poland, Austria-Hungary, Russia etc. (see Bulmer 1986). The 
beginning of the 1900s also marks a new era in (U.S.) sociological studies. In 
1918, two sociological pioneers, Thomas and Znaniecki, wrote the book “The 
                                                 
3  5th edition. First edition was published in 1993.  
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Polish Peasant in Europe and America”. In their book, which was the first major 
empirical study about immigration in general, the authors tried to explain social 
problems by taking both individuals and their surrounding society into account 
(see Treas 2014, Triandafyllidou 1996). Early works of immigration handled 
questions related to voluntary and permanent forms of migration, especially 
groups migrating towards the U.S. Since people shared similarities in terms of 
their background, for years, people who migrated were eventually expected to 
assimilate into the receiving country’s society. Migration was seen as a process 
of leaving the homeland and adapting into a new society. The term “assimi-
lation” was implemented by sociologists belonging to the Chicago school in the 
beginning of 20th century. The term marked the overtaking of host society´s 
norms and traditions and becoming gradually similar to the host country’s 
majority population. According to Park and Burgess (1921) assimilation was a 
“process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the 
memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing 
their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural 
life (p. 736). This was later elaborated by Park (1950)4, Warner and Srole 
(1954) and Gordon (1964). In early works of assimilation, immigration was 
seen as a permanent process, which ends with migrants being incorporated into 
the society; however, from the 1960s the forms and amounts of migration 
changed (Green & Staerkle 2013). As migrants came to U.S. and Western 
European countries in search of better economic opportunities, from former 
colonies and hired in quantities as a foreign work force, migration become in-
creasingly politicized (Treas 2014, Kivisto 2002, Jürgenson 2016). At the same 
time, the receiving societies have become more complex (Bartram et al 2014) 
and culturally diverse in order to provide a unidirectional way of incorporation 
(Deaux 2006) because of inner fragmentation (Bartram et al 2014).  
The critique of assimilation theory intensified in the end of the 1980s and in 
the beginning of the 1990s (see Portes & Bach 1985, Glazer 1993). As Nagel 
(2009) brings out, overlooking ethnicity and race and highlighting white, 
middle class society as a norm to which migrants should aspire, stood in sharp 
contrast with reality. The assimilation concept was criticised as entailing an 
ethnocentric and functionalist bias by Treas (2014) who pointed out the need for 
migrant populations to change without any efforts from the side of titular 
population. In line with these criticisms, more scholarly and practical attention 
was paid to the conditions of the host society. Based on the U.S. example, Alba 
and Nee (1997) stated that assimilation requires steps including readiness for 
acceptance and change from the native population. Even earlier studies by 
Portes and Zshou (1993) proposed the concept of segmented assimilation, 
which states that migrant groups adapt to a host society differently depending 
on various factors. On the one hand, they are influenced by their social and 
                                                 
4  According to Park (1950, p. 281) assimilation was process “which people of diverse 
racial origins and different cultural heritages, occupying a common territory, achieve cultural 
solidarity sufficient to sustain a national existence.  
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economic resources, families, and communities. On the other hand, policies in 
the receiving country, attitudes of the natives and the existence and size of a co-
ethnic community also have an effect (Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Portes 2007). 
The authors suggested three possible outcomes for adaptation: straight line i.e. 
within time, immigrants assimilate more; bumpy-line, which means there are 
setbacks, and third, segmented or structural multidirectional assimilation (see 
also Portes & Zhou 1993, Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Treas 2014).   
Building on their concept of segmented assimilation, the authors also pro-
posed the concept of “selective acculturation” meaning that migrants accept 
some elements of the host culture, but at the same time reject other elements 
(Portes & Rumbaut 2001). This accepting and rejecting of various elements 
results from challenges, such as racism or a segmented labour market, in the 
adaptation process. Thus, migrant population groups assimilate into different 
segments of society. The upward mobility migrants may strive to be similar to 
the titular majority group and abandon their ethnic origin, while low status 
immigrants might choose the downward trajectory and identify with the most 
disadvantaged minorities (Portes & Rumbaut 2006, Green & Staerkle 2013). 
The development of concepts related to segmented assimilation contributed 
to the return of the core concept of assimilation in academic and political 
discourse with certain transformations in the beginning of the 2000-ies (Bru-
baker 2001). Even though the terminal end of assimilation is still projected as 
the “decline of an ethnic distinction and cultural and social differences” (Alba 
& Nee 2003 p. 14), assimilation is no longer conceptualised as a uniform, one-
way process; rather, different outcomes that form in the interaction between 
immigrants themselves and their receiving society are projected (Alba & Nee 
2003).  
One model of such outcomes that has become popular in many European 
countries, including Estonia, was offered by John Berry (1997, 2006). Berry 
reduces assimilation as an option in the immigrant acculturation process, which 
follows the following initial concept: assimilation marks a process where the 
minority population adopts the majority’s culture, identity and traditions. The 
other options in his 4-dimensional acculturation5 model, otherwise known as 
cultural convergence, are: separation, integration and marginalisation (see Berry 
1997, 2006). Separation marks the occasions when individuals reject the 
dominant/host culture because they want to preserve their own culture and 
prefer to relate with the host society through an ethnic community and/or ethnic 
(economic) enclaves; marginalization refers to a situation when bonds are kept 
with neither the culture of origin nor the dominant/host culture; integration 
refers to cases when migrants adopt the dominant cultural norms, but at the 
same time, also maintain the culture of their own country of origin (Berry 1997, 
2006). Green and Staerkle (2013) have elaborated on Berry’s initial concept 
                                                 
5  Bartram and colleagues (2014, p. 8) say acculturation is “the process by which the 
cultural patterns of distinct groups change when those groups come into contact with each 
other, and, sometimes resulting the groups becoming less distinct culturally”.  
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with the idea of an interactive acculturation model that considers migrants’ 
choices to be formed as a result of mutual interactions with members of the 
receiving society. Thus, the outcome is not a “pure” choice of either party, but 
rather an outcome of their inter-relationships (Green & Staerkle 2013, Bourhis 
et al 1997).  
In the context of multiple scholarly definitions, in both applied research and 
policy documents, one of the most widespread terms about migrant settlement 
and adaptation has been integration (Castles et al 2014). While there is no 
agreed scholarly definition of this term (Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore 
2017), the European Union defines integration as a “dynamic, two-way process 
of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States” 
(Council of the European Union 2004, p.17&18). Involvement and adaptation in 
society encompasses many aspects of social life, most often economic and 
political. Since integration into various spheres is often a pre-requisition for 
naturalisation, and vice versa, and because non-existent citizenship could boost 
social exclusion (ibid.), Hansen (2003) suggests competency in the local lan-
guage and citizenship as key indicators of integration. Integration enables immi-
grants to navigate key social institutions (Bartram et al 2014) and grants access 
to desired resources in society (Remennick 2003). It further allows immigrants 
to adopt necessary cultural and social capital in order to success in receiving 
society (Kwok-bun & Plüss 2013). In general, if assimilation assumes that 
immigrants acquire similar norms and traditions, then integration seems to be a 
more complex and instrumental process of adaptation. Those who integrate into 
a society are required to have the necessary abilities to use society´s resources 
and obey the rules in multiple ways without the presumption of becoming 
similar.  
Both assimilation and integration were built on the assumption of a time-
dependent process: the longer immigrants spend in country, the more they assi-
milate or integrate. From the second decade of the 2000s, scholars speak about 
personally multidimensional involvements that are depended on the life course. 
Immigrants, irrespective of their new residence society, are equipped with 
different access to cultural, social, economic and political resources (Kwok-bun 
& Plüss 2013). Both Treas (2014), and Elder and colleagues (2003) point out 
that adaptation due to the consequences of mobility and/or a chance in cultural 
context depends on the life course and stress experienced from an individual 
point of view (see also Morawska 2018). Since (re)adaptation is affected by 
many different fields of life, multidimensionality is fundamental when descri-
bing migration experience (Treas 2014).  
In parallel with the personal agency-centred and multi-dimensional ap-
proaches to the migrant’s adaptation/incorporation into the host society, another 
theoretical stream called transnationalism appeared. This is based on the human 
geography that contributed to the “spatial turn” in the social sciences. Trans-
nationalism, which is discussed more in chapter 2.2., approaches the migrant 
populations’ interrelations with the host and sending societies through migrant 
networks, or interpersonal ties linking friends and community members in their 
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places of origin and destination (Massey et al 1998). These ties or networks 
shape the decision to migrate since possibilities to get help in finding work or 
other support and create remittance economies influence the ways individuals 
are incorporated into society (Bartram et al 2014). The interpersonal and institu-
tional structures of migrant networks (Portes 1995) contribute to the uneven 
distribution of migration flows across countries (Bartram et al 2014). These 
networks provide social capital for individual migrants to settle in the host 
societies and coordinate the movement of remittances and business knowledge 
(Portes 1995). The networked social capital also creates segmentation and 
inequalities because the exchange of needed resources (money, information) are 
not equally accessible to all members of migrant networks (Poros 2011). 
Populations, which are networked and share similar practices and loyalties but 
are physically dispersed across several territories are called diasporas6 (Bartram 
et al 2014). It is said that old diasporic cultural patterns which were dis-
appearing within newer generations have now, thanks to the new technologies, 
been reinforced and transformed into new transnational communities (Vertovec 
1999). This transformation is in line with many other socio-cultural patterns 
(Castells 1996). A diaspora implies bounded communities who are concerned 
about the maintenance of physical/symbolic borders and where the membership 
is ethnically and/or religiously limited; transnational communities however, 
have lower barriers to entrance based feelings of belonging (Faist 2000). Kok 
and Rogers (2017) note that the development of access to information com-
munication technologies (ICT) and wide use of the Internet shifts diasporic 
allegiances towards de-territorialised, transnational forms, and facilitates the 
construction of a hybrid identity and sense of belonging to an imagined trans-
national community. According to Guarnizo and colleagues (2003), diasporic 
allegiances transform and are shaped by the ways migrants get involved in the 
new society of residence. Since digital diasporas re-create alliances with the 
help of digital communications, diasporas can be decades/ generations older 
than the actual mobility event (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004). Transnational 
communication within the dispersed networks (i.e. based on the same language 
but with otherwise low-entering-barrier) can also take on a cosmopolitan 
character. Cosmopolitanism is boosted not only by more frequent travelling and 
general mobility, but also by global hybrid (popular) culture (Tsuda 2003) and 
contested politics within and beyond nation states (Cheah & Robbins 1998). 
According to Colic-Peisker (2010), those with higher mobility and stronger 
professional identity are more likely to adopt a cosmopolitan identity or 
attitude. The role of media cannot be underestimated here (Nessi and Bailey 
                                                 
6  Diaspora in general marks part of population living dispersely in other territories while 
still incorporating a collectively self-identified ethnic group. Diaspora is defined as 
“expatriate minority communities, that are dispersed from an original center to at least two 
peripheral places and maintain a memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland. 
And that believe they are not- and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host country, 
and whose consciousness and solidarity as a group are importantly defined by this 
continuing relationship with the homeland” (Safran 1991 p. 83).   
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2014). According to Glick Schiller and colleagues (2011), having a cosmo-
politan outlook means being open and rooted at the same time. Other authors 
regard cosmopolitanism as the opposite to a locally rooted culture (e.g. Kim 
2011, Christensen 2012). Beck (2006) suggests that cosmopolitanism questions 
the principal ways of life, memory, identity, power, and politics that can no 
longer be understood and evaluated locally, but only globally.  
Whereas cosmopolitan is based on non-local, less-rooted, hybrid culture, 
another concept that also emerged during the first decade of the 2000s is multi-
culturalism. Multiculturalism pointed out diversity and considered that cultural 
heterogeneity between social groups positively affects social life (Kymlicka 
1995, Green & Staerkle 2013). Castles and colleagues (2014) point out that 
migration and the resulting ethnic and racial diversity are very emotive subjects 
in contemporary societies because nations feel the cultural, political, economic 
changes to the host societies themselves. Multiculturalism can therefore also be 
considered as a protective reaction against the danger of global hybridization; 
by nurturing and institutionalising diversity, ethnic identities are believed to be 
protected from melting together. This idea, however, did not find profound 
support in the long run. As Green and Staerkle (2013) have pointed out, multi-
culturalism has received criticism for undermining national cohesion, promoting 
segregation, making intergroup relations worse etc.  
In 2007, Vertovec introduced the concept of super-diversity as a condition 
which “is distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased 
number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, 
socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants which 
unfolds in different nations and societies” (p. 1024). According to the authors, 
the aim of applying this concept is to describe the “transformative diversifica-
tion of diversity” (p. 1025). Super-diversity is multidimensional and, according 
to Grillo (2015), takes place in at least in four dimensions: ethnicity, socio-legal 
and political status, socio-cultural diversity and economic diversity, and inequa-
lity. Additionally, super-diversity in different societies varies depending on the 
stage of migration as well as the human and social capital migrants have 
(Meissner & Vertovec 2014, Crul 2016).  
 
 
2.2 Transnationalism 
The 1990s marked the beginning of a turn in patterns of mobility (Urry 2000) 
during which, with the development of information and communication techno-
logy, new forms of mobility such as virtual or imaginative travel emerged and 
were combined with physical travel (Sheller & Urry 2006). These kinds of 
mobilities reached beyond geographical borders without physical movement 
(Urry 2000, Cresswell 2002) and created new identities and micro geographies 
in everyday life (Cresswell 2011 p. 551). This provided a fertile ground for the 
quickly spreading popularity of the idea of transmigrants initially published by 
Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Szanton Blanc (1995, see also 
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Glick Schiller et al 1992). The authors suggested that migrants in the U.S. and 
Europe should be conceptualised as transmigrants because, in addition to 
settling into a new society, they are simultaneously engaged in other (home) 
countries. Fast technological communication capabilities and increasing mobi-
lity means that these multiple engagements are naturally sustainable and part of 
a normal lifestyle. Transmigrants are people who are involved in the everyday 
life (including at the institutional level) of a host country, but at the same time, 
maintain connections, build institutions, conduct transactions, and influence 
local and national events in the countries from which they migrated (Glick 
Schiller et al 1995). Transnationalism refers to multiple ties and interactions 
with people or institutions across national borders held via long-distance com-
munication networks and virtual arenas (Vertovec 1999). Essentially, this 
means that sociocultural groups are no longer defined territorially (Monsutti 
2010).  
Greiner and Sakdapolrak (2013) point out that sometimes translocality is 
used as a synonym for transnationalism since translocality encompasses mobi-
lity, migration, circulation and spatial interconnectedness which are not re-
strained by national boundaries. At the same time, Smith and Guarnizo (1998) 
refer to translocality to indicate that relationships between multiple places do 
not necessarily reach beyond political borders. Therefore, although transnatio-
nalism and translocality are slightly different concepts, they are treated as 
synonyms in this thesis. 
Double or multiple forms of connectedness and loyalties are reported among 
migrant populations in different countries (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007, Glick 
Schiller & Levitt 2007). Levitt (2003) calls it living in two societies at the same 
time. This conjoint style of living is the central claim of the theory of trans-
nationalism. In the transnational view, the migrant’s integration into society is 
not just adaptation to the society according to its culture and rules, but also the 
acceptance of migrants without expecting them to abandon their networks and 
backgrounds (Kwok-bun & Plüss 2013). Portes and colleagues (1999) bring out 
several types of transnational activities, including economic, social, cultural and 
political ones. In terms of the networks and connections of migrant groups, 
transnationalism appears among previously settled as well as new migrant 
groups. Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) point out that integration issues cannot 
be handled within the host society’s state borders alone, but also need to involve 
international organizations and networks through which ideas, practices, and 
resources are exchanged and organized. On the individual level, people’s con-
nections to the social spaces have changed (Glick Schiller et al 1992, Castells 
1996). Furthermore, virtual spaces have principally transformed the place-
related loyalties and people have become multi-space actors (Appadurai 1995). 
In these fields, people combine various ways of being and belonging in different 
contexts by continuously dealing with multidimensional social relations and 
creating connections between different places and their own multiple positions 
(Smith 2005, Watters 2011). According to Smith (2005), the way transmigrants 
tend to act upon structural economic conditions and make their own history also 
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makes the relationships between identity, place and mobility complex. Simi-
larly, Tsuda (2003) argues that transnational identity is based on simultaneous 
connections and feelings of belongings to multiple countries. The authors argue 
that traditional political identities (Mandaville 1999) or identities based on 
cultural and place (Butcher 2009) are transformed and formed from below 
rather than being shaped by states (Pawlak & Goždziak 2019). Actors in social 
fields face social expectations, cultural values and ways of communication, 
which are shaped by more than one social, economic, and political systems 
(Levitt, 2011). These belongings are created via transnational practices. Verto-
vec (2004b) says that individuals consciously and unconsciously take different 
dispositions7 to create their everyday practices and set milestones for personal 
goals and social interaction. 
Guarnizo (2000) distinguishes more generally between two types of trans-
national practices. He defines core transnationalism as involving activities that 
are practised on an everyday basis. Expanded transnationalism, meanwhile, 
includes occasional practices such as responses to political crisis or natural 
disasters (ibid.). Core transnationals stay involved in the politics of their home 
country via electoral or non-electoral means, follow media from their home 
country on an everyday basis, or are in touch with their home country in other 
ways. Others become active only on special occasions such as highly contested 
elections or natural disasters (Guarnizo et al 2003). It is appropriate in this 
context to refer to the idea of a transnational habitus proposed by Guarnizo 
(1997). According to him, transnational habitus encompasses a set of dualistic 
dispositions, which leads migrants to react to local situations in ways which are 
not always predictable for their partners. He draws an example from the Domi-
nican Republic: Dominicans living outside of the ethnic homeland maintain a 
dual reference frame through which they compare situation here and there. This 
means aspects of life here and there are perceived as complimentary and 
constantly in the background (ibid.). By the same token, Golbert (2001) 
explored Ukrainian Jews and found that they evaluate their everyday expe-
riences, past and future with a double consciousness which is based on their 
transnational ties and conception of self. Their daily reality, according to 
Golbert (2001), is seen as an intersection of ideas, relationships, histories and 
identities, where, at the same time, transnational practices are localised. As 
Vertovec (2004b p. 22) similarly notes: “values, perceptions and aspirations that 
may be grounded in a pre-migration setting get situated in relation to structural 
opportunities and constraints in post-migration”. This state of mind and prac-
tical (cognitive) skills are said to provide a specific form of social agency 
(Lacroix 2014). In Study IV, we considered actor repertoires, i.e. potential 
ways of acting and thinking in a particular situation, and argued that the range 
of actor repertoires is wider among transnational people. Because of their 
multiple ties, transnational actors’ repertoires are less stringent and contain 
more alternatives compared with non-transnational actors. Levitt (2011) argues 
                                                 
7  Elaboration of Bourdieu´s concept of habitus (1977, 1990). 
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that transnational structures are actually liberating and increase agency for the 
individual. Some researchers report further that integration/assimilation and 
transnational engagements are mutually reinforcing (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002, 
Portes et al 2002, Guarnizo et al 2003, Cela et al 2013); the interaction between 
integration and transnationalism however, can also take other configurations 
(more detail in Chapter 2.4.). 
The various daily and extraordinary activities people undertake within the 
transnational social spaces to respond to local and long-distance social obliga-
tions and belongings are labled as transnational activities (Guarnizo et al 2003). 
One of the most researched among these activities is political participation. 
Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) describe acts of solidarity to crises or other 
events in the homeland by lobbying, demonstrating, organizing or campaigning. 
Remote voting has also received a significant amount of attention (e.g. Lafleur 
2014, Ahmadov & Sasse 2015). In general, previous researchers report that 
political activism exercised in different countries tends to be reinforced: partici-
pation in political organizations and voting in elections in the homeland and 
host country are related (DeSipio et al 2003, Guarnizo et al 2003, Koopmans et 
al 2005). Itzigsohn and Villacres (2008) have noted that non-electoral partici-
pation (e.g. participation in community and charity organizations) in one 
country may encourage electoral participation. Participation in civic-minded 
organizations helps people to learn how they function and therefore achieve the 
necessary confidence to participate in political activities (see also Verba et al 
1995, Ayala 2000, Galston 2001). Civic actions can also be performed in both 
the host and sending country regardless of political citizenship (Glick Schiller & 
Fouron 2001). Those citizens claiming and acting in relation to more than one 
government are referred to as transborder citizens by Glick Schiller (2005, 
p.48). Lacroix (2014) says that these individuals have taken on a transnational 
subjectivity to locate oneself in an interconnected world. This means people’s 
personal experiences and perceptions of different systems either support or 
constrain their participation in different spheres of a new society of residence 
(ibid.). Transnational organisations and political or economic actors signifi-
cantly shape the context and process of integration (Portes & Fernández-Kelly 
2015). 
Not only are economic activities, such as the sending and receiving of finan-
cial remittances, widely researched in this process, but the exchange of social 
remittances like cultural forms (see also Hannerz 1996), social capital, and ideas 
have also received much attention (Levitt 1998, Eckstein 2010). Material re-
mittances and the subsequent flows of money from migrants to relatives and 
others in the country of origin can be an important contribution to the receiving 
society (Bartram et al 2014). These material remittances also carry social value 
as they affect traditional forms of economy in receiving contexts (Parrado 
2017). By sending money, migrants at the same time send non-physical goods 
like ideas and values that shape social discourses and practices in their personal 
network with members in other countries (Mittelman 2000, Boccagni & Decimo 
2013) and create a sense of belonging to the community of origin (Carling 
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2014). Besides economic remittances, migrants also transfer technological, 
political, social and cultural remittances to their home communities (see Levitt 
1998, Fitzgerald 2000, Goldring 2003). These types of remittances can further 
contribute to funding institutional activities (Markley 2011). Goldring (2003) 
notes that while economic remittances are usually conceived of as unidi-
rectional flows from host countries to the sending countries, social and other 
remittances may be multi-directional and mutually beneficial for both countries.  
In the cultural domain, one topic of transnational mediated practices which 
has been well researched, is virtual participation in celebrating important days. 
Research into this theme has reported that such participation creates feelings of 
togetherness and causes interruptions in the local everyday lives of individuals 
(Birth 2012, Rau 2015, Shove 2015). According to Madianou and Miller 
(2012), technological opportunities and communications have made remote 
cultural participation easier for migrant communities. For example, Christian-
sen’s (2019) investigations into Mexicans living in US found that practising 
rituals via Twitter enables migrants to experience their home culture while 
maintaining identity and forging ethnic relations.  
The following subchapter addresses the important set of media consumption 
practices in the political, economic and cultural domains. 
 
 
2.2.1 Media and transnationalism 
In a globalised world, with the help of technology, new cultures are introduced 
to immigrants long before they leave their homes (see Massey et al 2002, Treas 
2014). Communication capabilities also help migrants to prevent sharp breaks 
in their personal relationships (Treas 2014). Nowadays, transnational activities 
largely take place with the help of communication (Guarnizo et al 2003), and 
new, cheap, web-based media technologies are widely accessible and have 
become part of, and change everyday lives (Vertovec 2004a). The way that 
digital media and different ways to communicate create so-called communi-
cative connection means that current migrants’ media culture differs from pre-
vious eras (see Diminescu 2008). Couldry (2004) postulates that media prac-
tices should not be separated from other everyday practices because people have 
incorporated media into their everyday lives in unnoticeable, routine and 
socially learned way.  
The media impact on the lives of transnational migrants has been inves-
tigated from various prisms. From one angle, authors discuss the general impact 
of transnational mediated communications (both mass media and private social 
networks) on local integration and loyalties. National media cultures also face 
possible pressures as media products are distributed across different national 
borders and global connectivity grows (Hepp 2009). The ability to always be 
connected might also hinder involvement in a new society since this connection 
provides alternative perceptions of norms and values which may not coincide 
with those dominating the host society. Some authors say that when media has 
25 
the ability to inform and connect people over time and space, it has the potential 
to contribute to both people´s de-territorialisation and to their re-territo-
rialisation (Morley 2000, Moores 2006). Other authors argue that media enables 
the consolidation of pro-diasporic identities, creates mobilization around a 
common diasporic identity, and encourages participation in relevant activities 
(Adamson 2012). From another angle, authors have argued that communicative 
connectivity is becoming more and more de-territorialized (Kok & Rogers 
2017). New hybrid e-identities are constructed based on online activities and 
new e-diasporic spaces, which exceed territorial constraints (Diminescu 2008). 
This means that the borders where cultural thickening is taking place do not 
have to correspond to territorial borders. This makes it hard to find reference 
points for constructing a national community (Hepp 2009). Appadurai (1996) is 
sceptical about the positive impact of media on the local integration process. He 
says that maintaining connections with sending countries hinders the formation 
of any loyalty towards a new place of residence. Transnational mediascapes 
create an imagined world, which only seems real when culture is disconnected 
from a specific place. This has a de-territorializing impact and risks creating 
feelings of disappointment or conflicts among de-territorialized groups (Appa-
durai 1996). Other researchers have also argued that highly mediated everyday 
life impedes migrants from relating to the local cultural and political space 
(Georgiou 2012).  
Besides maintaining interpersonal digital communication across borders, 
following daily news is something that could also connect individuals with 
public life in the host society. Martin and Rizvi (2014) argue that media use 
always happens in certain places and this fact itself represents a practice of habit 
through which the meaning of place is created. In general, media researchers 
have argued that, by following the media of both host and sending societies, 
migrants are making quick and everyday comparative acts and interpreting 
events and issues for themselves (Robins & Aksoy 2002). Some authors also 
speak about the “double consciousness” of transnational audiences (Golbert 
2001), which results in a critical view of media content. On the contrary, other 
authors have found that the “interpreting lenses” are still based on either the 
values and perceptions of ones’ society of origin (Vertovec 2004a) or on the 
media culture of the host society (Adams & Ghose 2003, Hepp et al 2012). 
Research has found that both strategies are exercised among individual users 
(Study IV, Vihalemm & Juzefovics 2020).  
Thus, the general views among researchers are rather doubtful that trans-
nationally mediated communication could encourage double loyalties and be-
longings. The research results concerning the following of news suggests three 
principal pathways: a) interpretations of the daily news based on the norms and 
values of the host society which thereby contribute towards involvement in the 
local society; b) interpretations of the daily news basde on the norms and values 
of the sending society which thereby contribute towards a set of diasporic 
norms and values; c) interpretations that enhance a critical yet autonomous view 
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about the issues that are happening which are based on a comparison and strive 
towards a certain mediating/in-between position.  
The next chapter will give an overview of the more general interplay 
between transnationalism and local integration, which can also offer a frame for 
the conceptualisation for media use analysis.  
 
 
2.3 Interactions between migrant integration and 
transnationalism 
In the last decades, the most prospective concepts explaining migrant popula-
tion incorporation into a host society are integration (especially because of its 
widespread practical use in European political contexts) and transnationalism 
(because of its relevance in the modern digitalised world). The former of these 
is a complex and contested term which has been used to capture or describe 
complex processes like social mobility, residential patterns, cultural adaptation 
etc. and which is interpreted through both private and public spheres (Kivisto 
2003, Ehrkamp 2006, Pennix et al 2008, Bianisa 2013) and focuses on identity. 
Transnationalism maintains that social relations occurring in specific locations 
constitute place (Massey 1992). By focusing on place, it is possible to exceed 
the borders of social networks and thereby emphasize transnationalism. In this 
sense, place and identity are the intersections where transnationalism and inte-
gration meet (Bianisa 2013). 
While at first transnationalism was seen as an alternative to assimilation and 
integration because it took mobility into account but didn’t prioritize the nation-
state over it, Ren and Liu (2015) stress that transnationalism has become the 
dominant theoretical framework in migration studies. In recent years however, 
researchers have found limitations in terms of migrant transnationalism (ibid.). 
Ren and Liu (2015) distinguish between three sets of limiting factors: the role of 
politics and states in terms of shaping transnationalism are underestimated (see 
also Levitt & Jaworsky 2007); the way transnationalism affects different seg-
ments and generations differently has not gained enough attention; the impact of 
migrant’s multiple transnational involvements in host and origin countries in 
order to understand the dynamics of transnationalism needs to be analysed (Ren 
& Liu 2015). The final of these limitations raises a (justified) question about 
whether transnational ties can co-exist with integration into a host society (Erdal 
& Oeppen 2013, Ren & Liu 2015). Other researchers have found that trans-
national activities do exist in parallel with integration into the society of a new 
country of residence (see Kivisto 2001, Vertovec 2009, Erdal 2013, Erdal & 
Oeppen 2013). This raises yet another question about which connections 
between integration and transnationalism occur and what the nature of the 
relationship between these connections is. 
In what follows, I give an overview of the scholars’ views concerning the 
relationship between these two concepts, based mainly on Erdal and Oeppen’s 
(2013) work. I found their article comprehensive in terms of it’s of state-of-art 
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literature, and inspiring in its interpretation of empirical research results. The 
authors point out that integration and transnational connections exist simulta-
neously and that migrants’ transnational ties are the ones which impact the 
process of integration (Erdal & Oeppen 2013, Erdal & Lewicki 2016).  
Erdal and Oeppen (2013) distinguished four approaches about the inter-
relation between transnationalism and integration: alarmist, less alarmist but 
pessimistic, positive, and pragmatic. Vihalemm & Juzefovics (n.d.) have 
elaborated on this frame as shown in Table 1. 
The first approach proceeds from the idea of the competitive use of re-
sources. Authors who have approached the topic from the position of individual 
agents and analysed the logic behind how migrant incorporation in the host 
society might work have offered combinations of personal and societal/con-
textual factors that shape the pathways of integration. Many of these authors 
implicitly or explicitly proceed from the concept of resources (Kwok-Bun & 
Plüss (2013): their availability or shortage across the life-course (e.g. Treas 
2013) or in relation to the host society’s structural needs (Portes & Rumbaut 
2003). In analysing the inter-relations between transnationalism and local 
integration, Kivisto (2001) has posed the question about dependency, time and 
resources; does participation in transnational activities prevent people from 
learning the linguistic and socio-cultural skills that create independence, or does 
such participation makes demands on time and resources in a way that competes 
with the civic society of the host community (Kivisto 2001, Ley 2013)? In this 
rather materialistic view, transnationalism and integration are competing in 
either a dominance/subordination relationship or, as Erdal & Oeppen (2013) 
say, in an antagonistic one. 
International terrorism has brought questions of loyalty and trust to the fore-
ground in discussions surrounding the relationship between integration and 
transnationalism. Rather than considering the context of the receiving society, 
in this approach, transnational practices are explained as either a function of the 
migration process or as the cultural characteristics of the particular migrant 
group. The transnational activities of Muslim migrants in Western cities is 
regarded as a danger to integration in countries of settlement (Snel et al 2006). 
Because their transnational practices are integrated as a characteristics of 
Muslim migrants, or Islamic culture (Kundnani 2014), transnationalism and 
integration, in this case, are mutually incompatible. Erdal & Oeppen (2013) call 
this view on the existence of transnational ties (whether functional or symbolic) 
an alarmist view. The dual identity of migrants is believed to complicate or 
hinder their integration into the host society. Erdal and Oeppen (2013) stress 
that in cases of ideological or actual conflict between the host and sending 
societies, transnational connections are considered a threat to the majority 
population’s cultural cohesion. The transnational practices of migrants, such as 
watching diaspora TV channels, sending remittances or ways of dressing, facili-
tate fear and mistrust among the majority population. 
Erdal and Oeppen (2013) call the second approach pessimistic because of the 
structural-functional incompatibilities and difficulties that migrant populations 
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face in transferring human, social and cultural capitals to the host society’s 
structures and affordances. This motivates members of the migrant population 
to invest their resources and “engage in transnational livelihood strategies” (p. 
872). This position is in line with earlier works of transnationalism (ibid., see 
also Appadurai 1990, Basch et al 1994, Faist 1999). In certain occasions, this 
may also motivate the emergence of what Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 
(2005), drawing on Portes and Rumbaut’s concept of ‘reactive ethnicity’(2001), 
refer to as “reactive transnationalism”. This means that when the non-trans-
ferability of ones’ resources is perceived as discrimination, transnational identi-
ties undergo a “thickening” and participation in economic/sociocultural trans-
national activities intensifies. 
Both alarmist and pessimistic approaches to transnationalism and integration 
are, according to Erdal and Oeppen (2013), in an antagonistic relationship. 
 
In Erdal and Oeppen’s (2013) view, the positive position of integration and 
transnationalism considers that these processes could be mutually supportive or 
synergetic. For instance, Oeppen (2013) explains how visits to a former home 
country generates resources, which could be invested into integration. From 
another angle, Levitt (2003) shows how successful economic integration can 
fund transnational activities like investments in and visits to a home country. 
Thus, in economic terms, the interaction between transnationalism and integra-
tion has also been found to be mutually reinforcing (Portes et al 2002). Never-
theless, not all combinations of integration and transnational activities are bene-
ficial (Levitt 2003, Snel et al 2006, Tsuda 2012). 
According to Erdal and Oeppen (2013) the pragmatic position is considered 
to be leading in the literature on transnationalism and integration. In this 
approach, the reality of transnational actions is much more nuanced and 
complex. This means that transnational ties and integration processes can co-
exist because they are not considered to be a zero-sum game (ibid.). In the prag-
matic view, transnational means that migrants have developed social and 
symbolic ties with both the receiving and origin country (Faist 1999, Erdal & 
Oeppen 2013). These relationships may not be either beneficial nor antagonistic 
but simply additive and exist in parallel with one another (Erdal & Oeppen 
2013). For a majority of migrants, transnational activities are just part of their 
everyday lives (Erdal & Oeppen 2013) which can occasionally intensify (see 
also Guarnizo et al 2003). What Erdal and Oeppen (2013) stress is that migrants 
constantly have to balance the resources necessary to uphold ties with receiving 
and sending societies.  
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Erdal and Oeppen (2013) indicate that there are several ways to see the trans-
nationalism and integration of migrant populations as similar. For one, they are 
both social processes of adaptation in changing circumstances and result from 
spatial movement. They also both consist of simultaneous interactions and 
negotiations between different parties/groups. The processes of integration and 
transnationalism can and do appear at the same time and the interaction between 
them can be described as a “migrant balancing act”. Since migrants live locally 
as well transnationally, these processes are associated with several structural 
constraints and opportunities, and cover different dimensions (political, eco-
nomic etc.) provided by different societies (ibid.).  
 
 
2.4 Summarizing the theoretical concepts and  
establishing the frame for empirical study 
At the theoretical level, while all of the concepts previously referred to are 
mutually inter-related, there is lack of cohesive understanding of this relation-
ship among scholars. It seems that scholars like to mix and match the terms and 
play with them. For example, Barkan (1995) defines assimilation as a hybrid 
product of different processes like contact, acculturation, adaption, accommoda-
tion and integration. Whereas Gordon (1964) says that acculturation is the 
predecessor of structural assimilation, Berry considers assimilation as a basis to 
develop a multidimensional acculturation model. Researchers have also ap-
proached transnationalism differently (see more in Chapter 2.3).  
In order to avoid the sometime rather messy and overlapping definitions 
offered by different authors, I have deliberately created a rough mapping of the 
concepts to contextualize my work. This mapping is based on three basic 
questions: Who/what is the cognitive benchmark of the process? Is it important to 
explore how the process is projected/perceived over time from the researcher’s 
perspective? How is the process projected/perceived in spacial terms?  
The main concepts explained above are positioned in this frame in the 
following way: 
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The majority population of a destination country is actually at the core of the 
concept of assimilation (and in some interpretations of acculturation and inte-
gration close to this). Even though the concept deals with the deeds and 
thoughts of the migrant minority, it is the majority who provide the reference 
point in evaluating the process where maximum similarity is the desired out-
come. The borders are clear and peoples’ movement between them is accom-
panied with certain social consequences. Multiculturalism considers a notion of 
diversity between groups that forms a certain interactional sub-system where 
relations pass incremental changes but the sub-system of cultural diversity is 
maintained over time. The larger system (within which the diversity+based 
subsystems exist) is still a nation state which creates the legislative and institu-
tional conditions for the diversity. The concept of multi-dimensional/selective 
acculturation is between assimilation and multiculturalism and shares common 
features with both. The concept of segmented assimilation (integration) con-
siders the agents’ possession and access to resources, and distinguishes groups 
based on the combination of resources. Different processes can occur in parallel 
in society, and the process can go in different directions over the course of  
an agents’ life, or across different domains of social life. In the concept of  
transnationalism, the general frame is a network. Agents are principally seen  
as “node points” within the network. These agents have connections and 
(non)access to social spaces, and their agency derives from their connections. 
Although the concept of superdiversity embraces both the notions of segmented 
assimilation and transnationalism, it is quite vague in its hybridity.  
In this thesis I use the term segmented integration. This is a hybrid term 
developed on the basis of the segmented assimilation approach previously ex-
plained here. The term integration is used because it refers to the various 
possible outcomes and different ways migrant populations are involved in a new 
community which do not end with assimilation. Even though the multicultu-
ralism approach has been used in many studies of cultural associations and 
Estonian cultural autonomy policy, is not used in this thesis.  
The end of Soviet Union and restoration of Estonian Republic in the 
beginning of 1990s make up a critical period for the concept of assimilation. In 
the first years of nation building, the main political actions subscribed to the 
public discourse of protecting Estonian language and the titular nation. The first 
political documents focusing on the problems of the adaptation and incorpo-
ration of the Russian speaking migrant population were issued in the late 1990s 
(Chapter 3, Study V). In the political documents, the use of the term assimi-
lation was avoided and the concept of integration, which emphasizes the im-
portance of maintaining one’s own ethnic identity and in-group relations (Berry 
1997, 2006), was seen as ideal. In practical life, various concepts and implicit 
expectations circulated, and despite the existence of several versions of a State 
Integration Plan (Riiklik programm “Integratsioon Eesti Ühiskonnas 2000–
2007”, Eesti Lõimumiskava 2008–2013, Lõimuv Eesti 2020), we cannot speak 
about a common approach. Over the course of time, researchers and policy 
practitioners in Estonia recognized the need for approaches that would help to 
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explain the alternative approaches of integration. The segmented assimilation 
approach has been applied in studies addressing immigration generations and in 
considering the division of regions in Estonia. This approach has implicitly 
driven the practical language, education and media policies in Estonia. More 
efforts are invested into the younger generations with the hope that many of the 
problems will dissolve with newer generations (or just assumed that this will 
happen without much effort from policy-makers).  
I approach my research topics by applying two concepts, which seem to be 
relevant for the investigation of the Estonian Russian speaking migrant back-
ground population: segmented integration and transnationalism. I consider a 
combination of these concepts useful in Estonia (and other similar societies like 
Latvia, for example) where the migrant background community has “matu-
rated” with multiple historical layers and controversies. The changing of the 
minority group makes it impossible to measure and characterize the Russian-
speaking population adequately with a limited number of features.  
In what comes in the next chapter, I explain the empirical considerations for 
why I think that the combination of these two concepts is best suited to explore 
the integration of the Estonian Russian speaking migrant-background popu-
lation.  
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3. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND  
ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE INTEGRATION OF 
RUSSIAN-SPEAKING POPULATIONS 
3.1 Background and political conceptualisation of  
the integration of Estonian Russian-speaking populations 
In 1991, Estonia was a society with a considerable migrant population (about 
one third of the total population) (Tammaru 1997). In the previous 50 years, the 
Estonian population had grown, and its composition had drastically changed. 
The proportion of ethnic Estonians among the total population had declined to 
61,5% by 1989 (Tammaru 1997, Marksoo 2005, Tammur 2006). As noted in 
the “Introduction” of this thesis, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fast 
and radical economic changes, nation building and EU and NATO oriented 
integration was shocking for the migrant background populations. For these 
populations, Estonia’s re-gaining of independence marked a shift from being a 
“dominating” minority to minority without any advantages (Heidmets 1998). 
For native Estonians, the collective perception of an ideal Estonia from the first 
independence and between two world wars helped them to manage the tran-
sitional hardships. Meanwhile, migrant background populations had to manage 
the reinterpretation of the Soviet governance (including immigration policy) 
that had been the backbone of their self-determination (Kalev & Roosmaa 
2012). In the 1990s, the economic, linguistic, political and geographic divides in 
Estonian society made creating a common political space for further develop-
ments, irrespective of the chosen strategy, complicated (Pettai & Hallik 2002).  
In the beginning of the 1990s, civil society was weak. Due to the popula-
tion’s low trust towards the government, the top-down political decisions for 
comprehensive structural and institutional reforms received fairly modest public 
legitimacy (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). The support of international institu-
tions was important in order to become economically and politically inde-
pendent from Russia. At the same time, in seeking this support, Estonia was 
also motivated to seek solutions to the ethnic problems. Although Estonia’s 
initial ethno-politics was restitutional and the best solution many politicians 
could hope for was an emigration of migrant background populations8, this did 
not happen, and international organizations supported the idea of a patient step-
by-step evolution towards the integration of Russian speaking migrant popula-
tions into Estonian society (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). One demand, which 
was unacceptable for a majority of the ethnic Estonian population, was the 
liberalisation of citizenship. Thus, political elites had to find a compromise 
between national and international agendas who monitored the situation to 
                                                 
8  The extreme proposal that Soviet occupants should leave without social guarantees 
received critical response from international organizations (Jurado 2003, Lauristin & Viha-
lemm 2009). 
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ensure that the ethno-political situation in general stood on rather stable track 
(Lauristin & Heidmets 2002, Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). While evaluations 
of inter-ethnic relations showed improvment during the first decade (Korts & 
Vihalemm 2008), public protests still appeared as late as the Bronze soldier 
crisis in 20079. In 1991, the legal continuity strategy was the chosen policy to 
rebuild the Estonian Republic. This strategy granted citizenship to descendants 
of pre-WWII citizens and was supposed to gradually incorporate interested 
parts of Soviet-time immigrant population and their descendants (Kalev & 
Roosmaa 2012)10. In the first parliamentary elections in 1992, representation by 
the Russian speaking population was missing. Shock form the changes and 
citizenship restrictions not only lead to the isolation of migrant background 
populations from politics, but it also fragmented the arenas to address their 
problems between various institutional domains (Pettai & Hallik 2002). 
Russian-speaking politicians had limited opportunities to participate in elections 
for a longer time11. In 1993, the Alien Act12 was adopted to enacted procedures 
on how non-citizens of the Estonian Republic would receive living and working 
permits to replace their Soviet passports. From the macro perspective, its objec-
tive was to assure an internationally recognized status and define the duties of 
foreigners living in Estonia (Kalev & Roosmaa 2012). From socio-psycho-
logical and political perspective, however this created socio-psychological un-
certainty since a majority of the members of Russian-speaking migrant back-
ground populations become de-facto stateless persons (Pettai & Hallik 2002). 
About 90,000 non-citizens decided to obtain Russian Federation citizenship, 
thus marking the first lines of segmentation among Russian speaking migrant 
background populations. These original segmentations consisted of three 
political-legal categories: Estonian citizens, Russian citizens and those whose 
citizenship was undetermined (Pettai & Hallik 2002). Until the end of the 
1990s, there was no explicit state integration policy, and as previously stated, 
major political decisions were made without involving Russian-speaking 
migrant background populations (Pettai & Hallik 2002). Yet, during the first 
decade of post-Soviet statehood, the basis for further integration policy, seeking 
to find a balance between homogeneity and disparity in society, formed in 
political and administrative circles. These circles debated the demolishing or 
                                                 
9  The Bronze Soldier crisis refers to two nights of riots, which took place in April, 2007 
after the Estonian government’s decision to relocate the Second World War Soviet memorial 
called the Bronze Soldier and the remains of Soviet soldier. 
10  Citizenship was automatically granted for those who were Estonian citizens between the 
First and Second World Wars and their descendants. Other had to apply for citizenship and 
go through a naturalization procedure which included an exam about the knowledge of 
constitution and Estonian language plus a loyalty oath (Kalev & Roosmaa 2012). 
11  In 1997 Estonian parliament started to narrow the language requirements for electoral 
candidates at the local and state level. This meant candidates who hadn’t obtain their educa-
tion in Estonia, had to prove it. The only sphere where non-citizens were not isolated, were 
local elections where permanent residents had a right to vote. 
12  https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/28574 
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(partial) maintenance of two parallel education systems and reshaped inter-
pretations of Russia as a security threat vs. Russia as an informational and 
cultural agent for Russian speaking populations (Vetik & Ruutsoo 1999, Vetik 
2004). The multicultural ideology and the state of integration offered in Berry’s 
model provided and optimal foundation for the politicians, consulting acade-
mics, and Estonian political elite to develop an integration policy (Pettai & 
Hallik 2002, Vetik 2004, Lauristin 2010). Russian speaking migrant back-
ground populations were not forced to assimilate, and integration was portrayed 
as a two-way process of agreement between majority and minority groups. At 
the same time, however, any claims for a bilingual state were avoided in policy 
regulations (Lauristin 2010). In addition to a declaration of cultural difference 
as a resource in practical government, the problem of how to create a common 
form of public communication also appeared (Vetik 2004).  
The previously mentioned need to establish a declarative and practical 
balance motivated the creation of the first state-level program “Integration in 
Estonian society 2000–200713” (Riiklik….2000) in 1998. This program was 
created with the help of UNDP14 and its implementation was financially sup-
ported by Nordic countries as well. The objective of this program was to create 
a compromise between three agents: the ethnic Estonian majority who wanted 
to preserve a monoethnic nation state; the Russian minority who wanted to be 
recognised as a legitimate part of Estonian society and improve its social and 
economic position; and thirdly, Nordic countries with UNDP and OSCE who 
wished to reduce the risk of ethnic conflict and pressure on Estonian politicians 
to take steps towards protecting minority rights (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). 
In assessing the first state-level integration program, some previous authors 
have found that rather than maintaining a laissez faire position, this document 
set general aims for purposeful action (Heidmets 1998, Lauristin 2010). Vetik 
(2004) on the contrary, criticizes the program, arguing that specific problems 
and solutions cannot be separated from the society’s more general and trans-
formation specific problems. In his view, competitiveness in the labour market, 
the inability to receive a good education, and non-participation in culture and 
politics are all wider problems, which can be neither solved nor defined within 
an integration policy. Despite these practical shortages, Vetik (2004) appre-
ciated the symbolic significance of the first integration strategy, which marked a 
principal shift from the ethnocentric approach that had previously prevailed in 
society, towards a multiculturalism one.  
In the first state integration document, integration was defined by two pro-
cesses to harmonize society: knowledge of Estonian and having Estonian 
citizenship while maintaining the possibility to preserve cultural rights 
(Riiklik…2000). From the perspective of the Estonian majority population, 
integration was defined as inclusive attitudes towards the participation of 
                                                 
13 See more here https://www.kul.ee/sites/kulminn/files/integratsioon_eesti_uhiskonnas_ 
2000-2007.pdf  
14  UNDP – United Nations Development Programme.  
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members of Russian-speaking minority populations in the political, economic, 
civic and cultural life of Estonia (ibid). The structural and psychological iso-
lation of the Russian speaking communities was understood as a potential threat 
to social stability. Thus there was a stress on the importance of using Estonian 
as a common language in the public sphere in order to creating more cohesion 
while retaining an individual’s freedom of choice concerning their ethno-
cultural identification (see also Vihalemm & Masso 2007). Kõuts (2002) has 
analysed the discourse of the 2000–2007 Integration Programme period and 
concludes that highlighting the Estonian language was addressed to ethnic 
Estonians in order to alleviate their fears related to the preservation of Estonian 
language and culture. At the same time, the emphasis on individual effort in 
language learning and the freedom of choice to practice ethno-cultural identity 
was stressed in order to prevent the collective mobilization of Russian speaking 
migrant background populations as ethno-linguistically homogeneous commu-
nities (ibid.). 
Lauristin and Vihalemm (2017) indicate that the transition period15 for 
Estonia ended with Estonia gaining EU membership in 2004. This was a time 
for new principal choices in the quest for a better standard of living and 
widening of personal life prospects (ibid). Still, in the 2000s the Russian-
speaking population’s employment position still had somewhat less prospective 
in terms of salary and career opportunities compared to native Estonians 
(Leping & Toomet 2008). 15% of members of Russian speaking minority 
populations managed to take or keep white-collar jobs16, 45% had some kind of 
further professional training, 10% had established their own enterprises and 9% 
participated in EU financed projects in the public, private and non-profit 
sectors. These aspects of economic (segmented) integration have been taken 
into account when constructing the measurement tool (see Chapter 4.2). The 
State Integration plan for 2008–2013 set equal economic and social oppor-
tunities and actual participation as new strategy objectives. Rather than being 
separate objectives, language learning (and thereby reproduction of a common 
integration field) and naturalisation were seen as means to achieve these goals. 
This marked a second important shift in integration policy (Lauristin & Viha-
lemm 2009). The State Integration Plan 2008–2013 stressed the idea of social 
cohesion based not only on the Estonian language but also on civic participation 
and shared values such as social well-being and safety. One of the main goals of 
this plan was to increase the active political and civic participation, including 
participation in NGOS and those initiated by civic associations, of all Estonian 
residents irrespective of their citizenship or nationality (Kallas & Kaldur 2017, 
Lõimuv Eesti 2020). I considered these domains of integration in capturing the 
                                                 
15  Transition period in Estonia is considered to be 1990s and 2000ies as a period of 
economic and political stabilization and consolidation.  
16  In the sentences all shares are calculated from the subsample of the population belonging 
to ethnic groups other than Estonians from the “Me. The World. The Media 2014” survey 
database.  
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civic and political involvement of Russian speakers in my empirical research 
(see Chapter 4.2.1). The ideas of stressing the practice of diverging ethnic 
identity and the mandatory Estonian-language public sphere were both pre-
sented in a somewhat “softer” tone in the State Integration Plan 2008–2013 
(Eesti lõimumiskava 2008–2013). Since I consider that the subjective feeling of 
being informed about important events in the society and then actual partici-
pation in various public events (like fairs, spectacles, sports, family events etc.) 
where people can meet and are important characteristics in the participation, I 
included these indicators in my model of empirical measurement (see Chapter 
4.2.1).  
The linguistic aspect of integration is defined more functionally in the se-
cond Integration Programme. In the same spirit, for my empirical measurement, 
I define the communicative domain of integration as being characterized not 
only by the knowledge of Estonian language, but the actual use of language in 
different spheres of life (including media following) and for a variety of mutual 
contacts with Estonians (see Chapter 4.2.1). 
As for Russian speakers, one of the carriers of common ethno-cultural iden-
tity in turbulent times has been culture, namely the celebration of important 
days and religiosity (Vihalemm & Kaplan 2017). I took these aspects into 
account in order to empirically measure the cultural domain of integration (see 
Chapter 4.2.1).   
Thus, my model for empirically measuring integration is inspired by the 
domains sketched in the State Integration Programme 2000–2007. Even though 
one may criticize the practical setting of objectives and measurement of their 
achievement in this document, in principle, it “looked with open eyes” to the 
multi-dimensional character of integration. The third state integration plan, 
called “Integrating Estonia 2020” (Lõimuv Eesti 2020), further elaborated on 
the operational terms of some ideas mentioned in the former integration plans.  
Despite the good intentions expressed in the integration plans, in their every-
day lives, Russian-speaking populations still felt public discourses held them 
responsible for what happened in the past and maintained the mundane expecta-
tion for them to overlook their own cultural needs and collective memory and 
become similar to Estonians. Bitter feelings surrounding this public discourse 
found (partial) expression in the Bronze soldier crisis2 in 2007 (see Lauristin & 
Vihalemm 2008, Ehala 2009, Vihalemm & Kalmus 2009, Vihalemm 2012). 
This event however, disproved the prevalent public opinion that integration had 
been unsuccessful among older or middle-aged populations who do not know 
Estonian language well enough since it was not older, but mainly younger popu-
lations who protested on the streets and committed acts of vandalism (Viha-
lemm & Kalmus 2009). Some authors were very pessimistic about the prospects 
for further integration. At the same time, integration was still recognized as 
essential not just due to the “question of Russians” but for the whole country’s 
safety and development (Kallas et al 2012). For this reason, the further version 
of the state integration plan incorporated European values and principles as the 
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basis for better involving Russian-speaking populations in the integration 
process (ibid.).  
The state of integration in Estonia is measured with the help of integration 
monitoring, a study that has been carried out since the year 2000. The study 
explores different dimensions like education, labour market, media, language 
use and learning, culture, equal treatment, citizenship, and more recently, the 
adaptation of new-wave immigrants (Kaldur et al 2017). Until 2008, mainly 
descriptive statistics were used to describe the progress of integration. In 2008, 
for the first time, the model of “well-integrated non-Estonian” was constructed 
(see Lauristin 2008). According to this model, a well integrated non-Estonian 
was a citizen who spoke Estonian, felt part of the Estonian nation, had frequent 
contact with Estonians and was hopeful about the general perspectives for 
development in Estonian society (see also Lauristin 2012, Vihalemm & Leppik 
2014). In 2011, the research group working with integration monitoring aban-
doned the “one ideal approach” and instead, presented an empirical description 
of integration clusters formed by a statistical analysis of integration monitoring 
data along with an interpretation of integration processes in different domains of 
social life (Lauristin 2012). In seeking a more nuanced empirical approach to 
the integration process, Lauristin (2012) took the three aspects of linguistic, 
political and social integration into account to constructed aggregated variables 
(ibid). The linguistic aggregated variable encompassed single variables related 
to Estonian language use, communication and the importance of Estonian-
language media. The political aggregated variable included single variables like 
Estonian citizenship, participation in elections, and Estonia as homeland (ibid). 
The social aggregated variable assessed trust towards institutions, political acti-
vity, and participation in NGOs or public events (ibid). On the basis of agg-
regated variables, she created a cluster analysis consisting of five clusters to 
illustrate the state of the segmented integration of Russian speaking migrant 
background populations in Estonia. These clusters included: equally strongly 
integrated in all domains; strongly integrated as a citizen with weaker language 
skills; good language skills, but weaker civic identity; weakly involved with in-
sufficient language skills but participating in local life; not involved-integrated 
cluster (ibid). By using the same method and data, the approach was repeated a 
year later by Kruusvall (2013). My thesis offers a theoretical conceptualisation 
and empirical elaboration for this approach (see also Vihalemm & Leppik 
2014). 
In the following chapter, I give an overview of the main characteristics of 
the integration of Russian-speaking populations in Estonia. These characte-
ristics served as a base for constructing the measurement models of integration 
described in the Methodology chapter. 
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3.2 Empirical overview of the main domains for integration 
On its homepage, the Estonian Ministry of Culture states that the aim of integra-
tion is to create a situation in which a coherent and tolerant society is ensured 
for all nations living in Estonia. Ideally, Estonia would be a place where 
everyone would have a good and safe life, and be able to work, study, promote 
culture, and be a part and full member of society (Ministry of Culture 2020). 
Seeing as integration into society is a broad-based societal process, it encom-
passes different fields of life. An overview of the most essential integration 
domains is given below. In addition to background information, each of the sub-
chapters consists of an (statistical) overview of variables, which are the basis for 
further integration pathways. Table 3 below presents a short overview of how 
the aggregated and single variable integration domains, described in sub-
chapters, are related (see more in table 5 in Chapter 4.2.1).  
 
 
Table 3. Overview of integration domains and dimensions covered  
Integration 
domain Dimension covered 
Variables describing 
domain or dimension17 
Used for 
developing 
integration 
types 
Civic and 
political 
Political involvement as  
a citizen 
Citizenship, election 
behaviour + 
Participation in civic 
organizations 
Participation in NGOs, 
campaigns etc. + 
Trust in Estonian 
institutions 
Trust towards different 
national institutions + 
Alternative democratic 
participation 
Participation in public 
meetings, demonstrations, 
debates (incl. Internet) etc.  + 
Participation in the public 
sphere 
Taking part in different public 
events, being informed.  + 
Economic Economic involvement 
Success in the labour market, 
entrepreneurship, wealth. + 
Educational18 – 
Education level, life-long 
learning – 
Linguistic Estonialisation 
Knowledge and use of 
Estonian, following Estonian 
media + 
Cultural Ethno-cultural identity 
Celebration of days 
importance, religiosity + 
 
 
                                                 
17  See more in table 5 in chapter 4.2.1. 
18 Due to lack of sufficient data, this domain is not taken into account when measuring inte-
gration.  
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The Political and civic domain of integration 
Traditional political participation is understood as activities that are related with 
the status of political citizenship, including those, which affect the parliament or 
political process (Verba & Nie 1972). Bosniak (2008) speaks about the four 
meanings of citizenship: legal status; influence of decision-making processes 
via elections; active engagement in democratic self-governance; (subjective) 
solidarity and identification (see also Bartram et al 2014). Nowadays the ampli-
tude of participation has widened. Dalton (2008) proposed a theoretically wide-
spread characterization of structural affordances for political participation and 
distinguishes between “duty” and “engaged” citizenship. Daltons’ (2008) con-
cept of “duty citizenship” encompasses traditional forms of political partici-
pation like going to elections. “Engaged citizenship” meanwhile, comprises 
non-electoral activities in multiple forms like taking part in voluntary organi-
sations, boycotting, public demonstration, signing petitions etc. (see also Cope-
land 2014, van Deth 2016).  
A similar empirical division is made by Lauristin and colleagues (2012): a) 
institutional participation in politics (e.g. governing or working in political insti-
tutions, belonging into political party) and b) extra-institutional like partici-
pation in public meetings, demonstrations, signing petitions, protesting etc.  
I approach my research by using these concepts, especially in Study II. Below I 
also provide some background evidence to explain my considerations for em-
pirical measurement.  
The political participation of members of the Estonian Russian-speaking 
population is connected with Estonian citizenship and trust towards institutions 
(Kallas & Kaldur 2017). For one, citizenship status is needed in order to exer-
cise “duty citizenship”. The share of Estonian citizens has increased gradually 
since Estonian independence in 1991. According to the population census from 
the year 2000, 40% of people of with ethnicities other than Estonian had Esto-
nian citizenship, 37% had undefined citizenship and 19% had Russian citizen-
ship. The other 4% held citizenship of some other country (Statistics Estonia). 
By the 2011 population census, the share non-ethnic Estonians holding Estonian 
passports had risen to 45%, and in 2019 that number had increased even further 
to 55% (ibid.). 
The exercise of “duty citizenship” is so far the predominant mode of politi-
cal involvement among Estonian Russian speaking populations. 66% of Esto-
nian citizens with non-ethnic Estonian roots participated in the 2015 Parlia-
mentary elections (Kallas & Kaldur 2017) while only 12% of the Russian 
speaking population has participated in public political meetings, picketed or 
signed a petition (Me. The World. The Media 2014, authors’ calculations). Only 
a minor portion (7%) of Russian speakers have participated in political dis-
cussions online (Integration Monitoring data 2017). Thus, it appears that 
technological possibilities have not noticeably encouraged the semi-public 
discussions. Despite this finding, I consider it important to measure traditional 
and alternative political participation separately. For one, even though the part 
of the Russian-speaking population who does not have Estonian citizenship is 
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legally excluded from the Parliamentary elections, non-citizens with living 
permits can participate in elections as the local municipal level, so non citizens 
can still exercise engaged and local level political citizenship. Furthermore, I 
expect a generational shift from “duty citizenship” to “engaged citizenship” as a 
part of more general global trend (Study II).  
Although the additional analysis carried out for Study II indicated that 
younger Russian speakers belong to the “engaged citizen” category less fre-
quently than ethnic Estonians, I suggest that over time the shift from political 
participation as “duty citizen” to the participation as “engaged citizen” will 
occur among migrant background populations too (Study II). Since the 
Russian-speaking population is an ageing one (more so than the ethnic Estonian 
population), it might create a possibility for traditional, “duty citizenship” forms 
of political participation to fade into the background. As the idea of “engaged 
citizenship” belonging to the older generation of Russian speakers fades, the 
political activism and protest of younger Russian-speaking cohorts (e.g. third 
generation) will become more visible for the media, politicians and community 
of ethnic Estonians.  
 According to the Daltons’ model of the duty citizen, participation is related 
to peoples’ perceptions of democratic governance. Whereas in Europe in gene-
ral, younger people tend to be more critical about the democratic governance in 
their countries (Study II) than older people, in Estonia this is contrary; younger 
generations evaluate democracy higher than the older ones (Study II). The 
following quotation from the focus group interview I made in the beginning of 
2015 in Tallinn illustrates how the value of democracy appears in news media 
interpretations:  
 
Why such a drastic reaction that Arabs cannot live in Europe any more? I mean, 
you let them in and we have to shut down the mosques. It does not seem demo-
cratic to me…. Why are some churches are closed and some not? It does not 
correspond to the EU standards (M, 18)  
 
Despite the fact that they value the general idea of democracy (over authorita-
rianism), the participation of younger (election-aged) members of the Russian-
speaking population participating in elections has declined in recent decades 
(Study II). Younger, 15–25 year old Russian speakers are more critical (com-
pared to older groups) in their evaluation about the actual performance of demo-
cratic governance in Estonia. Therefore, they are likely demotivated from parti-
cipating in traditional politics and performing Datlon’s duty citizenship (Study 
II). At the same time, according to the Me. The World. The Media Study, 
younger people trust society’s main institutions more than older groups. Thus, it 
is likely that they channel their exercise of political participation into alternative 
forms because they are confident that the institutional order of Estonian society 
functions well. They believe that citizens can influence public policy and that 
this be done in other forms, which are more effective than delegating legitimacy 
for action in a particular party.  
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Several studies have shown that trust towards institutions is strongly related 
with political participation (Kallas & Kaldur 2017, see also Norris 2004, Dalton 
2004). Trust towards states’ institutions reflects how a person feels about being 
an equal partner in contributing to discussions about common public life (Kallas 
& Kaldur 2017). As I will show in chapter 4.2, although institutional trust 
among Russian speaking migrant background populations is more moderate 
(less trustful) compared with ethnic Estonians, minority groups enable civic 
partnerships in different modes (Study V).  
Integration Monitoring 2011 pointed out that the role of different interest 
groups and NGO-s in terms of policymaking and public discussion has grown, 
especially due to widened technological possibilities (Lauristin et al 2012). This 
has not changed much from 2015 to 2017: participation in NGOs and associa-
tions is still widespread among the Russian-speaking population.  
In addition to participating in an NGO, attending public events (mass for 
example) and activities, following daily news, and doing voluntary work are all 
important forms of participation in modern societies. Lauristin and colleagues 
(2012) regard civic activities as all organised or spontaneous, one-time or conti-
nuous, activities which are initiated by citizens and not carrying (party) political 
messages, yet serving the public interest. I have included this type of civic 
participation in the empirical model (more in Chapter 4.2).  
The habits of following daily news are more modest among the Russian 
speaking population compared to ethnic Estonians (Study V, Leppik & Viha-
lemm 2017, Seppel 2017). Although 2/3 of Russian speaking audiences report 
regularly following political news, their news menu is often formed by the links 
and recommendations of their acquaintances thereby involving a modest level 
of independent civic agency (Vihalemm & Juzefovics 2020). 
In general, the political involvement and general civic participation of Esto-
nian Russian speakers’ in the public sphere are the dimensions where integra-
tion was relatively strong (Study V) compared to the other domains (measured 
in the same way). This participation was rather high and stable in terms of parti-
cipation in NGOs and civic activities but modest and declining in terms of 
political activism (Study V, see also Vihalemm & Leppik 2017). 
 
The economic domain of integration 
One very important aspect of Russian speakers’ integration is their economic 
situation and, more specifically, how they overcame transformations in the 
labour market in the 1990s (Study I). According to Saar and Helemäe (2017), 
ethnic segregation in the labour market continues to hinder integration into 
society because people with different ethnicities do not act and communicate in 
the workplace, which is one of the main domains of social life. When arriving 
to Estonia after the Second World War, Russian speakers were offered jobs in 
the military and industrial sectors (Tammaru & Kulu 2003, Marksoo 2005). 
Since the Soviet Union preferred to recruit personnel from outside of Estonia to 
work in these sectors, by the end of the Soviet era, about half of the Russian-
speaking population was employed in these particular sectors (Kala 1992, 
44 
Hallik 1998, Tammaru & Kulu 2003, Vöörmann & Helemäe 2003). At the same 
time, ethnic Estonians were employed in the fields of agriculture, culture and 
education (Kala 1992). Therefore, both sectors of employment and occupations 
were segregated (Helemäe et al 2000).  
A reform plan was initiated by the new government in the beginning of 
1990s to replace the Soviet administrative legacy with new institutions and legal 
structures (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). Because the money for pensions and 
other social protection expenses came from the (common) Soviet budget, the 
new market economy was in shock (Lauristin 2010). The economic sectors 
which had previously supplied other Soviet republics (Puur 1997) either ended 
operations or re-oriented to new markets. This caused mass unemployment and 
a shift of employment to tertiary sectors (Eamets et al 2000). The share of 
Russian-speaking employees diminished in both the public and industrial 
sectors and rose in the service sector during the first decade of Estonian post-
Soviet independence (Pettai 2000, Vöörmann & Helemäe 2003).  
While in the Soviet era there was practically no unemployment, after 
reforms, the number of jobs declined and unemployment increased rapidly 
(Antons 2003), especially among Russian speakers (Pettai 2001, Antons 2003). 
Several researchers indicate that unemployment still tends to grow faster among 
Russian speaking migrant background populations, mainly due to occupational 
structures (Nurmela & Krieger 2011, Saar & Helemäe 2017).  
At the same time, from 1995–2007, the average salary of ethnic Estonians 
was 10–15% higher (Krusell 2010) than that of Russian speakers. This pay gap 
still exists, having reached up to 20% (see Soosaar et al 2017), and is rather 
difficult to explain (see Leping & Toomet 2008). Data from the Integration 
Monitoring 2017 further indicates that Russian speakers assess their chances of 
getting a good job much worse than Estonians: 72% of Russian speakers believe 
Estonians have better chances of getting a good job. These differences are even 
bigger when considering leading jobs in public sector (about 80% of Russian 
speakers think Estonians have better chances) (Integration Monitoring 2017 
database, author’s calculations). Ethnic disparity in terms of occupational 
segregation remains evident in the recent decade. Among Russian-speaking 
populations, there are fewer individuals who have gained higher positions and 
more whose position in the labour market has been lowered; this has not 
significantly changed within the last 10 years (Masso 2017).  
One way to explain both Russian speakers lower expectations and their 
position in the labour market is the knowledge of Estonian language. From 
1989, Estonian language was set as the only official language in the Estonian 
Republic. Thus, the professional language requirements affected non-Estonian 
speaker’s prospects in the labour market, particularly when it came to higher 
status jobs in public administration or local government authorities. Since these 
jobs required a language examination, this narrowed career options for Russian 
speakers and knowledge of Estonian gained high functionality. Lindemann 
(2011) found that employers set rather high language standards, but that 
Russian speakers can apply and enjoy equal opportunities if they have advanced 
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Estonian language competencies. Vihalemm and Hogan-Brun (2013a) point out 
that, in terms of strong occupational segregation, minorities’ socio-economic 
self-positioning is related to their knowledge of the local language.  
Masso (2017) found that Russian speaking migrant background populations 
have lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates, and that they feel 
they have less say in their work relationships and in the labour market in 
general than their Estonian counterparts. This estimate has not changed within 
the last 10 years. A majority of the working age population (15–74 years old) 
are employees. The growing trend of entrepreneurship (among ethnic Estonians 
from 10% in 2000 to 11,8% in 2019, among other ethnicities from 4.4% to 
8.7% according to Statistics Estonia database) that might have been promoted 
by technological and social innovation (different start-ups, social entrepre-
neurship etc.) gives good prospects for the rise in economic agency of migrant 
background populations. 
Study I points out that according to research in different countries, members 
of immigrant populations are less successful in the destination country’s labour 
market than members of the native population. Some authors blame human 
capital or lack of it (see Becker 1964, Mincer 1974, Chiswick 1978, Chiswick 
& Miller 2002) while others offer the theory of a dual (see Portes et al 1985) or 
ethnically biased labour market as explanation (see Roth et al 2012). Yet 
another group of researchers contend that residential segregation influences 
worse (or different) performance of members of a minority in a segregated 
labour market (see Ellis et al 2004, Aslund & Skans 2010). However, these 
theoretical explanations are limited in their explanations of the peculiarities in 
labour market participation possibilities for members of the Estonian Russian-
speaking community (Study I). This is partially due to the fact that, because of 
the general social transformation of Estonian society as a whole, which was 
previously described here, Estonian Russian speakers differ from typical immi-
grant communities.  
To summarize, the economic and labour market outcomes of Russian 
speakers are affected by a combination of sectoral and occupational segregation 
inherited from Soviet era. This results not only from the lack of a country speci-
fic language or citizenship, but also from problems related to human capital, 
since professional training from the Soviet era is incompatible for post-Soviet 
labour market demands. These factors have had a durable impact since the 
1990s (Study I). Learning Estonian was explicitly connected with a downward 
mobility in the labour market (Study I). It is likely that people with relatively 
good Estonian language skills applied for higher positions where they had to 
compete with ethnic Estonians. People with poor or no language skills either 
likely settled for existing or similar jobs where the requirements were lower in 
terms of country specific capitals, or they took advantage of the opportunities 
offered by the enclave economy (see Study I). Altogether these tendencies 
explain Russian speakers’ rather modest economic agency (depicted in Figure 2 
in the methodology section). 
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Economic and labour market outcomes, which together form an important 
dimension of integration, are influenced by both the cultural background of 
migrants as well as structures in society (Study I, V). Therefore, the economic 
dimension of integration cannot be separated from general integration. As 
Study V points out, there is a moderate mutual correlation between political and 
economic involvement. Not having enough economic resources makes it hard to 
influence processes in public and political sphere and the opposite is also likely 
true. 
Based on these findings, the economic integration measurement for this 
study was constructed on the basis of job and material security and lifelong 
training possibilities. It also considers entrepreneurship as a possibility to im-
prove one’s economic positions in spite of the long inertia of the labour market 
structuration (see Chapter 4.2).  
 
The educational domain of integration 
The education system has a significant role in the integration process. One 
reason for this is that education creates opportunities for a successful transition 
into the labour market. Another reason is that language competence is deve-
loped via education (Saar 2008). The changes that have taken place in the field 
of education after Estonian re-independence were concurrent with other major 
political and economic changes in society. These changes had a significant 
impact on the education system, especially on school networks (Soll 2015). The 
years or decades after re-independence could be described by a freedom from 
ideological pressure, the creation of new education institutions, an autonomy of 
universities, a quick increase of students and an imposition of quality control, 
all which took place under the constraints of budget limitations (Heidmets et al 
2011). One of the important changes for Russian-speaking populations was the 
transition to Estonian-language in secondary education. In 1997, the parliament 
passed amendments, which stated that, by 2007 Russian gymnasiums/secondary 
schools should have switched gradually to Estonian-language. For secondary 
level education the objective was that 60% of study/learning should take place 
is Estonian (Saar 2008).  
While education for Russian speakers was somewhat higher than education 
for Estonians in the beginning of the 1990s, by the end of the 90s, the situation 
had been reversed (Saar 2008). According to the 1989 census, 21% of Estonians 
had a specialized secondary education (obtained after secondary education, 
corresponding to ISCED19 level 5) and 18% had higher education. Among 
Russian speakers, these percentages were 26% and 17% accordingly. The 2000 
census showed that the share of Estonian speakers with higher education had 
risen to 26%, and only to 20% among Russian speakers, while the number of 
those having secondary specialized education did not change much (Statistics 
Estonia, see also Saar 2008). Saar (2008) has pointed out that Russian-speaking 
populations perceive ethnicity as one of the factors hindering educational 
                                                 
19 ISCED – International Standard Classification of Education 
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prospects. Saar (2008) points out that there is a certain segregation after primary 
education; those who have graduated from Russian-language primary schools 
are more likely to continue their studies in a vocational school, whereas those 
who have studied in Estonian-language primary schools go to gymnasium 
(Lindemann & Saar 2011, Saar & Helemäe 2017). It is important to note that 
this choice is not always voluntary and the decision to attend a vocational 
school might be because of the fear of failing in studying in Estonian-language 
(ibid.).  
The transition to Estonian-language in higher education has made Russian-
language education a general “dead end” since graduates with Russian edu-
cational backgrounds have limited choices for continuing education. This 
applies especially to young people whose language knowledge is limited (Saar 
2008). The persistence of vertical segregation persistence is supported by 
changes in the educational system, particularly the transition to Estonian-lan-
guage in higher education (Saar & Helemäe 2017). As a result, the share of 
those having a higher education has declined among Russian speakers, espe-
cially among younger age cohorts. Further transition from a secondary school to 
university or college is complicated, irrespective of reforms (ibid.). If in 1989 
the education level of members of the migrant background community was 
higher compared to native Estonians (12 % and 10% respectively), then by the 
year 2000 the proportions were reversed (18% of native Estonians had higher 
education compared to 16% of other ethnic groups) (Saar & Helemäe 2017).  
Obtaining an education does not end at a certain age, and public policy 
supports the lifelong learning process (e.g. The Estonian Lifelong Learning 
Strategy 2020). However, native Estonians have used this opportunity more 
often than non native Estonians. In 2019, the share of those who participated in 
some form of lifelong learning was 22% among native Estonians and 16% 
among other ethnicities (Statistics Estonia 2020). In addition, an analysis 
conducted by the Estonian Bank indicates that among the highly educated 
portion of the population, the risk of working in a job that requires lower 
qualifications and earns less than the Estonian medium salary is higher among 
individuals with a migrant background (Urke et al 2019). A big share of those 
having higher education work in the public sector, where a good knowledge of 
Estonian is a requirement that might be a barrier for people of other mother 
tongues with otherwise equal educational qualifications 
Although education is an important aspect of integration, it is not taken into 
account when constructing the measurement tool. Some aspects of education, 
namely participation in work-related trainings (i.e. life-long learning) are part of 
measuring the economic integration. Education was left out of the current 
model (see Chapter 4.2) since there were not good indicators in the survey for 
composing a separate index.  
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The linguistic domain of integration 
Language and the culture based on a certain language have an important task. 
Language and culture shape the identity of ethnic groups and are the basis for 
common beliefs, traditions, attitudes etc. (Kirch 2002). Language, especially the 
knowledge of a local language, helps to maintain contacts not only with co-
ethnic individuals, but also with the receiving society and its social and political 
institutions (Pisarenko 2006). 
All the Baltic states, Estonia being no exception, have decided in favour of 
strong and control-oriented language politics (Vihalemm & Siiner 2011). This 
was done in order to ensure the use of Estonian in all spheres of life (ibid.). 
Estonian become the official state language by the end of Soviet era, and it 
marked a redistribution of power (see Rannut 2008). By the end of the first 
Estonian parliament, the citizenship and language acts were both complemented 
with national elements. For example, the citizenship act initiated the inclusion 
of a specific civic exam and the language act proclaimed all languages except 
Estonian, which is the official state language, as foreign (Pettai & Hallik 2002). 
The language act also enforced a national language requirement in order to hold 
a certain position (Vihalemm & Siiner 2011). Irrespective of legislation how-
ever, the actual knowledge of Estonian remains rather modest among Russian-
speaking populations who are geographically isolated (living in concentrat 
areas). This isolation reduces their chances to practice Estonian (see also Viha-
lemm & Siiner 2011). Additionally, due to the wide availability of Russian-
language media, a passive knowledge of Estonian is more likely to be 
maintained (ibid.). 
Therefore, the linguistic domain is surely important when measuring poten-
tial integration. According to the population census back in 2011, the share of 
Russian speakers who know Estonian was approximately 41%. This figure is a 
little higher than findings from the 2000 census. According to data from the 
Integration Monitoring 2017, almost 15% of Russian speakers speak Estonian 
very well and another 25% claim to understand, speak and write in Estonian 
well. Compared to 2007, the share of those who do not speak Estonian at all has 
declined while the share of those who have at least a passive knowledge of 
Estonian has reached up to 50% (in 2007 it was 43%). Also, compared to 2011, 
more young people claim to speak Estonian and more individuals with Russian 
citizenship have developed a passive knowledge of Estonian. Kruusvall (2015) 
points out that language competence grows with the passing of the immigrant 
population from older to newer generations. While about 20% of first genera-
tion immigrants have an active proficiency of Estonian, this number is 40% in 
the second generation and 60% among third generation populations (ibid.). 
About one tenth of individuals of other ethnicities do not speak the country´s 
official language (Kivistik 2017). By 2017, people of other ethnicities and 
ethnic Estonians had mutual social contacts to use Estonian language in 
work/study context or in the public sphere and significantly less in the private 
sphere (ibid). In North-Eastern industrial cities and in many organizations in 
Tallinn, the working collectives tend to be predominantly Russian-speaking 
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ones which do not support the development of Estonian language skills (Viha-
lemm & Siiner 2011). From a linguistic perspective, the growing need for 
English and accepting attitudes towards other languages might be a unifying 
factor for Estonian and Russian speakers (ibid., see also Kivistik 2017).  
Based on data from different integration monitorings of Estonian society, it 
is also possible to assess language competence when it comes to following 
certain types of media: in 2011, about 50% of Russian speakers claimed they 
knew Estonian language well enough to understand Estonian-language media 
whereas one fifth did not understand anything (Vihalemm 2011). In 2015, the 
share of Russian speakers who understood Estonian well enough to follow 
media was 42%, and 23% did not understand Estonian well enough while 14% 
did not follow Estonian media (Seppel 2015). Still, the following of Estonian-
language media among Russian-speaking audiences is rather modest (see also 
Chapter 3.3). Although Estonian language competence has slightly improved 
among Russian-speaking populations, it has not resulted in a wider following of 
Estonian-language media (Study V, see also Leppik & Vihalemm 2017).  
The outbreak of political tensions surrounding the Ukraine-Russia conflict 
accompanied with media polarization and propaganda not only increased 
people’s interest towards news media (Study IV) but it also discouraged 
general trust in the mass media and polarized perceptions regarding the trust-
fulness of Estonian/Western versus Russian media (Study IV). Because limited 
language knowledge may lead to misinterpretations of the media content, 
following Estonian language media may cause even more confusion for some 
members of the Russians speaking minority. A parallel following of both 
Estonian and Russian media content can also create feelings of social anxiety 
and exclusion rather than social security and inclusion, as Study III reveals. 
The analysis from the 2019 survey data20 showed similar results: Russian 
speakers with a good command of Estonian reported being more often confused 
by encounters with different mediums compared to people with a poorer 
command of Estonian. Thus, the better the knowledge of Estonian, the bigger 
the confusion. Among those who encounter contradictory information, the 
confusion persists since they do not know which source to trust. Among those 
who speak Estonian, 70% expressed confusion while only 30% of those who do 
not speak Estonian felt the same way. This may explain why, as explored in 
Study III, the knowledge of Estonian language is paired with higher criticism 
towards journalistic production and mistrust toward media as an institution. 
Media users with better Estonian language skills have access to more media 
channels, and thus, more information to compare, in different languages (e.g. in 
Estonian). Therefore, they tend to be more critical and less trusting when it 
comes to drawing conclusions based on the news or media in general (Study 
III). On the one hand, this fosters a certain self-reliance and hybrid identity as a 
media citizen. On the other hand, it might facilitate a kind of civic alienation 
and deepen mistrust towards institutions and political processes (Study III, IV). 
                                                 
20  Open Estonian Foundation survey, see more in chapter 4.1.  
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Thus, similarly to the labour market outcomes, Estonian language skills contri-
bute in paradoxical ways to the (mediated) social involvement of Russian 
speaking populations into Estonian society. The social revenues for the use of 
Estonian language either in competing for a job or in consuming certain types of 
media may remain contradictory and modest when one compares the outcomes 
of more monolingual (i.e. mainly Russian language using) compatriots who 
have chosen more ethnically segregated modes of social self-realization and 
participation (Study I, III) and build a positive distinction by maintaining or 
strengthening ethno-linguistic and cultural group identities. Using the previous 
explanations, the linguistic dimension of integration as used in the empirical 
model was constructed not only based on the assessment of Estonian language 
skills, but also on its use in interpersonal communications and in the following 
of mass media (see Chapter 4.2). 
 
The cultural domain of integration 
Ethno-cultural identity as an indicator of integration is multifaceted and covers 
more aspects which will be described in this chapter. In addition to national 
self-determination, religiosity and the celebration of important days, other 
aspects of culture are also important (e.g. literature, art, entertainment etc.) and 
changing the view of normality for Russian-speaking populations. Some of 
these cultural aspects are described in the following paragraphs.  
Integration monitoring from 2011 indicated that while national self-determi-
nation is an important aspect of ethno-cultural identity among Russian speakers, 
cultural associations and Russian days of importance are also important. These 
cultural aspects are often mentioned in different integration documents (like 
state integration plans), but so far they have not been a national priority. From 
the Integration Monitoring 2011 report, Vihalemm (2011) found that, among 
Russian speakers, the strength of ethno-cultural identity is associated with 
religion, the celebration of important Russian and folk-calendar days and other 
associations with folk culture. Among Estonians, meanwhile this correlation is 
not significant (ibid). Studies dealing with the identity of Russian speakers 
(Vihalemm 2011, Vihalemm & Kaplan 2017) have pointed out that one main 
component of the ethno-cultural identity of Russian speakers is in fact reli-
giosity and connections to the Orthodox church. Researchers also find that 
cultural memory could be treated as a synonym of invisible religion (Assamann 
2011, Paert 2016). Even though state atheism was the major goal and official 
ideology of the Soviet era (Kowalewski 1980), and therefore religion shouldn’t 
have to played a significant role in terms of identity formation (see Laitin 1998, 
Paert 2013), the traditions were kept alive and religion did not fade into the 
background (Kowalewski 1980). This aspect of religiosity persists today. 
Official statistics shows that the share of religious people is much higher among 
Russian speakers. According to the 2011 population census, approximately 50% 
of the Russian-speaking population consider themselves religious whereas 
among ethnic Estonians, this percentage is about 20% (Statistics Estonia). 
According to Paert (2016), the religion and cultural memory of Russian 
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speakers are closely related. Thus, identification with the Orthodox church 
could be part of a resistance to acculturation into a more secular Estonian 
society and part of a perceived diverging cultural identity. Vihalemm and 
Harro-Loit (2019) point out that, for Russian speakers, one of the carriers of 
cultural continuity has been the celebration of holidays and other important 
days. Although some particular days of importance have been transformed 
through political changes (Harro-Loit & Kõresaar 2010, Kreegipuu 2011), 
Russian speakers still have a heterogeneous attachment to the days inherited 
from different historical layers of the calendar (Harro-Loit et al 2020). The 
Soviet regime exploited the folk calendar in order to spread atheistic ideas and 
add several political anniversaries and other important days. Even though a 
gradual removal of these days began after re-independence (Kreegipuu 2010, 
Harro-Loit et al 2020), most of these days still carry some identity-bounded 
values for Russian speakers while others have more symbolic meanings or are 
significant only to members of certain groups (ibid.). Still, calendar traditions 
provide a collective form of self-determination which enables individuals to feel 
and express ethno-cultural differences and bring them to the public’s attention 
(Seljamaa 2010). The dimension of ethno-cultural identity was compiled (see 
Chapter 4.2) based on these considerations. 
 
 
3.3 Mediated transnationalism among  
Estonian Russian speakers  
Estonian re-independence in 1991 meant that the previously state-controlled 
media system was replaced by a free market which gave way to international 
and transnational audio-visual networks (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013b). 
Due to the lack of political interest, Russian TV-channels were no longer trans-
mitted and Russian speakers turned towards new technical solutions like 
satellite and cable networks which made Russian media easily accessible. 
Moreover, among Estonian politicians, it was believed that eventually Estonian-
language and other media would merge (ibid.). So far, this has not happened, 
especially since in the 1990s Russian speakers were following “their own” 
media. Due to the decisions made back in the 1990s, the media following prac-
tices of Russian-speaking audiences differ significantly from those of the native 
population. Another important milestone to take into account is the enactment 
of the Estonian Language Law in 2011, which requires that information in 
public places, including audio-visual content, should be solely in Estonian or 
with translation. This law however, does not apply to foreign (i.e. Russian state 
sponsored) content (because foreign production is not subject to Estonian law) 
(Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013). Altogether this means that it is hard to 
reshape the media practices of Russian speakers which have developed within 
last 20 years.  
Audience preferences are largely defined by the channels that are available. 
As Kõuts-Klemm and colleagues (2019) indicate, people usually prefer to 
52 
follow media which is in their mother tongue and, if the necessary or qualitative 
information is not available, then other language media is used. Leppik and 
Vihalemm (2017) have found that, within the last 20 years, the availability (as 
well accessibility) of different media channels has hugely improved. The 
Estonian media system consists of Estonian-language, Russian-language and 
global media (ibid.). Such a wide availability and accessibility of multilingual 
media is a new normality which makes the media space transnational for 
Russian-speaking populations as well as for Estonians. Kõuts-Klemm and 
colleagues (2019) point out that there are 141 Russian-language TV channels 
viewable in Estonia, two of which are of Estonian-origin: TV3+ and ETV+. In 
addition, a variety of channels in other languages are available.  
The Me. The World. The Media survey has enabled the monitoring of media 
following trends since 2005. Since that time, the media following habits of 
Russian-speaking migrant background populations have somewhat changed and 
Leppik and Vihalemm (2017) indicate that the following of Estonian-language 
media declined from 2005 to 2014. The same trend was found by Jõesaar 
(2017) who, relying on TNS Emor data, showed that Estonian-language 
channels/mediums are not popular among Russian speakers. According to 
Study II, the slow development of Estonian language skills among Russian 
speakers after the collapse of the Soviet Union has made it difficult to follow 
and interpret Estonian media content.  
The interest in programs offering locally produced Russian-language content 
has fluctuated over a longer period of time (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013b, 
Vihalemm & Leppik 2017). In recent years (2011 and 2014 compared to 2005), 
the usage of local (Estonian-origin) Russian channels has grown slightly 
(Leppik & Vihalemm 2017) and there have not been any remarkable changes 
when it comes to following Russian-origin or Western media channels. Both 
studies by Leppik and Vihalemm (2017, see table 6.4.2) and statistics presented 
by Vihalemm and Hogan-Brun (2013b, see appendix 1) show that Russian 
channels dominate Russian speakers’ media menu and the importance of these 
channels has rather grown over time. This is supported by statistics from Kantar 
Emor (2020) which show that, for Russian speakers, time spent following TV is 
divided mostly between following three Russian TV channels: PBK, NTV Mir 
and RTR Planeta.  
Irrespective of Russian media dominance, Estonian Russian speakers gene-
rally value digital heterophily. They share the ideal of a “smart information 
practitioner” who is able to “put the puzzle together” by using information from 
different sources (Vihalemm & Leppik 2014, Study IV). This is mutually 
supported because using different channels causes news flows to become more 
versatile and occasionally competitive. This enables viewers to compare and 
more profoundly analyse the information received (Study V, see also Leppik & 
Vihalemm 2017). Being informed is important for members of the Russian-
speaking population. About one fourth claim it is important to receive up-to-
date information about events in Estonia and abroad while another 60–70% 
claim it is important, but they do not mind delayed information. Additionally, 
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according to the Me. The World. The Media (2014) survey, about 45% of 
Russian speakers follow news media on an everyday basis (among Estonians 
this share is 61%). 
Following certain types of media content is less and less linked to the home 
environment, and not determined by time, place or device (see also Morely 
2001, Robins & Aksoy 2002, Diminescu 2008). In addition, Internet usage has 
grown rapidly and, from the technological media aspect, the importance of 
printed media has become marginal for Russian speaking populations. At the 
same time, the use of social media networks as sources of everyday news has 
increased. One third admit to getting daily news posted on social media by their 
online acquaintances (Study V, see also Vihalemm & Leppik 2017). This 
tendency for social network members to making up news repertoires is espe-
cially characteristic of the younger generation. About half of those aged 15–29 
receive information from social media (ibid.). 
The fact that only 41% of Russian speakers claim to have active Estonian 
language knowledge, means that their following of Estonian language media is 
quite modest (Leppik & Vihalemm 2017, Kõuts-Klemm et al 2019). However, 
it is still important to reach Russian-speaking audience via Estonian mass 
media. 
In 2015, Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) started broadcasting the 
Russian-language TV channel ETV+ for the Russian speaking minority. This 
has changed the media following habits of Russian speakers a little (Leppik & 
Vihalemm 2017, see also Jõesaar 2015). The weakly reach of ETV+ has 
steadily grown, and by May 2017 it had reached 40% of Estonia’s Russian 
speaking audiences (at the same time, about 10% of Estonians also watch ETV+ 
each week) (Jõesaar 2017). ERR statistics point out that from 2017 to January 
2018 the increase in ETV+ viewers made records especially among Russian-
speaking audiences (Estonian Public Broadcasting).  
Additionally, a survey carried out in spring of 2019 indicated that about a 
quarter of Russian speakers watch ETV+ frequently and another 41% some-
times. In March 2020, the PBK (Channel One Russia), a so-called favourite 
outlet for Russian speakers in Estonia, announced the removal of Estonian news 
production from its content. While this change could also possibly direct Rus-
sian speakers to follow some Estonian Russian-language channel (like ETV+) 
in order to receive missing information, at the moment, there are not sufficient 
statistics to support this claim. Data from Kantar Emor (2020), however, do 
show a slight increase in ETV+ viewership. From February 2020, to April 2020, 
the channel’s daily percentage of viewership increased from 1.1% to 1.7%. It is 
not clear however, whether this percentage has risen due to the cancellation of 
Estonian broadcasting by the PBK or due to the corona crisis.  
The growing Russian diaspora in multiple countries means that, in general, 
within the last 20 years, the media scape for Estonian Russian speakers has 
widened. At the same time, following Estonian-language (or origin) media is 
quite moderate. Still, by consuming parallel forms of local Russian and, to a 
smaller extent, Estonian-language media, as well international mediums, the 
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media habits of Estonian Russian speakers are rather transnational and takes 
place across several countries (mostly Estonia and Russia) (Study V, Leppik & 
Vihalemm 2017). Furthermore, the interpretation of current affairs takes place 
according to several systems of values and norms at the same time. The fact that 
Russian speakers participate in various mediascapes, from following their 
favourite medium of Russian TV slightly more than 4 hours per day (Kantar 
Emor 2020) to keeping cross-border ties with the help of Skype, makes them, 
without a doubt, transnational. The development of technology as well the 
media market has also encouraged the emergence of mediated transnationalism 
among Estonian Russian speakers (Study V, Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). In the 
case of Estonian Russian-speaking populations, this means we can speak about 
a quite steady form of transnationalism, i.e. core transnationalism according to 
Guarnizo (2000) (see also Chapter 2.2). Nearly half of Russian speakers have 
contacts with Russia, a quarter with Belarus and/or Ukraine, and a majority of 
them follow Russian media on everyday basis (Study V). In addition, the media 
itself has become transnational. Although the channels followed might be of 
foreign-origin, advertising is, in most cases local, (e.g. ads about services 
offered by local Estonian companies etc.).  
Although Russian television dominates the media menu for Russian-
speaking populations, the reception of media content varies according to local 
status, life experience and networks of communication. Likewise, media recep-
tion supports multiple dimensions of identity development both for individuals’ 
diasporic orientation and local identity (Vihalemm 2002, Leppik & Vihalemm 
2017). In other words, media use and following are also segmented. There are 
segments of Russian speakers who follow more Estonian mediums, those who 
follow only Russian media, those whose repertoires are international etc. (see 
also Leppik & Vihalemm 2017, Study V).  
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4. METHODOLOGY 
This methodological chapter gives an overview of the data and methods used, 
and explains the different information structures and design of the measure-
ments tools and analysis of the studies.  
 
 
4.1 Overview of the data and methods used 
In this thesis, mainly quantitative data is used to explore the segmentation of 
integration. The integration clusters and transnationalism index, which are the 
main tools of analysis of this work, are based on the Me. The World. The Media 
2014 survey data. The survey “Me. The World. The Media” is one of the most 
important and thorough surveys covering the Estonian population’s interests, 
values, traditions, religion, history, belonging, identity, use of one’s time, 
cultural interests, environment and consumption, health, media use, work, and 
family. The survey consists of more than 600 variables and the sample size of 
the latest round (2014) included 1,503 respondents (including 473 Russian 
speakers). The survey is conducted in two languages, Estonian and Russian, and 
has been carried out by the University of Tartu in cooperation with survey 
companies every three years since 2000 (2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2014) 
(Masso et al 2020). In my thesis, I used data from the years 2014 to form the 
cluster analysis (Study V), and data from from 2005, 2008 and 2011 to organize 
the time series analysis of media consumption (Study III, IV, V). 
In addition to Me. The World. The Media, other surveys are also important 
for this thesis. I used the immigrant population survey, which was carried out by 
Statistics Estonia in 2008, in order to explore labour market outcomes of 
Russian-speaking populations (Study I). The sample size was 2,432 and it 
consisted of individuals, aged 15–74 years old, with immigrant backgrounds 
who held permanent residency in Estonia, and whose parents were born in a 
foreign country (predominantly Russian-speaking population). 
The European Social Survey (ESS, rounds 2006 and 2012) data was used to 
observe the younger generation’s political participation (Study II). Since the 
goals of the ESS are to map the attitudes, beliefs and behavioural patterns of 
different populations in Europe, this dataset enabled a comparison of Estonia 
with other EU countries.  
For additional background information and general statistics, Integration 
Monitoring data from 2011, 2015 and 2017 was used (Study V). The Inte-
gration Monitoring survey is ordered by the Estonian Ministry of Culture and 
focuses on both Native Estonian speakers and those whose native language is 
not Estonian. The integration monitoring surveys have been carried out since 
the year 2000 and topics covered vary from labour market and political 
participation to media use.  
In Study III, in addition to data from Me. The World. The Media, data was 
used from the survey “Topical events and different information sources” 
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commissioned by the Open Estonia Foundation and carried out by Saar Poll in 
August 2014. This survey was carried out shortly after the shooting-down of a 
Malaysian airplane over Eastern Ukraine and the death of all 298 people on 
board. The sample consisted of 1,000 respondents aged 15 to 74 of which 505 
were Estonians and 494 non-Estonians. 
Study IV was supported by different datasets. In addition to the Integration 
Monitoring and Me. The World. The Media mentioned above, the Integration 
Monitoring data was used alongside different Latvian datasets to find com-
parable information.  
For the quantitative data analysis, I used descriptive statistics (frequency 
tables, comparison of means, correlations etc.), cluster analysis, factor analysis 
and regression analysis. Quantitative information not only allows us to assess the 
frequency of certain properties (e.g. how many Russian speakers trust Estonian 
institutions) and general trends (and their change in time) about the background 
information of members of the Russian-speaking population (e.g. citizenship, 
language knowledge, education, generation etc.), but it also allows us to consider 
media consumption as well and find correlations between different factors. Most 
importantly, in this thesis, the quantitative approach allows for the repetition of 
the initial analysis done by Lauristin (2012) and the addition of new dimensions 
and measurement tools to that analysis (see more in Chapter 4.2). 
The quantitative approach implemented in this thesis is affected by the metho-
dological work done within the long-term research project “Me. The World. The 
Media”. This survey makes it possible to analyse how individuals (Estonians as 
well Russian speakers) cope with macro-level structural changes (Masso et al 
2020 p.6) by offering single usage as well as a range of aggregated index 
variables (in 2014 there were 128 indices). The researchers working with the 
project adopted the methodological tool proposed by Archer (2013) and used 
different uni- and multivariate methods in analysing the data: correlation, factor, 
cluster and regression analysis, multidimensional scaling etc. (Masso et al 2020 p. 
6). Using the Archer (2013) approach (relational understanding of causality) has 
enabled the studies carried out so far (within this project) to help understand and 
explain the dynamics and outcomes of social change (Masso et al 2010). For 
example, by using cluster analysis, it has been possible to determine interrelations 
and explain wider mechanisms behind social or structural changes in Estonian 
society (Masso et al p. 9). Additionally, combined with other analytical methods, 
this approach has enabled researchers to explore the interrelations between 
individuals and variables as well aggregated indices (i.e. relationships between 
different parties involved in social processes) (ibid.).  
Therefore, due to the opportunities offered by previous work based on the 
Me. The World. The Media survey (see Kalmus et al 2020), I followed the 
traditions and central claims of the research team of this work and relied upon a 
multidimensional analysis. To form the integration clusters, certain index 
variables, altogether 8 indices, were considered. These aggregated variables are 
based on the single variables described in chapter 4.2. Integration clusters are 
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combinations of integration dimensions and represent sub-groups or ideal types 
of Russian-speaking populations.  
Qualitative data was used to illustrate the quantitative analysis. The quali-
tative analysis presented in this thesis is based on the focus group data gathered 
from 2015. From winter to spring 2015, four focus groups were carried out: 
three in Tallinn and one in Ida-Virumaa (Kohtla-Järve). A qualitative approach 
was necessary to gain a deeper understanding of how people’s belonging to 
different integration clusters responds to changes taking place in Estonian 
society. It further considers what role the media plays in this process and infers 
about the reasons behind specific media following habits, and assesses which 
interpretation practices describe Russian-speaking populations, how news 
media institutions and their messages are perceived, and how Russian speakers 
position themselves as media users.  
Table 4 below presents data collected in relation to the research questions. 
The data collection and analysis methods for each publication are described 
more specifically in the relevant part.  
 
 
Table 4. Overview of data collection and analysis  
 Data collection Connection 
to study 
questions 
Study I Quantitative research: immigrant population study carried out in 
2008 encompassing permanent residents of Estonia aged 15–74, 
who were themselves, or whose parents were foreign born. 
Sample size was 2,432.  
1.1 
Study II Quantitative research: data of the European Social Survey (ESS) 
rounds 2006 and 2012 were used. ESS survey sample is 
representative of all persons aged 15 and over with minimum 
response rate of 70%. 
1.1; 1.2 
Study III Quantitative research combined with qualitative research. The 
empirical analysis is based on a series of focus group discussions 
with members of Russian-speaking communities in Latvia and 
Estonia from late 2014 to early 2015 (The Estonian part is the 
same as mentioned under Study V). Different quantitative data-
sets were also used: Integration Monitoring 2015 (Estonia), 
Demaudits 2014, Attitudes television 2014 (Latvia).  
2.2; 3.2 
Study IV Quantitative research combined with qualitative research. More 
specifically data from Me. The World. The Media, as well data 
from survey “Topical events and different information sources” 
carried out in August 2014. Additionally, data from four focus 
group discussions with members of the Russian-speaking com-
munity were used. Focus group interviews were carried out in the 
the beginning of 2015. 
3.2 
Study V Quantitative research: data from the Me. The World. The Media 
Survey. The sample consists of Estonian population aged 15–75, 
each round has 1,500 respondents (years 2002, 2005, 2008 and 
2014). The main focus was on data from the 2014 round. 
1.1; 1.2; 
2.1; 3.1 
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4.2 Constructing measurement tools  
for quantitative study 
In order to measure integration, different methods or approaches have been used 
in both the academic (i.e. Amit 2012, Caselli 2015, Dickey et al 2018) and 
political fields (i.e. Entzinger & Biezeveld 2003, Niessen & Schibel 2004). To 
measure the strength of integration in Estonia in 2008 and 2011 (the latter of 
which was more detailed) an integration index, which divided the Russian-
speaking population into different categories, was composed (see Lauristin 
2008 & 2012). The index compiled for the 2011 Integration Monitoring (see 
Lauristin 2012), was based on different integration dimensions (aggregated 
variables) which represented the topics of the Estonian integration policy (see 
more in Chapter 3) and focused on three dimensions: a) citizenship and civic 
identity; b) language competence and use; c) social and political involvement. 
More specifically, integration was measured via different variables such as 
following and trusting Estonian media, communication in Estonian, language 
competence, participation in elections, trust towards institutions, and also, the 
celebration of Russian days of importance (Lauristin 2012). By combining the 
aforementioned three dimensions, the five different types of integration were 
separated. The dimension-based approach and clustering was also used in a 
2013 study done by Kruusvall as well in the 2015 Integration Monitoring (see 
Kruusvall 2015). These latter works helped to validate the tool initially created 
by Lauristin (2012) and prove its relevance in terms of measuring the inte-
gration of Russian-speaking populations.  
Previous research on integration clusters (Lauristin 2012, Kruusvall 2013, 
2015) has indicated that the integration process among Russian-speaking popu-
lations strongly depends on social background. Non-Estonians living in Estonia 
(mostly members of the Russian-speaking population) are not a homogenous 
group; rather, they consist of different sub-groups who have different needs and 
qualities based on their linguistic, political and social involvement (ibid.). Sub-
groups with less education, absent willingness and capability to integrate and 
lower social status are the ones who are in the greatest danger to be (ethnically) 
stratified (see e.g. Lauristin 2012). Using clustering as an approach, enables 
researchers to first define these groups and secondly, to indicate what kind of 
(political) support measures they would need.  
Even though the empirical model for the exploration of segmented inte-
gration through aggregated variables of integration dimensions and cluster ana-
lysis is inspired by the ample work described above, the current analysis goes a 
step further. One the one hand, research has indicated that there is persistent 
segregation, and that Estonians and members of the Russian-speaking popula-
tion work in different sectors/collectives, have different communication net-
works and media following habits, practice different traditions, enact different 
political behaviour etc. On the other hand, the purpose of integration policy is to 
direct Russian-speaking populations towards a greater participation at the civic 
and political level, while maintaining their traditions and ethnic identity at the 
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same time. In this work, different nuances have been taken into account by 
adding more integration dimensions and thereby covering more variables 
describing the integration of Russian-speaking populations. Considering the 
empirically measured context of integration domains (described in Chapter 3), 
this eight-dimensional model embraces aspects of political, civic, economic and 
cultural domains of social life (Study V). However, one of the downsides is 
that, in the current empirical model, the cultural domain does not include educa-
tion and cultural consumption. Media consumption/following as well partici-
pation in culture (e.g. NGOs, visiting cultural events), religious practices and 
celebration of days of importance are taken into account. This means, that 
future empirical models can be amended.  
 
 
4.2.1 Formation and description  
of aggregated integration indices 
The survey Me. The World. The Media (n=47521) from 2014, which covers 
many domains of social life that reflect aspects of integration, was the main 
source used for the quantitative analysis in this thesis. Based on this survey, the 
integration types, which were formed based on the aggregation of single 
variables into indices, cover four main integration domains (described in 
Chapter 3.2). The equal political and civic participation of Estonian residents 
has been stated in several integration plans (see Chapter 3.2): being involved in 
different (joint) civic as well political activities not only increases the coherence 
of society, but also strengthens civic identity (see Chapter 3.2, also Lõimuv 
Eesti 2020). In this thesis, political and civic participation encompass various 
dimensions of integration (see Chapter 3.2, Study V). Namely, political 
involvement as a citizen (either having formal citizenship or participating in 
elections), participation in public sphere (taking part in different public events, 
being informed about the news), trusting institutions, belonging to NGOs and 
alternative political activity (like joining political campaigns in social media or 
participation in meetings/demonstrations). Figure 1 points out the extent to 
which Russian speakers are involved in certain dimensions.  
 
                                                 
21   The total sample is 1503, and the number of Russian speakers is 475.  
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Figure 1. Composition variables of the aggregated index variables of political and civic involve-
ment and agency: Share of positive22 answers among the whole sample of Russian speakers 
(n=475). 
 
                                                 
22  Here and afterwards (figures 2, 3, 4), the share of positive responses also encompasses  
the rersponses “I rather agree” and “agree totally” whereas “no” includes “rather don’t 
agree” or “don’t agree”.  
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Another important aspect of integration is economic agency. Together with 
political domain, the economic situation after Estonian re-independence 
changed a lot and affected Russian-speaking populations in numerous ways 
(more in Chapter 3.2). I measured the economic agency and involvement of 
members of the Russian-speaking population via the single variables depicted in 
table 5. Based on the conclusions of Study I, an important form of economic 
agency is entrepreneurship, which involves being either self-employed or em-
ploying others (11%23 answered yes) (see figure 2). Another variable characte-
rizing the ability to raise resources is participation in projects in the Estonian or 
international business sphere (the share of positive answers was 11%). Based on 
the conclusions of Study 1, I also included the variable of work-related training 
or further education (15%) in the index composition because this characterizes 
the aspect of resilience as an employee. Also, the variable of general wealth 
(20%) is important as it characterizes the degree of economic security and 
household resilience (93% of Russian speakers own some kind real estate). As 
previously stated, all these aspects are under-represented among Russian-
speaking populations. Participation in further training, whether work related or 
not, is an exception and the participation rate is twice as high among Estonians. 
Meanwhile, economic agency, which differs by only a couple of percentage 
points, is not considerably higher among ethnic Estonians.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Composition variables of the aggregated index variable of economic agency 
and involvement: Share of positive answers among the whole sample of Russian 
speakers (n = 475). 
                                                 
23  Here and afterwards when describing the single variables chosen for forming indices in 
the brackets, the share of positive answers is presented (n = 475). 
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The different social spaces are marked with a line of division between Estonian-
Russian language. Considering that one-third of Estonian’s population speaks 
Russian as their mother tongue, for such a big community, the spread and 
development of Estonian-language skills has proceeded rather slowly (Study 
III, see also Chapter 3.2). Moreover, knowledge of Estonian plays an important 
role in terms of social inclusion/integration and the lack of Estonian language 
skills is connected with social and structural segregation (Study III, see Viha-
lemm & Hogan-Brun 2013a). 
Estonian language media use is associated with a person´s general connec-
tion to Estonia. Those who follow Estonian language media participate more in 
the political and public spheres compared to those who follow mainly Russian 
media (Study V). However, the following of Estonian-language media among 
Russian-speaking audiences is rather modest (Study V, see also Chapter 3.2). 
The infrequent following of Estonian (or Estonian-origin, but Russian-lan-
guage) media indicates a weak connectedness with Estonian society (Study V). 
Thus, language skill and language use are multifaceted rather than unidimen-
sional variables. 
To measure the linguistic-communicative dimension of integration (see also 
Study III), I included variables describing the active use of Estonian language 
which support that 57% of Russian speakers use Estonian language either some-
times or frequently (see figure 3) and 40% claim their command of Estonian is 
good (see Chapter 3.2). Another important aspect in terms of the linguistic-
communicative dimension is media use. Therefore, I covered variables related 
to Estonian-language or Estonian origin Russian-language media: radio, TV 
channels and web portals. About two-thirds of the Russian-speaking population 
listens to Russian-language radio and another 40% watch Russian-language TV 
(channel TV3+). The following of Estonian-language TV channels or listening 
to Estonian radio is rather seldom (22% and 15% accordingly).  
Despite differences in socio-economic background, citizenship and media 
following patterns, the ethno-cultural identity and its strength is a common, 
unifying dimension of integration (Study V, see also Chapter 3.2). At the same 
time, different groups of Russian speakers implement it differently (see Chapter 
5.1, Study V): some are more religious (see Chapter 3.2); younger generations 
have embraced new values and identities whereas older generations are rather 
committed to traditional ways of thinking (Vihalemm & Kalmus 2009, Study 
V); the value of celebrating important days also varies among members of the 
Russian-speaking population (see Chapter 5.2), etc. 
Study V offers the comprehensive index variable to describe the ethno-
cultural identity of Russian speaking populations. This variable consists of 
habits of celebrating Russian national and Russian Orthodox days of impor-
tance24, exercising religious practices (52% claim to be religious, 29% go to 
                                                 
24  For Russian speakers in Estonia, the celebration of holidays and days of importance is s 
carrier of cultural continuity in turbulent times (Vihalemm & Harro-Loit 2019). 
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church), taking part in ethno-cultural associations and feeling solidarity (we-
ness) within the group of Russians in Estonia (18%) (see figure 4).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Composition variables of the aggregated index variable for Estonian language 
and media use. Share of positive answers among the whole sample of Russian speakers 
(n=475). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Composition variables for the aggregated index variable of Ethno-cultural 
identity. Share of positive answers among the whole sample of Russian speakers  
(n = 475) 
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In order to aggregate single variables (Russian speakers answers to the Me. The 
World. The Media questionnaire), increase the reliability of the variables, and 
better present general tendencies found in the answers (see also Vihalemm & 
Masso 2017), I used index/aggregated variables. Based on single variables, I 
formed 8 different indices. The single variables with shortened (recoded) scales 
are presented in table 5. All single variables used to create the indices, are either 
binary (0 & 1) or measurable on a scale of 0 to 2. The 8 indices formed are 
called integration dimensions and named accordingly (see table 5).  
The first step towards the formation of these indices was selecting the right 
variables based on their content validity. Additionally, single variables were 
tested for how well they meet the statistical criteria of compatibility. In this 
analysis, Cronbach’s alpha is used to find out how single variables are related; 
the bigger the value of the Alpha, the better the chosen variables measure the 
phenomenon being studied. After that, single variables were summarized in a 
partial sum index based on the variables already recorded (see table 5). For 
further analysis, the recoding of summarized variables was also necessary. Be-
cause aggregated variables (indices) are formed based on different numbers of 
initial, single variables, their scale varies from 0 to 20. Therefore, for indices to 
be comparable and interpretable, I shortened their initial scales based on a 
normal distribution. The indices of (1) political involvement as a citizen, (2) 
participation in civic organisations, (3) trust in Estonian institutions, (4) econo-
mic involvement and (5) estonianisation received four values: failing, weak, 
medium and strong. The indices of (6) alternative political participation, (7) 
participation in public sphere and (8) ethno-cultural identity received three 
values: failing or weak, medium and strong.  
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Table 5. Single variables used to compose index variable 
Name of the index Values of constituting variables 
Political involvement as a citizen (Cronbach's alpha = 0,76)
Citizenship Other = 0, Estonian = 1 
Participation in national elections 2011 No = 0, Yes = 1 
Participation in local municipality elections 2013 No = 0, Yes = 1 
Participation in Europarlament elections 2014 No = 0, Yes = 1 
Subjective feeling of togetherness with co-citizens No = 0, Yes = 1 
Participation in civic organisations (Cronbach's alpha = 0,51)
Is a representative/has a public function No = 0, Yes = 1 
Participation in NGOs No = 0, Yes = 1 
Trust in NGOs No = 0, Yes = 1 
Participation in campaigns and movements No = 0, Yes = 1 
Charity and voluntary work No = 0, Yes = 1 
Trust in Estonian institutions (Cronbach's alpha = 0,84)
The Parliament Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2 
The President Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2 
The Government Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2 
The media Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2 
The courts Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2 
The police Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2 
Education system Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2 
Health care system Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2 
Church Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2 
Banks Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2 
Alternative political participation (Cronbach's alpha = 0,69)
Participation in public meetings Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2 
Participation in demonstrations Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2 
Participation in political debates Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2 
Wearing a badge or ribbon with political content Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2 
Support for or joining a protest campaign Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2 
Participation in an internet petition Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2 
Participation in the public sphere (Cronbach's alpha = 0,56)
Participation in different public cultural, sports and 
commemorative events No = 0, Yes = 1 
Daily following of the news No = 0, Yes = 1 
Being well informed about current affairs No = 0, Yes = 1 
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Name of the index Values of constituting variables 
Important to be informed about current affairs  No = 0, Yes = 1 
Economic involvement (Cronbach's alpha = 0,63)
Entrepreneurship (being owner, board member or 
shareholder of a company), No = 0, Yes = 1 
participation in business projects or EU-funded 
projects No = 0, Yes = 1 
Recent participation in work-related (re)training 
courses No = 0, Yes = 1 
Owning real estate No = 0, Yes = 1 
Financial wealth (do you have sufficient money for 
food, clothes, hobbies etc.) Little = 0, Big = 1 
Estonianisation (Cronbach's alpha = 0,73)
Knowledge of the Estonian language and frequent 
use in different spheres of life No = 0, Yes = 1 
Having ethnic Estonians as friends No = 0, Yes = 1 
Following Estonian-language media No = 0, Yes = 1 
Ethno-cultural identity (Cronbach's alpha = 0,60)
The feeling of ethnic belonging as a Russian 
(Ukrainian, other ethnic group) No = 0, Yes = 1 
Participating in and supporting the activities of an 
ethnic cultural society No = 0, Yes = 1 
Celebrating holidays in the Russian folk calendar 
and national holidays of the Russian Federation No = 0, Yes = 1 
Religiosity None = 0, Some = 1, Big = 2 
Attending church No = 0, Yes = 1 
 
 
 
The integration dimensions (indices) described in table 5 are not all-encom-
passing; education, for example (see Chapter 3) could be a separate dimension, 
but is not included in the current analysis, and cultural domain is also more 
versatile than the aspects included here. In future research, depending on the 
context, distinguishing educational as well as cultural domains could also be 
considered; however, due to the limitations of the empirical material collected, 
these domains are not considered in this study/model.  
Figure 5 presents the variation of aggregated index variables (integration 
dimensions). The strongest is participation in the public sphere which involves 
taking part in different public events, following news media and being well 
informed. The weakest is alternative political participation, referring to parti-
cipation in public meetings, demonstrations, debates etc. In this sense, Russian 
speakers do not differ much from the ethnic Estonians. Among Estonians, 
participation in the public sphere was also the strongest (92%), whereas those 
who were alternatively politically active, was about 49%. The latter of these two 
was still considerably more than in the case of Russian speakers.  
According to the aggregated index variable of trust towards various social 
institutions, about half of the Russian speaking population (among ethnic 
Estonians this variable was two-thirds) feel at least moderate trust (see figure 5) 
in these institutions. That, together with knowledge of Estonian, significantly 
eases their communication with government agencies and other institutions if 
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needed. This further contributes to their social involvement and diminishes the 
risk of social marginalization. Estonian language and media, however, are being 
used regularly: approximately half of the Russian speaking population regularly 
uses Estonian language in their daily life either via communication with Esto-
nians, following Estonian language media or in other situations (Study III and 
Study V).  
Practices helping to maintain ethno-cultural identity (cultural associations, 
cultural events, celebrating ethnic or Russian national holidays) are spread 
among approximately one-half of the Russian-speaking population (Study V). 
The same basically applies to participation in civic organisations (NGOs). Eco-
nomic agency and involvement by the Russian-speaking population is rather 
low (Study V), but similar to that of the native population: among Russian 
speakers the medium level of involvement is at least 35%, while among Esto-
nians it is 46%. 
 
Figure 5. Integration of Russian-speaking population into different spheres of society.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on “Me. The World. The Media, 2014” 
 
In order to measure the transnationalism of the Russian-speaking population, I 
constructed the aggregated index of translocality (Study V). The term trans-
locality marks the relationships between multiple places which do not neces-
sarily reach beyond political borders (Smith & Guarnizo 1998). There have 
been several attempts to measure translocality. For example, Naumann and 
Creiner (2017) explored translocal relations in the case of miners in the 
Northern Cape province of South Africa. By using data from ethnographic field 
research, the authors tried to explain why miners expand their action space yet 
are attached to a certain place. Rios and Watkins (2015) observed the Hmong 
diaspora in the US to explain translocal placemaking from the point of view of 
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urban planning. Föbker and colleagues (2016) used qualitative interviews to 
focus on highly skilled immigrants in Germany and explore how their everyday 
practices and networks as well their translocal mobility practices are related to 
integration.  
In this analysis, transnationalism is explored on the local level. This means 
that transnationalism is explained based on mediated relations which are mostly 
located outside of Estonia. The majority of the Estonian Russian-speaking 
population has personal contacts outside of Estonia, and they do follow the 
media content produced outside the borders of Estonia (Table 8.3 in Study V). 
Although people also make physical visits abroad, the transnationalism of 
Estonian Russian speakers is mainly mediated by the nature of their everyday 
following of both national and foreign media (Russian, Western), and social 
media or other forms of digital communications. 
The transnationalism index was composed of the following single variables: 
visiting friends and relatives living in Russia and other countries, having friends 
and relatives who have recently emigrated from Estonia, having many social 
media contacts outside Estonia, doing business or having work or study 
relations abroad, following Russian media, following other international media 
(Cronbachʼs alpha = 0,83). The methodology and steps in forming the index 
were the same as described above: recoding the single variables, after that 
summarizing, then shortening the index according to normal distribution. The 
index was given three values: “weak or missing”, “medium” and “strong”. 
Strong transnationalism marks having friends, relatives, partners abroad, 
visiting them, frequent following of Russian or other foreign media channels, 
and many social media contacts abroad. Weak or missing transnationalism, on 
the contrary, marks infrequent contacts with foreign countries, scant following 
of foreign media, and few social media contacts abroad (Study V).  
 
 
4.2.2 Formation of integration clusters 
Integration clusters were developed to compare Russian speakers with each 
other and not with ethnic Estonians. The cluster-based approach is an approach, 
which has been previously used for analysing integration. For example, Haugen 
and Kunst (2017) used cluster analysis to measure the acculturation of the 
majority population in Norway. Schwartz and Zamboanga (2008) also used 
cluster analysis to assess the acculturation of US college students by first 
distinguishing the three main dimensions of cultural identity and then defining 
two groups of identity orientation. In this analysis, clusters are based on diverse 
social activities or indices (as described above), which help us to comprehend 
different ways of social involvement.  
Cluster analysis enables researchers to assort variables or individuals based 
on certain (hidden) dimensions or predetermined variables. It also facilitates the 
process of distinguishing between groups of people acting similarly so that the 
differences between groups would be as big as possible. For that purpose, I used 
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the k-means method since it enables researchers to explore/find groups of 
individuals behaving similarly in a dataset on the basis of previously determined 
combinations of variables (Vihalemm & Masso 2017). The way in which 
cluster analysis uses datasets to find hidden structures and enables the explo-
ration of the qualities of belonging to a certain cluster help explain the 
mechanisms of action.  
Because cluster analysis does not answer the question of why structures 
differ, some of the findings are further illustrated with qualitative examples in 
the results chapter.  
The k-means method divides the sample (here the Russian speakers) into 
quite homogeneous groups of individuals. The first step is to find suitable 
variables which are those measurable in a comparable scale. For the purpose of 
this analysis, these are the integration dimensions as described above. In the 
second phase of clustering, the number of groups is determined and named. 
Even though the three and five cluster formations were also tested, I found the 
four-cluster solution most suitable because it distinguished most strongly 
between respondents. The final cluster centers are presented in table 6 below. 
Out of 8 integration dimensions, the strongest distinguishers, where the F-
values were bigger, were political involvement as a citizen and participation in 
civic organisations. The weakest distinguishers were alternative political partici-
pation, economic involvement and trust in Estonian institutions, where the F-
value was the lowest.  
 
 
Table 6. K-means clustering result: final cluster centers25  
  Name of the cluster 
 Index 
Multi-
active 
cosmo-
politan 
cluster  
Dutiful, 
institutionally 
engaged 
cluster 
Active 
ethno-
culturally 
engaged 
cluster 
Passive, 
weakly 
engaged 
cluster  
Political involvement as a citizen 3,26 3,28 1,75 1,66 
Participation in civic organisations 3,32 1,56 2,93 1,41 
Trust in Estonian institutions 2,66 3,00 2,91 2,00 
Alternative political participation 1,64 1,04 1,36 1,14 
Participation in the public sphere 2,35 2,07 2,28 1,69 
Economic involvement  2,95 2,30 2,17 2,12 
Estonianisation 3,30 3,08 2,08 1,84 
Ethno-cultural identity 2,67 2,02 3,19 2,14 
 
 
                                                 
25  The indices of political involvement as a citizen, participation in civic organisations, 
trust in Estonian institutions, economic involvement and estonianisation are measured on the 
scale of 1 to 4, whereas indices of alternative political participation, participation in public 
sphere and ethno-cultural identity are measured on the scale of 1 to 3.  
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The four paths of segmented integration were labelled as follows (see also table 
6) by taking previous research and theoretical concepts describing the inte-
gration of migrant background populations into account: 
a)  A multi-active, cosmopolitan cluster describable via strong involvement 
through multiple domains of social life. 
b)  A dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster characterized by strong political 
involvement as Estonian citizens, high trust in Estonian institutions and 
relatively strong economic involvement and ethno-cultural and religious 
engagement. 
c)  An active ethno-culturally engaged cluster who has strong ethno-cultural and 
religious engagement, and high participation in NGOs, civic activities, the 
public sphere. 
d)  A passive, weakly engaged cluster whose involvement is weak in all dimen-
sions. 
Just as in other methods of typological analysis, the subjective decisions of the 
author’s plays a large role in terms of defining the numbers of clusters and 
variables included in analysis (see Masso & Vihalemm 2017). In this analysis, 
the clusters are based on manually constructed indices with a predetermined 
composition. The cluster analysis positions members of the Estonian Russian 
speaking population in relation to each other (not with majority population) so 
that the construed integration segments (clusters) represent “ideal types”. Thus, 
the description of the clusters/ integration segments would need more research 
validation.  
 
 
4.3 Design and analysis of qualitative data 
Data from focus group interviews is analysed using a qualitative approach. This 
method enables us to examine how people think and why they do so, and also to 
explore their knowledge and experiences (Kitzinger 1995). Additionally, since 
focus groups address the question of how instead of how many, they can 
complement quantitative studies (see Sagoe 2012). Combined with quantitative 
methods, qualitative studies can help promote efficiency more than a single 
method approach (ibid., see Michell 1998). Khan and colleagues (1991) indicate 
that another possible task for focus groups could be following up on quantita-
tive studies. They maintain that these focus groups enable researchers to better 
explain and expand on the data, as well understand reasons behind particular 
findings: for example, understanding how transnationalism and local integration 
are interrelated and affect each other in the context of (ongoing) political crisis.  
In the current analysis, data from the focus groups was used to make a 
connection with the integration clusters since the participants of the focus-
groups also answered a short survey. In order to match the quantitative and 
qualitative parts of the study, the focus group participants were distributed into 
certain integrations. Later, individuals were matched with the clusters discussed 
above (Chapter 4.2) as they shared lots of similarities (the basis variables which 
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constituted indices were more or less the same). For the analysis, focus group 
participants’ quotations were used to illustrate the media content reception and 
interpretation of integration clusters formed based on the Me. The World. The 
Media survey. 
The focus group discussions with members of Russian-speaking commu-
nities in Estonia were carried out in early 2015. During this time, the Russian-
Ukraine crisis was prominently featured in national, Russian, Ukrainian and 
Western news media agendas. Altogether, four focus groups, with a grand total 
of 26 participants, were carried out in the capital city Tallinn (3) and in the 
North-East part of Estonia in the town of Kohtla-Järve (1). The three groups 
carried out in Tallinn consisted of: one group with seven younger participants 
aged 18–35, who did not speak Estonian; one group of six young people, aged 
18–38, who spoke Estonian; and one with eight slightly older participants, aged 
40–67. The focus group interview conducted in Kohtla-Järve was done with 
five participants, aged 18–54 years. In general, the participants were ethnic 
Russians and Ukrainians (i.e. people with multiple identities whose media 
repertoires and political and cultural loyalties varied). The snowball-sampling 
method was used to find focus-group participants. 
I was involved in the process of preparing the interview questions and 
finding suitable media texts from various Russian and international sources. The 
focus groups were semi-structured and lasted approximately two hours with the 
main emphasis on media content and its reception. This focus helped show how 
those belonging to different integration clusters interpret news and other media, 
and how the ongoing crisis or integration pathways might affect this. The 
participants were invited to discuss the content of longer and shorter texts based 
on topical news which was related mostly to the Ukrainian crisis. Participants 
were given 3 or 4 longer texts and a choice of up to 8 shorter news pieces from 
which they chose and debated over the most interesting ones. Their discussion 
topics covered mostly recent (topical) political and local affairs, such as a 
school shooting in Viljandi, events related to closing Charlie Hedbo, the 
Munich Security Conference in relation to Sergei Lavrov, news related to 
ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict, etc.  
The analysis of how media content was interpreted was inspired by Stuart 
Hall’s (1973) encoding/decoding model. According to this model, media 
content is interpreted based on ones own cultural background, socio-economic 
situation and personal experiences. Hall says audience is not passive, but rather, 
it relies on its social context and, in terms of construing content, is active and 
able to change messages via collective actions (Hall 1973). Texts are ambi-
guous, so they can be interpreted in several ways. Every individual entails 
different background and external knowledge about media content or texts 
which they use to interpret mass media. This, in turn, leads towards several 
interpretations of the same context. So, the influence of media comes out 
primarily when constructing meaning. In this analysis, transcripts of focus 
group interviews were later interpreted based on the aim of the specific study 
and research questions proposed there. For some texts, the program MAXQDA 
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was used in order to create categories. In most of the cases (especially Study 
III, IV), the coding is based on research questions and empirical evidence.  
 
 
4.4 Ethical considerations  
The quantitative surveys I use in my research granted full anonymity for 
respondents and were used in accordance with the data protection rules that 
were valid at that time. GDPR came into force after my research was done. The 
empirical analysis is based on five different surveys: The Immigrant population 
survey I used in Study I, was carried out and owned by Statistics Estonian and I 
accessed the data by signing a confidentiality agreement. I could only use data 
in Statistics Estonia on the spot and for scientific purposes. I used the European 
social survey, which is freely accessible, in Study II. Integration Monitoring 
data (Study III, IV, V) was made accessible by the University of Tartu, and I 
was member of the research group using data. Me. The World. The Media 
survey was also accessible to me as I was part of the research group who 
participated in the preparation of the questionnaire. Open Estonian Fund survey 
data was related to Study III and the principal investigator, Andres Jõesaar, 
granted access to this data. 
Additionally, I used empirical evidence from the focus groups. Carrying out 
focus groups requires great attention to anonymity as well as confidentiality 
rules. Before the interview, focus group participants were given and had signed 
the informed consent, after the researcher explained the purpose of the study. 
By signing this form, participants gave permission for their data to be processed 
and analysed, and this also guaranteed their anonymity. This rule is followed in 
the analysis, and the respondents were anonymized in all processes of analysis. 
In this thesis, all the personal data interviewees gave was not associated with 
their views. Participants were informed that they can leave at any point of the 
discussion if they feel pressured in some way. All the focus-group interviews 
were recorded after participants gave written permission to so. Records and 
transcripts were only used for the analysis of the current thesis. The original 
transcripts are archived in an external disk with no Internet access. 
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5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1 Main types of integration  
The differences across integration dimensions described in chapters 3.2 and 4.2 
(also see figure 5 on p. 59) represent possibilities for participation in social life. 
As experienced by the Russian-speaking population, these possibilities relate to 
conforming to structural possibilities or exercising one’s agency and attempting 
to alter them. As previously stated, the Russian-speaking population is inter-
nally heterogeneous and the combinations between these dimensions in relation 
to place of living, age, immigrant generation, education etc. are examined by 
using cluster analysis. This analysis is presented in this and the next chapter and 
is based on the results of Studies III and V.  
The cluster-based approach enables us to divide the Russian-speaking popu-
lation into four subgroups whose integration into Estonian society is led by 
certain leading dimension (Study V, also see Chapter 3.2 and 4.2). Figure 6 
below represents the segmented integration of the Estonian Russian-speaking 
migrant background population. It depicts the integration clusters across their 
constitutive index variables according to the mean values of the respective 
indexes on a standardised scale form 1 (missing) to 4 (strong). 
The cluster with highest mean values in most integration dimensions, except 
trust towards institutions and ethno-cultural identity, is named the multi-active 
cosmopolitan cluster (see study V). In this cluster, members are resourceful and 
have high agency across multiple dimensions of social life, and they feel more 
frequent (compared with other clusters) solidarity with broad, trans-border 
social groups and categories like Europeans, humankind and more abstract 
categories like people with the same lifestyle or preferences (Study V, 
Appendix 8.2). This cluster comprises of 19% of the adult Russian-speaking 
population and corresponds quite well to the goal of growth of cultural, political 
and socio-economic integration brought out in “Integration Estonia 2020” (see 
Chapters 3.1 and 3.2, also Lõimuv Eesti 2020). 
The cluster with high mean values in trust towards institutions, political 
involvement as (Estonian) citizen and participation in the public sphere is 
named the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster. In this cluster, the mode of 
involvement is close to the traditional way of democratic participation (see 
Chapter 3.2, e.g. political participation, Study V) via elections, obeying rules 
and regulations, following mass media that is called “duty citizenship” by 
Dalton (2008, see also Study II). This cluster, which is characteristic to the 
older generation of ethnic minorities (Study II), forms 35% of the adult 
Russian-speaking population.  
The cluster with high mean values in ethno-cultural identity, membership in 
NGO-s and participation in the public sphere is called the active ethno-
culturally engaged cluster (Study V). Members of this cluster are active at the 
community level and in civic society, they take part in cultural and religious 
associations, which is a considerable component and maintainer of ethno-
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cultural indemnity, (see Chapter 3.2), participate in public events, and feel 
strong solidarity with Estonian Russians (Study V, Appendix 8.2). This cluster 
forms 26% of the adult Russian-speaking population.  
The cluster with the low mean values in most integration dimensions is 
called the passive, weakly engaged cluster (Study V). Members of this group 
are, according to the varied questions asked in the Me. The World. The Media 
2014 survey, the most disinterested and demotivated for any kind of public 
participation. At least part of their passivity, however, is due to institutional 
hindrances or lack of personal resources. Their weak or non-involvement is 
structurally prescribed and thus, the structural and voluntary exclusion are 
mutually reinforcing. This cluster forms 21% of the adult Russian-speaking 
population.   
 
Figure 6. Integration clusters according to integration dimensions.                                                        
Source: Authors’ calculations based on “Me. The World. The Media, 2014” 
 
 
We can say that the majority of Russian speakers are integrated into Estonian 
society through economic, political, or civic practices or some participation in 
public space. But their agency type, the socio-economic and political risks 
associated with these groups and also the possibilities for policy makers or 
governors to develop some kind of dialogue with these population segments are 
varied. Therefore, the practical approach of segmented integration is connected 
with media use among these segments. Because mass communication varies in 
functions from utilitarian to ideological, the process of segmented integration is 
strongly related to peoples’ media use. The interpersonal and inter-group 
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communications via social networks is also shaped by their structural integration 
and vice versa. Being well-informed and having mediated social connections 
shape individuals’ structural integration and identity orientations. For Russian 
speakers, as previously mentioned (see Chapter 3.2), over the years, Russian 
media, especially Russian TV channels, have remained a main sources of news, 
and over 90% of Russian speakers follow at least one Russian TV channel every 
day (Study V, Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). Following media of Russian origin is 
a common practice among Russian-speaking populations and the Estonian 
Russian-language radio stations are also widely listened to (see table 7).  
 
 
Table 7. Media use among integration clusters 
  
multi-active 
cosmopolitan 
cluster 
dutiful, 
institutionally 
engaged 
cluster 
active 
ethno-
culturally 
engaged 
cluster 
passive, 
weakly 
engaged 
cluster 
Russian 
speakers 
total 
Russian TV 
channels 88% 90% 90% 90% 89% 
Russian-language 
web portals 66% 49% 28% 24% 42% 
International 
media 67% 53% 37% 36% 49% 
Estonian Russian-
language media 41% 30% 24% 37% 32% 
Estonian TV 
channels 36% 21% 17% 14% 21% 
Russian web 
portals 32% 20% 12% 10% 18% 
Estonian language 
web portals 29% 15% 7% 3% 13% 
Estonian Russian-
language radio 73% 59% 36% 58% 56% 
 
 
The multi-active cosmopolitan cluster represents the most successful mode of 
segmented integration. This cluster is characterized by strong nation-specific 
capitals (Estonian language and citizenship, and following Estonian language 
media), active political participation in both traditional and alternative forms 
and widespread NGO membership and participation in civic activities with civic 
and high economic agency (Study V). For this cluster, trust towards institutions 
and ethno-cultural identity received rather moderate as opposed to high mean 
values. Thus, the cluster members’ life orientation is rather emancipatory, and 
they do not rely on the good or fair functioning of institutions. While they feel 
solidarity with Estonian Russians (Study V, Appendix 8.2), their participation 
in ethno-cultural associations’, celebration of “Russian” days of importance and 
especially their religious attachment are all more modest compared to the active 
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ethno-culturally engaged cluster. This cluster has above-average proportion of 
females (67 %) and people with higher education (48%), people with Estonian 
citizenship (83%) and entrepreneurs/managers/specialists (44%). Every third 
cluster member lives outside of the concentration areas of Russian-speaking 
population, i.e. Tallinn or industrial cities in North-East Estonia (the full socio-
demographic profile is given in Appendix 8.1. of Study V). This cluster’s high 
agency is multifariously reproduced via high social status and labour market 
position, political participation, civic activity and good command in Estonian 
language. The higher agency is connected with an emancipatory critical stance 
towards state institutions and more trans-border, post-modern identity orienta-
tions (Appendix 8.2. of Study V). Thus, this mode of segmented integration 
cannot be called assimilationist. Even though the personal capitals invested in 
social upward mobility are linked with the nation state structures and local 
majority, structural involvement does not pair with unconditional loyalty and 
assimilation identity.   
The members of multi-active cosmopolitan cluster are outstanding not only 
for their frequent following of international news channels (like BBC, CNN, 
and EuroNews in Russian language), but also for their following of other media 
channels that are not popular among other clusters: Estonian Russian-language 
online news portals (like Delfi, Postimees) and Estonian-language television 
(table 7, Study V). The variation in local integration is positively correlated 
with patterns of regularity in following news rather than a versatility of chan-
nels in the media menu. Thus, political and economic integration, agency, and 
regular news following are mutually reinforcing. Being in constant information 
flow enables individuals to make (more) meaning of the ongoing events and 
processes in society, and further contextualize the events to exercise diachronic 
elements in the independent interpretation of the news (Study V). In general, 
the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster had the most versatile media menu com-
pared to other clusters. 
The dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster represents the mode of integra-
tion that is close to the civic assimilation. A high share of individuals in this 
cluster have Estonian citizenship, a high trust in institution, and hold the most 
pro-Estonia (or least pro-Soviet and pro-Russia) opinions of socio-political 
issues (Study V). At the same time, they feel solidarity with Estonian Russians 
(55%) and residents of Estonia (50%), but not much with Estonians (17%) 
(Appendix 8.2. of Study V). Thus, their political identity clearly dominates 
their ethno-cultural identity and assimilation into the ethnic majority is likely 
impeded by modest Estonian language skills (only 43% of them have active/ 
good Estonian language skills). Their participation in public life is mainly 
mediated and formal, and they trust principal institutions in society and follow 
news on regular basis. This is in line with the findings of Kaldur and colleagues 
(2017): the more people trust institutions, the more they are politically involved. 
Greater trust, in turn, goes together with Estonian citizenship (see Chapter 3.2). 
The existence of country specific capital like citizenship is a way of being and 
staying politically involved.  
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Cluster members’ civic involvement is limited to traditional institutional 
forms, and participation in NGOs and alternative forms of political participation 
is rare in this group. Their economic integration is moderate (see figure 6). 
According to the socio-demographical profile (Appendix 8.1. of Study V) this 
mode of integration seems to reproduce itself across generations because a 
considerable share (45%) belong to the younger and middle age cohorts (15 to 
45 years age). Two-third of Russian speakers belonging to this cluster were 
born in Estonia. About a third (34%) of the people belonging to this cluster have 
higher education and 27% are employed as managers or specialists. Compared 
to the members of other clusters, they feel more solidarity with all residents of 
Estonia and with people of the same generation (Appendix 8.2. of Study V). In 
general, the civic assimilationist mode of segmented integration is rather vital in 
Estonian society and spreads with the generation replacement of first migration 
generation to second and third migration generations as well as via tertiary 
education. Paradoxically, this pathway seems to materialize when Estonian 
language acquisition and the exercise of civic activity are somewhat impeded 
either structurally or for personal reasons.  
Like cosmopolitan cluster members, a significant portion of members of the 
dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster (53%) also follow international media 
rather frequently (see table 7). In addition, they mix Russian media channels 
with Estonian Russian language radio in their media menu. News following is a 
part of their daily routine. As said before, the economic and political involve-
ment in society reinforce the regular news following and the need to be well 
informed (see Vihalemm & Leppik 2017). In the media menu of members of 
the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster, informal news coming via links and 
suggestions from social media friends have an important role. News from 
informal communication networks are used for checking the relevance and 
accuracy of incoming information and are part of the “comparison-making” that 
was reported to be exercised by members of this cluster:  
 
“I get most information from the Internet. Also the radio “Ehho Moskvõ”. PBK, 
Postimees and Delfi. Ukrainian news from the Internet or from “Ukraina.24” 
(M, 57, dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster) 
 
“BBC had a completely different opinion than PBK or Delfi. It was made more 
from a western point of view and the Minsk agreement was seen as a problem 
and not as a solution. It all was depicted negatively” (M, 18, dutiful, institutio-
nally engaged cluster) 
 
The third pathway of segmented integration can be called diasporic and it is 
represented by the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster. In theory, the term 
diaspora marks people living in other territories but maintaining a continuing 
relationship and feeling a collective transborder ethnic identification with their 
original homeland (Safran 1991 p. 83). Diasporic in the name of the cluster 
indicates the members’ orientation towards Russia. A large portion of members 
of this cluster have Russian citizenship (43%) or they have not determined their 
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citizenship and are automatically EU citizens with so called “grey passports” 
(29%). A majority of them have a (very) poor command of Estonian language 
(Appendix 8.1. of Study V). Their socio-economic position is vulnerable. 
Many are employees, mainly employed as manual or service workers, and have 
not received further training. Entrepreneurship practices are not common and a 
big share of individuals in this group are retired from the labour market. Despite 
the rather unfavourable structural affordances, their social agency is rather 
remarkable. As non-Estonian citizens they cannot elect the parliament, but they 
can participate in local elections and thereby have a political “voice” in the 
community. Their civic/local position is supported by a rather active alternative 
political participation (Table 8.1. of Study V), widespread membership in 
NGOs, cultural and religious associations, active local (Russian language) 
media following and participation in the public events. Those civic activities 
could also serve the interest of the public and therefore propitiate involvement 
(see Chapter 3.2, Lauristin 2012). Members of this cluster are characterised by a 
strong ethno-cultural identity and attachment to the church. Almost half of them 
consider themselves religious and attend a church (twice as often as the average 
in the Russian-speaking population) that offers both community solidarity and 
some institutional boundedness.  
Belonging to the Russian orthodox church is strongly related to Russian 
ethnocultural identity (Vihalemm, 2011, Vihalemm & Kaplan, 2017). Accor-
ding to the socio-demographical profile (Appendix 8.1. of Study V) 59% of 
active ethno-culturally engaged cluster members are women, half are aged 45–
64 and 25% are older than 65 years. About 87% of the members of this cluster 
do not speak Estonian. Therefore, they do not follow Estonian-language media 
or use Estonian for communication. While two-thirds of the cluster members 
belong to the older cohorts of the first or second migration generation, it is too 
early to say whether or not the diasporic path of segmented integration is 
declining in the course of generational replacement. One source of its re-
production is digital participation in the Russian-speaking mediascapes and 
social networks which will be further explained in the next chapter. 
Almost all the members of active ethno-culturally engaged cluster follow 
Russian-origin media channels (see table 5). Typical reports about personal 
media menus were as follows: 
 
“Well PBK, RTR, and CNN in English. Social sites like Vkontakte and Pikap.ru” 
(M, 18, active ethno-culturally engaged cluster) 
 
“I watch TV and listen to the radio. RTR and PBK, also Radio 4 at work and 
NTV” (W, 67, active ethno-culturally engaged cluster) 
 
Irregular and random news following was characteristic of this cluster. Tem-
porally fragmented media consumption does not support thorough interpretation 
of the processes and events, and opinion formation is based on the fragmented 
sources. In this context, their intensive and extensive following of Russian tele-
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vision gives priority in the framing of events coming from the Russian state 
media.  
The fourth path of segmented integration seems to be close to the marginali-
zation (Berry 1997) and is represented by the passive, weakly engaged cluster. 
This group of people may be involved in society in other ways which were not 
represented in the survey Me. The World. The Media 2014; however, other 
analyses on the same database considering other variables also did not report 
specific ways and structures of social involvement except for consumer market 
structures and practices of everyday lifestyle management (i.e. Kiisel 2017). 
The group is less satisfied and more pessimistic in their life expectations 
(Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). Thus, their marginal position in society is not only 
a normative claim externally ascribed to the group by researchers, but an 
unideal mode of social existence for the group members themselves. According 
to their socio-demographic profile (Appendix 8.1. of Study V), men and 
women equally belong into this cluster. Nearly half of them are older, belonging 
to age group of 45–64, and having either undetermined or Russian citizenship. 
Furthermore, 83% have a poor command of Estonian language, which decreases 
their possibilities to participate in society or even cuts them off (see also Chapter 
3.2). Among members of this cluster, 40% are first generation migrants. Thus, the 
political-civic marginalization path of segmented integration may decline some-
what with the generation replacement. Considering the problem researches 
pointed out related to younger generations’ participation in the democratic and 
public sphere (Study II), the continuation (with some transformation) of this 
mode of social involvement is likely. 
The media following of this cluster is a slight exception of the general 
pattern according to which the passive, weakly engaged cluster shows the 
weakest results across social participation variables. As can be seen from table 
7, passive, weakly engaged cluster members’ media following is similar or even 
slightly more intense (in case of Estonian Russian language radio) compared to 
the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster (table 7). They still watch predomi-
nately Russian TV and listen to Estonian Russian-language radio (Study V). 
The news following among the members of the passive, weakly engaged cluster 
is rare and/or random, and distinct from the mainstream mediums. This is some-
what compensated with online activities such as following suggestions and links 
sent by social media friends and mixing entertainment with news (see Viha-
lemm & Leppik 2017). The excerpt below illustrates the news following stra-
tegy of the member of the passive, weakly engaged cluster: 
 
“The most important information is on the Internet. FB news distributed by my 
friend for example. I watched the astrological forecast for Porošenko, Merkel, 
Putin and Timošenko from Youtube” (M, 40, passive, weakly engaged cluster) 
 
As formerly indicated, the media menus of the integration segments vary, but 
the overall pattern of media consumption is more similar between the multi-
active cosmopolitan cluster and dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster. These 
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clusters are characterized by regular news following habits. The active, ethno-
culturally engaged and passive, weakly engaged cluster share similar media 
menus, and their news following habits are less regular compared to the other 
two clusters.  
The qualitative studies reveal that the circle of (social media) friends signi-
ficantly “designs” the content consumed. Several persons in a focus groups 
claimed they follow news when some of their friends have shared them (Study 
V). Quantitative data confirms that about one-third of Russian speakers receive 
news via links in social media (Me. The World. The Media 2014). In general, 
Russian-speaking audiences in Estonia are rather uncritical towards the media 
content and only a few of them agree that they get angry about something they 
see in the media. From the other side, however, a majority of them distrust 
Estonian media outlets (Vihalemm & Leppik 2017). Members of the multi-
dimensionally engaged cluster are critical and get upset about the media 
content, but, at the same time, are more trusting towards media institutions in 
general. Conversely, members of the weakly engaged cluster are less critical but 
more distrusting. Thus, involvement in society and regular news following seem 
to create favourable grounds for a focused, issue-specific response to media 
content whereas irregular (annoying) encounters with news tend to deepen 
scepticism towards the media system.   
While interest in Russian media and consumption of it unify the Russian-
speaking population, the media menus still diverge across the integration seg-
ments (Study V) and frequent and regular following of Russian media shapes 
how local life is perceived. The content and discourses coming from Russian 
sources are interpreted from the prisms formed based on other media outlets and 
immediate life experience related to the particular mode of segmented inte-
gration (Study V). My qualitative study helped to somewhat explain how 
members of the integration clusters interpreted politically contradicting news, 
and revealed that the practical, lived experience considerably shapes their recep-
tion. Thus, when investigating the impact of Russian media on the local 
Russian-speaking community, it is worth considering audience related aspects 
such as: social background, structural involvement, identity orientations, regula-
rity of media following, rather than message and channel related (Study III). 
Thereby, in the next chapter I will explain how I aim to connect the variable of 
integration mode with the variable measuring the mediated transnationalism 
(i.e. geo-political and cultural heterogeneity of the personal media and commu-
nication partner menu). 
 
 
5.2 Transnationalism among Estonian Russian speakers 
The Russian-speaking migrant background population in Estonia is describable 
by a sociocultural parallelism and as living in two societies at the same time 
(see Chapters 2.3 and 3). Furthermore, they are considered to be living in 
accordance to norms of the past and present, which are due to rapid changes 
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taking place in society (see Chapter 3). Transnationalism, in general as well in 
the case of Estonian Russian speakers, encompasses cross-border contacts, both 
virtual and physical, in different spheres: everyday, political, cultural, econo-
mic, etc. While Russian speakers might have business relationships with Esto-
nians, or be able to speak the national language and follow the media, ethno-
culturally different traditions are followed, and the following analysis also 
emphasises that political practices might be influenced by the normalities of 
other countries. Moreover, transnationalism is not hidden and does not take 
place in a vacuum, rather it is a normal, everyday practice for the majority of 
people, including ethnic Estonians (i.e. new normality).  
Figure 7 shows the mean values of the transnationalism index in various 
socio-demographic groups. Among Russian speakers, transnationalism is stron-
ger among 25–44 year olds, among people with higher education and Estonian 
citizenship who live outside of ethnicly concentrated areas such as Tallinn and 
North-East Estonia, and who speak Estonian. Transnationalism is weaker 
among older people, first generation immigrants, less-educated people, people 
with undetermined citizenship, people living in ethnicly concentrated areas, and 
people with a poorer command of Estonian (Study V).  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Values26 of transnationalism index among the Russian-speaking migrant 
background population. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on “Me. The World. The Media, 2014” 
                                                 
26  Means on the scale 1 to 5 where 1 is the weakest and 5 the strongest score. 
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By analysing how transnationalism is associated with dimensions of integration, 
I found that connections are stronger between transnationalism and economic 
involvement, political participation and activities and participation in NGOs 
activities (Study V). The connections are weaker between transnationalism and 
ethno-cultural identity and trust towards institutions (Study V). It seems that 
transnationalism is associated with not only traditional ways of being involved 
(formal citizenship, elections), but also a new type of engagement (NGOs, 
voluntary work, economic involvement). The same has been found by several 
researchers (DeSipio et al 2003, Guarnizo et al 2003, Koopmans et al 2005).  
Study V points out the connections between integration dimensions and trans-
locality. In general, citizenship is an important country-specific factor, which 
could reinforce local integration (see also Hansen 2003). By assuming that the 
relationships with a historical homeland exists in one way or another, citizen-
ship could be seen as a supporting factor for transnationalism (see also Guar-
nizo et al 2003). Those having Estonian citizenship tend to be more trans-
national than others (Study IV). Another important element of country-specific 
capital is knowledge of the national language. Sufficient knowledge of a local 
language enriches the media menu, widens communication circles, and there-
fore, feeds transnationalism (Study III, IV, V).  
Study V reveals the transnationalism across segmented integration clusters. 
In general, the members of the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster show the 
highest scores of transnationalism (Figure 8). Members of the dutiful, institutio-
nally engaged cluster and the active, ethno-culturally engaged cluster show 
almost equal scores of transnationalism (Figure 8). The members of the passive, 
weakly involved cluster showed the lowest scores of transnationalism index 
(Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. Strength of transnationalism in different integration clusters 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on “Me. The World. The Media, 2014” 
 
 
30%
49%
44%
74%
18%
22%
22%
12%
52%
30%
34%
13%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Passive, weakly engaged cluster
Active ethno-culturally engaged cluster
Dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster
Multi-active cosmopolitan cluster
Strong Medium Weak or missing
83 
In different modes of segmented integration, transnationalism has different 
mediating effect in reaction to the main dimensions of integration (Study V). 
According to my calculations of correlations between the transnationalism 
index and the indices of different integration dimensions (see Table 8), I have 
found that in the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster the transnationalism index 
variable is negatively connected with the Estonian language and media use 
index. Although cluster members have a good command of Estonian, those who 
reported stronger transnational practices also reported infrequent (less frequent) 
following of Estonian language media (Table 8). So, despite the fact that 
members of the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster are multifariously integrated 
into Estonian society, they can also turn away and be demotivated to develop 
local social contacts. According to the typology of interactions between integra-
tion and transnationalism by Erdal and Oeppen (2013), the relationship here 
between Estonian language/media use and transnationalism is antagonistic. The 
demand for resources and/or feeling of belonging in one place limits the ability 
to meet demands and/or displaces the feeling of belonging to the other place  
(p. 878). In the other three clusters, the correlation was the opposite and a 
stronger transnationalism was positively correlated with more frequent Estonian 
language/media use (Study V, p. 29). These opposite-directional correlations 
between transnationalism and local language use make me cautious to confirm 
that the host society integration (assimilation) and transnational orientations are 
always mutually reinforcing. It seems that they start to “compete”, not in the cases 
of weaker social integration, but rather in the cases of stronger social integration. 
The impact of exercising transnationalism practices appears to be able to turn 
from the synergistic to antagonistic according to Erdal and Oeppen (2013).  
In the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster, the transnationalism index is cor-
related with the economic integration index (Table 8). Further analysis revealed 
that members of the cluster with higher personal transnationalism scores were not 
only more active with business projects and other entrepreneurial practices, but 
also took part in re-training for new jobs. This enables employment flexibility and 
these individuals reported to be wealthy or have sufficient money for different 
needs (Study V, p. 29). Thus, here transnationalism is positively correlated with 
economic agency and the same effect was also present in the active ethno-
culturally engaged cluster (Table 8). I do not have specific data about the geo-
graphical scope of these economic activities, but it is likely that at least part of 
them have a scope that reaches the borders of Estonia. According to the typology 
by Erdal and Oeppen (2013), the relationship between transnationalism and local 
integration into the economic domain is not antagonistic, but either additive, 
including economically active in the country of origin and of settlement, or 
synergistic, where resources gained in one place are invested to develop further 
resources in the other (Erdal & Oeppen 2013: 878). 
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Table 8. Correlations between the translocality index and the indices of different 
domains of integration across integration clusters (Pearson’s r, n = 465) 
  
Multi-
active 
cosmo-
politan 
cluster 
Dutiful, 
institutio-
nally 
engaged 
cluster 
Active 
ethno-
culturally 
engaged 
cluster 
Passive, 
weakly 
engaged 
cluster 
Linguistic involvement -0,25*    0,21* 
Economic involvement    0,27**  0,21*   
Participation in local public sphere  0,18*    
Alternative democratic participation    0,23**    
Civic involvement    0,19** 0,19*   
Local political involvement    0,22** 0,23*   
Ethno-cultural identity    0,22**     
*p≤0,1; **p≤0,05. 
The Table is taken from Study V 
 
 
Among members of the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster, those with stron-
ger personal transnationalism index scores reported more frequent participation 
in NGO-s and civic activities (voluntary work, charity projects and campaigns) 
despite the general passiveness of this cluster in this regard (Study V, p. 30). 
The transnationalism was also positively related to traditional political partici-
pation in European, national and local elections and participation in the public 
events (Study V, p. 30). Without more precise qualitative or quantitative evi-
dence, it is impossible to explain the specific mechanisms of the mutual 
interaction of transnationalism and integration in these dimensions of inte-
gration; the existence of positive correlation itself, however, enable us to argue 
that the interaction between transnationalism and local integration is either 
additive or synergistic rather than antagonistic (Erdal & Oeppen 2013). 
Transnationalism also has a positive correlation with the index of ethno-
cultural identity in this cluster. People with higher personal transnationalism 
scores more frequently celebrate Russian folk, religious and national holidays. 
In the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster this correlation did not appear 
(Study V, p 30). My interpretation is that as the members of dutiful, institutio-
nally engaged cluster are, in general, rather modest in expressing their ethno-
cultural attachments, then entering into the (international) Russian language 
mediascapes encourages them to maintain a virtual bond with one’s historical-
cultural identity. Members of this cluster admit about ten per cent more 
frequently than members of other clusters that they feel better expressing their 
views to others in virtual channels rather than in face-to-face interactions and 
that they have social media “friends” who they actually do not know (Study V, 
p 30–31). Thus, the mediated (cross-border) communications may motivate the 
members of this cluster, who are otherwise rather shy in their social inter-
actions, to have a “voice” in the host society. That increases the possibility for 
their involvement in local policy-making. Transnationalism and local integra-
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tion are in a synergistic relationship in the dutiful, institutionally engaged 
cluster across different dimensions; feelings of (cultural) connections give con-
fidence to further develop socio-political connections and resources (Erdal & 
Oeppen 2013). 
In the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster, transnationalism is positively 
correlated with Estonian language/media use (see Table 8). The studies of 
political news repertoires and news interpretation revealed that people like to 
check information about particular, controversial issues from ideologically 
different media channels, including those they do not like (Study IV). This 
might be the mechanism explaining the positive correlation between how pro-
Russia oriented partisan media use is paradoxically maintained via the inflow of 
media information/discourses from the counter-attitudinal channels. The focus 
groups have revealed that people with rather modest Estonian language skills 
also use Estonian language media in some situations in order to check the 
claims, about what Estonians say about particular issues, for example, made in 
Russian language media (Study IV, Vihalemm & Juzefovics 2020). I conclude 
that, in regards to the Estonian language/media use among members of the 
active, ethno-culturally engaged cluster, the interaction between transnatio-
nalism and local integration is either additive or synergistic (Erdal & Oeppen 
2013). In this cluster, the positive correlation is also found between transnatio-
nalism and civic involvement (participation in NGO-s and civic activities, 
especially collective voluntary work campaigns) and local level political partici-
pation (going to local elections etc.). Cluster members with higher personal 
transnationalism scores appeared to be more frequently elected to trustee 
positions in various organisations. The members of this cluster belong mainly to 
church-related associations, choirs and other cultural associations, health-related 
interest groups and sports associations, which may have cross-border contacts 
(Lauristin et al 2012). It might be that the civic roles and positions grant more 
authority to individuals to engage in transnational communication circles. This, 
in turn, motivates them to contribute to NGO-s and other civic activities, and 
take care of their good state. It also gives them a good reason to develop 
constructive civil relationships and make mutual negotiations with the local 
power representatives. The interaction between transnationalism and local inte-
gration is likely in synergistic relationships for the members of the active ethno-
culturally engaged cluster since resources gained in one place are invested to 
develop further resources in the other (Erdal & Oeppen 2013). 
In the active, ethno-culturally engaged cluster, transnationalism is also posi-
tively correlated with wealth (see Table 7). Members of the cluster with the 
higher personal scores of transnationalism reported about the sufficiency of 
money for various needs more frequently. Vice versa, people who reported 
insufficiency of money to satisfy different needs had lower personal scores of 
transnationalism. These correlations show that transnational practices are pos-
sibly more accessible when material needs are satisfied and do not demand 
time, effort or other resources. In an antagonistic relationship (see Erdal & 
Oeppen 2013) however, demand for resources to make ends meet in the host 
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society may limit the ability to exercise mediated transnationalism. Based on 
the existing data, I cannot point to the causalities, but rather note that this 
correlation does exist.   
In the passive, weakly engaged cluster, transnationalism has a positive effect 
on the use of Estonian language and following Estonian media (see table 7). 
While the empirical evidence and qualitative research gathered here was in-
sufficient to offer a proper explanation, the mechanism can be similar to the 
active ethno-culturally engaged cluster. Estonian media is followed on special 
occasions in order to check information that is circulating in the Estonian-
language media-sphere. Considering the low interest towards politics and daily 
news about international and national affairs, it is likely that Estonian language 
and Estonian-operating information sources are used to search for practical, 
utilitarian reasons in situations perceived as important/alarming (Study IV). 
The people in the passive weakly engaged cluster reported following the links 
and suggestions their social media “friends” send them. It has been argued by 
other researchers that the issues, gossip, and questions raised by the members of 
one’s personal (transnational) network motivates them to turn to Estonian 
language sources to seek answers to the alarming questions (Vihalemm & 
Hogan-Brun 2013). To sum up, the interaction between transnationalism and 
local integration seems to be either additive or synergistic, but not antagonistic 
in terms of Estonian language and media use (Erdal & Oeppen 2013). 
Thus, the ways transnationalism contributes to the local integration varies 
across the segments of integration. According to the typology of interactions of 
transnationalism and integration by Erdal & Oeppen (2013), most of the inter-
actions in the case of Estonian Russian speaking population are likely either 
additive, meaning that the activities exercised and belonging are felt towards 
both/several places, or synergistic, that belonging in one place encourages parti-
cipation in the other place, or that resources gained in one place are invested to 
develop further resources in the other place. Since the transnationalism of the 
Estonian Russian speaking population is mainly mediated, Estonian society can 
theoretically benefit from the resources and encouragements gained from the 
transnational (Russian) spaces when they are invested into the local society. 
However, this would also likely need a specific integration policy with a 
stronger theoretical contribution from the economic and political conceptua-
lisations of transnationalism (see Landolt 2001, Bauböck 2003, Portes et al 
2008, Itzigsohn & Villacrés 2008).  
In Estonian society, however, the transnational practices of the Russian 
speaking population, especially their extensive following of Russian television 
following, is securitized because of the fear of Russian propaganda and the risk 
of the destabilization of Estonian society via a mediated geopolitical advocacy 
from the Russian Federation (Study IV, Vihalemm Juzefovics 2020). In this 
complicated situation, knowledge about how transnationalism may contribute to 
the identity and interpretation of the media discourse in the context of political 
tensions is worth studying. In the next chapter, I will give an overview of my 
main research results on this issue.  
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5.3 Mediated transnationalism in the context  
of political tensions.  
The role of media production and communicative interventions by the Russian 
Federation should not be underestimated when it comes to the identity forma-
tion of Russian speakers. This interplay between transnationalism and media 
use were examined in Study V.  
Mediated transnationalism, meaning having a versatile media menu and 
maintaining multiple cross-border social media contacts, forms a rather messy 
frame for interpretation that can easily discourage opinion formation about 
complicated/disputed political issues (Study IV). Russian speakers with good 
knowledge of Estonian, who followed Estonian, Western and Russian media 
sources, did not form an opinion about the shooting down of the Malaysian 
airplane MH17 in Ukraine. They did not take any position in the survey that 
was carried out shortly after the catastrophe (Study III). At the same time, a 
limited variety of sources and bad knowledge of languages helped in the forma-
tion of an opinion, which might be one-sided and afterwards create even more 
confusion (Study III). In the context of political tensions between Estonia and 
Russia, and following the relevant discourses in the media, people admit to 
feeling discomfort, confusion and (temporary) civic alienation or demotivation 
to continue to participate in the public news-scape (Studies III and IV). 
This feeling of confusion and news-related stress may also be a reason why 
some highly valued and trusted channels, including Estonian public broadcast 
service media in both Russian and Estonian languages, are used mostly in 
decisive/critical situations. At the same time, other frequently used channels are 
considered less trustworthy (Study IV, Vihalemm et al 2012). Important but 
unevenly reliable information channels are social media networks. About one-
third of the Russian speaking population admits that most of the news they 
receive comes from the links and suggestions posted by their social media 
contacts (Study V). This information is not always 100% trusted or even 
needed but is a part of a social communication and has an advantage over news 
offered by official media outlets. Word-of-mouth information, unmediated real-
life experiences, and eyewitness reflections were all considered to be significant 
sources of authenticity that are highly valued in tense situations, even when the 
media users are aware that the “eyewitness accounts” may suffer from critical 
and systematic control (Study IV). After discussing the events with acquain-
tances in Ukraine, Estonia, and elsewhere people, became even more confused 
because of the diversity of personal networks (Study IV). The wish to keep 
social relationships did motivate them to either avoid political topics in conver-
sations or disclose their own views/doubts about the issue (Study IV). Thus, a 
spatially and temporally disproportional bundle of lines of influence is formed 
by rare encounters with local trusted sources (e.g. Estonian public broadcast 
service media) and everyday encounters with a variety of trusted Russian, local 
and Western information where the original sources are often unknown (posted 
by social media acquaintances).  
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In the qualitative studies, I tried to sort out the main strategies the members 
of integration clusters use in their interpretation of news and their general 
understanding about the media system in the crisis. 
The members of multi-active cosmopolitan cluster are more critical in their 
reception of media content, more self-reliant in their interpretation, and more 
motivated to “put the puzzle together” from the pieces of information gathered 
from different (contradictory) sources (Study III, V). In the beginning, the 
conflict in Ukraine motivated people to search for information from different 
channels and expand their information repertoires (by reading Ukrainian and 
even Belarusian media for example) and using a more comparative approach 
(viewing coverage of the same event in different outlets) in their interpretation 
(Study III, IV). The use of multiple geopolitical and linguistic media channels, 
which is most characteristic to the multi-active, cosmopolitan cluster, is 
connected to a general understanding of news media as partisan journalism and 
as actors of propaganda that serves the interests of its owner (Study III). 
Several focus group participants stressed that they use multiple sources in order 
to balance the information.  
In conversations about new media, one part of this normative self-posi-
tioning as a smart media user is the frequent use of the label of “propaganda”. 
That label can create temporary solidarities between the conversation partners, 
and also be used in debates over meaning making. The following excerpt 
illustrates this strategy. 
 
“In my opinion, this article is the opposite of the article we read. She is trying to 
prove that Putin is extraordinary. In this case, it's just propaganda.” (W, 30, 
multi-active cosmopolitan cluster). 
 
“Some of the past speakers have said that he considers someone smarter. In my 
opinion, it's not about who is smarter. He simply hints that the Kremlin is guided 
by populist considerations. This is called populism, which means to make only 
popular decisions. You can influence the opinion of the masses” (M, 40, multi-
active cosmopolitan cluster).  
 
In tense periods, these strategies may also balance the feeling of confusion and 
motivate the use of different media sources. The result of the qualitative recep-
tion studies cannot be directly validated based on the quantitative studies; how-
ever, because the other combined qualitative and quantitative studies have 
indicated similar results, it is likely that the strategies used by the represen-
tatives of the multi-active, cosmopolitan cluster are used widely among other 
members of the cluster (Vihalemm & Juzefovics 2020). 
The members of other clusters are more sceptical about the media system in 
general. This might demotivate them, particularly members of the passive, 
weakly engaged cluster, from following political news at all or create a certain 
alienation as citizen, especially among the dutiful, institutionally engaged 
cluster (Study IV). The following example shows the resignation and aware-
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ness about audience members’ limitations in decoding and assessing the authen-
ticity of messages: 
 
“Are there any Russian troops (in Ukraine)? (…) it is not clear where the truth 
is. There is not much to talk about; the topic is too controversial. (…) everyone 
will defend his point of view, and we ordinary readers, who are not present in 
Donbass, cannot check if the Russian troops are there. This is probably the main 
disadvantage of modern mass media” (M, 25, dutiful, institutionally engaged 
cluster). 
 
Despite their pro-Russia ideological leanings, many members of the active, 
ethno-politically engaged cluster also use multiple sources for political news. 
Their motivation for checking the information from the Estonian-language 
media outlets is, one the one hand, related with a certain curiosity. On the other 
hand, it is sometimes coupled with the wish to learn about official confirmation 
(or lacking of it) to the stories distributed via their (Russian) social media 
acquaintances or from the Russian media channels. Thus, despite the everyday 
news flows from discursively hostile (in relation to Estonia) media channels, it 
is likely that they will check the information about local events when they 
consider the issue alarming enough.  
To sum up, media use and news interpretation strategies among the Russian 
speaking population during political tensions and heightened propaganda have 
maintained their transnational character and, at least temporarily, increased the 
motivation to also include local (including Estonian language) media channels 
in their media menus. The interpretation strategies are rather complicated. 
Media texts are considered as artefacts or products of a certain situational needs 
or organizational/political prescriptions rather than true “slices of life” (Mic-
helle 2007). In this context, the public and media communication discourse, 
which helps to make comparisons, includes intertextual references and addres-
ses the audience members and people capable for deliberation, can have a posi-
tive effect despite the different strategies employed by the segmented integra-
tion clusters (more in the “Discussion”). 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
This doctoral dissertation looks at the integration patterns of migrant-back-
ground populations and their relationship with transnationalism and media 
practices, the latter being the reason the former exists. The aim of this chapter is 
to explain the interplay between mediated transnationalism and the local inte-
gration of Estonian Russian-speaking populations.  
This thesis therefore contributes to the empirical measurement and inter-
pretation of the integration of migrant-background populations in the conditions 
of transnationalism, with the example of Estonian Russian-speaking migrant 
background populations. My analysis reveals that the concept of segmented 
integration is the most relevant one to explore and explain their in-group diffe-
rentiation and the nature of social agency as well as ethno-cultural and political-
civic identity. I have compiled a multidimensional model of the segmented 
integration of Russian speakers and explain the inter-connections of media use 
and segmented integration. 
Below I discuss the results in the context of topical international research. I 
then address the implications of the research results in Estonian society and 
present answers to the research questions. 
 
 
6.1 Discussion 
My thesis sought answer the question of how the increasing transnationalism of 
Estonian society is related to the segmentation of the minority population’s (i.e. 
Russian speakers) integration processes. Various processes and different theo-
retical concepts have been previously proposed to describe the involvement of 
Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background communities in different 
periods in time. During the Soviet era for example, it was not possible to talk 
about assimilation, which was a prevailing concept in the Western world at the 
time. After re-independence in 1991, according to the Integration Monitorings, 
neither assimilation nor full integration of Russian speakers happened. The 
reality of this situation is much more complex than one certain theoretical 
concept is able to tackle alone.  
The empirical results of this work (see Study V) confirmed that the concept 
of migrant population assimilation is inadequate since both the migrant groups 
and receiving societies are too complex and versatile to fit this linear model. 
Moreover, practically applying this type of model might even bring along nega-
tive consequences in relation to the stability of society. It is justified to agree 
with Green and Staerkle (2013) who say that historical and political contexts 
affect the relations between majority and minority populations, and therefore, 
consequent (non)integration of those of a migrant background. Treas (2014) 
indicates that involvement processes, and not necessarily integration are, by and 
large, affected by three main sets of factors (see Studies I, III, V): the receiving 
context or support network of co-ethnics (in case of Russian speakers it 
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becomes especially visible through the example of the labour market as 
explored in Study I); the culture of the receiving society (although this aspect is 
not discussed in this work) and thirdly, politics (how the legal status of immi-
grants is granted via citizenship, living permits etc.)(see Study V). The latter 
has been widely discussed as a problem in Estonian society (e.g. in different 
Integration Monitorings, years 2008, 2011, 2015, 2017 as well addressed in the 
state integration plans) and a possible hindrance to (formal) involvement. How-
ever, another important aspect to take into account, is that immigrant popula-
tions tend to be heterogeneous and, in this sense, Russian speakers are no 
exception. This means that adaptation depends on much more than external 
factors. Additionally, socio-demographic factors like education, income, age, 
generation etc. are also important to consider. The results of this work therefore 
partially draw on Vertevec’s (1999) thought that pre-migration values, percep-
tions and aspirations might affect post-migration structural opportunities and 
constraints. Although the migration of Estonian Russian-speaking populations 
took place some time ago, this idea is extendible. Changes in the 1990s, for 
example, have a big part to play in issues related to the involvement of the 
Russian-speaking population.  
The results of this work agree with Elder and colleagues (2003), and Treas 
(2014) who say that because involvement is affected by different fields of life, 
taking multidimensionality into account is unavoidable. My empirical analysis 
showed that the concepts of multi-dimensional or selective acculturation (Treas 
2013, Deux 2016) and segmented assimilation (Portes & Zhou 1993) are 
suitable to explore and explanation the patterns of (non) involvement of the 
Russian speaking population in Estonian society (Study V). In working out the 
integration dimensions, which enable the exploration of society’s multi-layered 
structure, I have combined the following factors: people’s life span and 
experiences (noted by Treas 2013); politics and a local community “tightness” 
(noted by Portes & Rumbaut 2003); and people’s personal political, economic, 
social and cultural resources (noted by Kwok-Bun & Plüss 2013) (Study V).  
As a theoretical contribution, I offered the term segmented integration in my 
thesis. I consider that this term is more appropriate because it solves the discre-
pancy between the notions of segmented integration and assimilation. Seg-
mented points to the multi-directional possibilities for the migrant population’s 
involvement while assimilation, on the contrary, indicates that melting into the 
majority population is the only possible outcome of this process. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to draw a parallel with Esser’s (2004) work, which describes inte-
gration as a process defined by the actor’s situational behaviour as well their 
actions in society. Consequently, these actions and behaviours create typical 
trajectories of social processes which are characterized as integration patterns 
such as segmented assimilation, pluralism and ethnic homogeneity, just to name 
a few. In this work, the segmented integration approach is empirically tested 
using the example of four different clusters, which represent patterns of inte-
gration that open new dimensions. In my measurement model, I connected the 
approaches of segmented integration to local and transnational media use. In 
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principle, this model is transferable to other societies like Latvia or different 
countries with socio-demographically and historic-culturally varied composition 
of migrant background populations.  
The results of this work show how access to, and the practical use and output 
of, resources shape the pathway of integration. Resources contribute to every-
day life (Study V), and the use of these resources also shapes the development 
of host society. The four integration clusters I explored not only shape the 
development of Estonian society economically (the multi-active cosmopolitan 
cluster) and politically (both the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster and also the 
ethno-culturally engaged cluster) but also by challenging social sustainability 
(the passive, weakly engaged cluster). Socio-economic background and the 
ways resources are used affect local involvement. The results of this work (see 
Study V) are in line with the findings of Treas (2014) who claims that 
integration is affected by an immigrant’s background as well as their local lived 
experience. Results show that if there is a lack of a certain, country specific 
capital, which impedes “formal” participation, other ways of being involved are 
found. Based on the data from this research (see Study V), it is correct to say 
that being excluded is a rather voluntary choice and not necessarily due to a 
lack of resources. While it is debatable, it seems that resources are missing 
because of individual decisions which are not directly due to social constraints.  
The findings of this cover article conclude that integration into one sphere 
might foster integration into another, and that integration dimensions can be 
mutually reinforcing. Kymlicka (2005) says that an immigrant population’s 
maintenance of their own ethno-cultural identity can have positive effect on 
their general integration. While I cannot prove the exact same, I did make a 
similar finding that ethno-cultural aspects of integration are positively corre-
lated with political participation in the civic, dutiful and multi-active clusters. 
Thus, certain dimensions do empower others.  
As another novel aspect, I proposed the term mediated transnationalism, 
constructed a tool of its empirical measurement and measured this in connection 
with segmented integration (Studies V). In a traditional or old sense, a general 
or global increase in transnationalism does not consider minority integration. 
My analyses are in line with the theoretical work of Couldry (2004), Diminescu 
(2008), Guarnizo et al (2003) and Vertovec (1999) which concern how the 
media’s constant availability establishes a favourable environment for trans-
national practices and intensifies the transnational social space (Study III, IV, 
V). Russian speakers’ communicative connectivity (see Diminescu 2008, Hepp 
et al 2011) is fostered by the international reach of the Russian language 
mediascape. The manifold communicative opportunities in Russian, and acces-
sibility to different kind of media all over the world, amplifies the segmented 
integration into the host society, as opposed to creating one diasporic pathway 
(Study V). 
Despite the fact that ethnic (or Russian) media is a regular part of Russian-
speaking audience’ everyday lives, media following habits are fragmented and 
vary across integration segments. This variation affects their transnationalism as 
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well as their local integration (Study V). In terms of segmented integration, the 
empirical analysis revealed that media empowers groups unequally by ampli-
fying their segmentation. The members of segments with more versatile media 
menus are more actively involved in the host society (Study IV, V). The results 
of my analysis support the findings of Kok and Rogers (2017), Faist (2010), 
Vertovec (1999) and Smith and Guarnizo(1998) who have all pointed out the 
transformation of earlier territorialized diasporas (with an historic homeland as 
their center) to de-territorialized, mediated communities. For the members of 
the multi-active cosmopolitan and dutiful institutionally engaged clusters, the 
Russian-language mediascape consists of both Russia’s and Western (Russian 
language) media outlets and personal social networks. The ethno-culturally 
engaged cluster, who is closest to the classical diaspora, has also developed a 
rather local ethnic minority group consciousness that is supported by local level 
civic activities. Media consumption is also a form of agency and, in this dimen-
sion, integration clusters do not generally differ as much as their interpretations, 
which are largely based on ideology, do.  
The results of this work also point out that the borders between different 
concepts can be hazy and it is technology that propitiates different kinds of 
communities such as cosmopolitan communities or digital diasporas (see Glick 
Schiller et al 2011, Christiansen 2012). 
The findings of the current thesis partly agree with authors who argue that 
transnationalism among immigrant population persists due to a wish to use 
media to compensate for life changes (Hannerz 1996, Guarnizo 2003, Robins & 
Aksoy 2005). As stated by Guarnizo (2003), migrants may use a dual reference 
frame through which they compare situations in their former homeland with 
situations in new country residence. This kind of dual reference frame enables 
migrant-background populations to develop specific interpretations of local life 
and, at the same time, contribute to social involvement (Study III, IV). The 
reception and interpretation of transnational media content is not homogeneous 
but depends on and contributes to the re-production of one’s position in the host 
society via their integration segment. In the context of geopolitical tensions 
between a host and sending society, this heterogeneity is under pressure. When 
individuals experience uncertainty in decoding the conflict, they may also feel a 
certain pressure on their current position in the host society.  
What matters is the location of media, either geographically or culturally. As 
stated also by Martin and Ritzvi (2014), and supported by the analysis here 
(Study III, IV, V), media following happens in a certain place and this place, in 
turn, cannot be separated from media practices. By the same token, Mandaville 
(1999) shows how the local could either be spread across places and the 
mapping of community or that local is dependent on how people define or 
position themselves between and across places. Media content is itself trans-
national in that it consists of different localities. In the case of Estonia, this is 
seen through the Estonian advertisements, which air between TV shows of 
Russian origin. The way in which media consumption activates different iden-
tities for different purposes shows a multiplicity of identifications. The 
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reception analysis showed how ideological messages coming from Russian are 
de-coded by taking several different local or experience based positions to 
understand propagandistic messages (Study III, IV). Based on this, I am able to 
agree with Georgiou (2007) that media content versatility might create multiple 
belongings. For Russian speakers, interpretation is shaped by several external as 
well internal factors. It does not take place in a vacuum, but in interactions 
between online and offline worlds (see Hepp et al 2011). Furthermore, ac-
cording to Guarnizo and Smith (2005) these interactions are mediated by trans-
local understandings particularly in cases where local understandings have an 
effect on a bigger scale; for example, interpreting Kremlin propagandistic mes-
sages or the Russian media system. In general, the current thesis agrees with 
Golbert (2001) and Robins and Aksoy (2003) who say that migrants often oscil-
late between different media cultures and therefore develop comparative view 
when it comes to following media. What this thesis adds to this, is a level of 
local involvement showing that since local is in the background, this means 
trasnational practices are localised.  
The empirical analysis (see Study V) conforms with the authors who indi-
cate that integration and transnationalism are not mutually exclusive (Kivisto 
2001, Ehrkamp 2006, Erdal & Oeppen 2013, Erdal & Lewicki 2016) and that 
their coexistence depends on different factors and positions (see Erdal & Oep-
pen 2013) which might emerge. These results are in line with De Haas (2005) 
who says that transnationalism is not unidirectional and that transnational ties 
do not generally hinder, but might actually be associated with and even 
mutually strengthen, social integration. The empirical findings indicate that 
transnationalism is universal among integration clusters, but that its intensity 
varies and is ultimately associated with different values and news spaces (e.g. 
Russian) and dependant on the existence of parallel (virtual) relationships, such 
as a community, business, etc. While De Haas (2005) claims that transnationa-
lism should not be treated as a problem since it does not compete with integra-
tion, Morawska (2018) points out that immigrant lives should be understood in 
the context of multiple combinations of transnational or assimilative practices. 
The current work supports the latter. Each integration segment presented in this 
work implement transnational practices differently, and these differences are 
correlated to how strongly integrated people are into different spheres of 
society.  
The results of this research are also in line with what Erdal and Oeppen 
(2013) describe as the pragmatic position of transnationalism and integration 
(Study III, V). As the results indicate, the reality for the Russian-speaking 
population is complex, and integration is affected by several factors: starting 
with individual’s socio-economic and demographic background and ending 
with different media consumption habits, which have a considerable impact on 
their interpretation of reality (Study III, IV, V). The ways in which mediated 
transnationalism contributes to the segmented integration of the Estonian 
Russian-speaking migrant background population varies across the segments of 
integration and often means a mixing of old and new (as indicated by Kwok-
95 
bun & Plüss 2013). According to the typology of interactions of transnatio-
nalism and integration by Erdal and Oeppen (2013), most of the interactions in 
the case of the Estonian Russian speaking population, are likely either additive 
(i.e. parallel activities and double belonging) or synergistic, rather than mutually 
antagonistic. With the relevant integration policy, Estonian society might bene-
fit from the resources and encouragement gained from the transnational (Rus-
sian) spaces when they are invested into the local society. This would require a 
shift from the integration strategy for the Russian speaking population to an 
integration strategy for the transnational Russian speaking populations. This, in 
turn, would need a more multifaceted approach involving the media use of Esto-
nian Russian speaking audiences. Rather than focusing on the political security 
approach, it should also include the economic, civic and cultural approaches of 
transnational media consumption.  
My empirical model (see Chapter 4.2 and 5.1) has shown that due to the 
unequal distribution of resources there are also integration segments and multi-
agency social forces. The monitoring of the integration of migrant background 
population by using segmentation (i.e. clustering method) enables a more 
nuanced and adequate assessment of problems and encompasses more features 
than the country-specific variables (e.g. knowledge of local language, citizen-
ship) which are usually used to assess integration. This method also helps us to 
notice the social potential of migrant population groups. In countries like the 
Baltics, with complex and turbulent societies, the segmented approach enables 
politically informed decisions.  
If, for some researchers (such as Vasta 2010), migrant populations with mul-
tiple belongings might create divided loyalties and hinder a sense of belonging 
to a majority population, I am not able to confirm this. Although loyalties vary 
when it comes to interpretation practices, it is too early to say whether political 
crisis have a direct influence on these practices. Based on the findings in this 
research, it is clear that the relationship between media use and social, cultural, 
political, and economic engagement is complex. Media promotes transnational 
connections and belonging, and creates a multidirectional lens, which is in turn 
affected by the local context. So a sense of place which is local exists in the 
background of transnational activities. Therefore, just because transnationalism 
and integration are segmented, does not mean they are incompatible; rather they 
are mutually strengthening and even depend on the physical place activities take 
place. It is also important to note that since the phenomenon of transnationalism 
is a new normality which describes the whole of society, it affects both Estonian 
and Russian-speaking populations.  
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6.2 Conclusions 
In this subsection I provide answers to the research questions and highlight the 
empirical contribution of my thesis. 
 
1. What are the main types characterizing segmented integration among 
Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations?  
 
• Segmented integration among Estonian Russian-speaking migrant back-
ground populations appears in four main types. These four types are 
represented in the empirical measurement model as: multi-active 
cosmopolitan, dutiful institutionally engaged, active ethno-culturally 
engaged and passive weakly engaged cluster (Study V). These clusters, 
which each describe a set of resources Russian speakers have and 
certain ways they use these resources, differentiate between the realities 
where Russian speakers live.  
• The most resource-rich and multi-faceted integration type, represented 
by the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster, is characterised by relatively 
strong involvement in political and economical domains of social life. 
Members of this cluster stand out through their frequent use of Estonian 
and their orientation towards Estonian-language social networks and 
Estonian-language media (Study V). Members of this cluster are poli-
tically active in both traditional and alternative ways (Study II, V). 
They have sufficient human and country specific capital to be able to 
take part in public discussions and initiate changes in the society (Study 
V). At the same time, their stronger political and economic agency, and 
use of Estonian in different spheres, has supported their orientation 
towards a cosmopolitan identity rather than a homogeneous nation state 
one (Study V). There are more younger and well educated people be-
longing to the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster (Study V). 
• The second type of integration that appears mostly in involvement in 
traditional political and economic domains of social life is represented 
in the model of empirical measurement as the dutiful institutionally 
engaged cluster (Study II, V). Their traditional political participation, 
high institutional trust and stable economic position does not motivate 
civic activity or alternative political agency (Study I, V). This cluster is 
equipped with high human capital, such as education, but moderate 
country specific capitals, since members of this cluster infrequently use 
Estonian language. Therefore, their own political and economic agency 
is somewhat limited (Study V). Because this integration cluster consists 
of mostly older age groups, it is likely that this type of integration will 
disappear over time (Study V). 
• The third type of integration is diasporic, and is represented in the 
model of empirical measurement by the active ethno-culturally engaged 
cluster. The main sources of social agency in this case are civic and 
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ethno-cultural activities and belonging to NGOs. These activities com-
pensate for the weak traditional political and economic integration and a 
shortage of country specific capitals (Study V). For this cluster, a 
strong ethno-cultural identity is semi-institutionalized, since a large 
portion have Russian citizenship, easily politicizeable, via intensive 
Russian media consumption, and could be a source of potential collec-
tive mobilization (Study V). Because this cluster consist of younger 
cohorts, this integration type is also self-reproducing (Study II, V). 
• In the fourth type of integration, weak involvement in all domains of 
social life measured in the model of empirical measurement is repre-
sented by the passive, weakly engaged cluster (Study V). The lack or 
non-use of country specific, economic and political capitals leads to low 
social agency and propitiates their exclusion. The percentage of men 
and women are equal in this cluster, and the socio-demographic profile 
was near to the average. Although the share of the older (up to 45 years) 
generation is almost half of the group, this type of integration may 
decline somewhat with the generation replacement; however, consi-
dering the problems raised by researchers related to the democratic and 
public sphere participation of younger generations (Study II), the conti-
nuation and transformation of this mode of social involvement is likely. 
 
2. How does media consumption relate to segmented integration among 
Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations?  
 
• Estonian Russian-speaking audiences’ media consumption habits are 
characterized by large amounts of time spent watching TV and using 
social media networks (Study III, IV, V). These consumptions prac-
tices are intertwined with other everyday practices (Study III). The 
media content individuals follow is often designed by friends and 
acquaintances’ offline and online suggestions and shared links in social 
media. One-third of audience members admitted that these forms of 
media are their main source of daily news (Study III, V).  
• Media use across integration clusters varies most in terms of regular 
following of news media and awareness about local events (Study III, 
IV, V). Meanwhile, awareness of news about Russia and/or Ukraine 
does not differ across integration clusters (Study V).  
• The multi-active cosmopolitan cluster is described as having a media 
menu which is diverse not only in the types of media, but also by the 
geographical origin of media sources. On the one hand, the ability to 
learn about varied political and/or cultural discourses in the news 
increases their feelings of complexity and uneasiness in making conclu-
sions about the issues represented in the media (Study III, V). On the 
other hand, it reinforces their self-confidence to make comparisons and 
distinguish propaganda as media consumers/media citizens (Study V).  
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• For members of the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster, regular 
news consumption is a norm (Study V). Although one-fifth of them 
have a good command of Estonian, they infrequently follow local lan-
guage news media and, instead, prefer local and international Russian-
language media (Study V). A political crisis might push them towards 
Russian media consumption and their interpretation of the media 
content is shaped mainly by their local integration and wish to be a 
loyal citizen of the Estonian Republic (Study V). 
• Members of the active, ethno-culturally engaged cluster use mainly 
Russian-origin media, and to a smaller extent, local Russian-language 
media (Study V). Their interpretation of media content is more affected 
by Russian normalities. For example, they might consider the occupa-
tion of Crimea in terms of the normal and logical course of events. They 
are however, to a smaller extent, also influenced by their experiences 
with Western and Estonian civic and media culture. For example, they 
might be aware of the belief that the Russian media system is not 
independent and might project possible propagandistic messages. The 
local lived experiences of this group are shaped by trust towards 
Estonian institutions and active involvement in NGOs, civic activities 
and public space in general, and experience in alternative political 
participation. In their interpretation practices, these local lived experien-
ce, a strong ethno-cultural identity and preference given to the Russian 
way of interpreting (political) events meet, interact and also contradict 
one another (Study V). 
• For those belonging to the passive, weakly engaged cluster, media has a 
mostly entertainer’s role. Their irregularity in terms of news following 
makes individuals in this cluster more distant from the public sphere 
and less reachable by institutional agents (Study III, V). The low socio-
political involvement and infrequent following of daily news seem to 
mutually amplify each other and result in more isolation from the public 
media space. At the same time, members of this cluster are active social 
media users (Study V), which makes them so-called secondary consu-
mers (i.e. media content is mostly shaped by other users). Although 
social media does involve them in a way, and they are exposed to com-
mercial media agents through their entertainment and personal social 
media networks, this does not encourage more substantial civic/political 
engagement (Study V).  
 
3. How is the mediated transnationalism of Estonian Russian-speaking 
migrant background populations related to their segmented integration?  
 
• The mediated transnationalism of Estonian Russian-speaking migrant 
background populations can be characterized by: an extensive con-
sumption of Russian-origin and other foreign media; regular cross-
border communication with acquaintances, family members and people 
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met on social media; and by having work or study relations abroad. 
Therefore, individuals practising transnational media following and 
semi-private communication operate between several cultural and 
information spaces (Study III, IV, V).  
• Transnationalism is supported by younger age (this is related with their 
more extensive use of social media) and Estonian citizenship. Trans-
nationalism is associated with stronger involvement in the economic 
and political structures of the host society. Foreign language compe-
tences and education are also factors that enable the enlargement and 
diversification of media use and personal communication networks 
across state borders (Study V).  
• First generation migrants exercise transnationalism mainly through their 
Russian/Western media use, and their cross-border personal communi-
cation network is not wide. Transnationalism is exercised less by those 
who lack or have weak knowledge of Estonian and/or live in con-
centrated areas of Russian speakers (Study V). 
• The audience members with higher scores on the transnationalism index 
are more critical towards the media (Study III). Their more critical 
stance can be explained by the fact that people who follow foreign 
media and maintain cross-border, semi-private communications operate 
between several cultural and information spaces. This makes their 
repertoires for the interpretation of information more varied since they 
have to consider more frames of reference and possibly compare the 
content and style of news from various sources (Study III, V). 
• In the context of political crisis, the strong transnationalism that mani-
fests through diverse media following preferences creates an overall 
uncertainty and suspicion towards news content overall. This some-
times causes individuals to abandon their following of political/topical 
information because the news is ideologically/discursively more hostile 
towards the opponents and more essentializing in addressing audience 
members’ identities (Study III, IV). However, transnational audience 
members with ideologically heterogeneous media menus still consider 
that having an ideologically diverse media menu is normatively con-
nected with the ideal image of being a smart media citizen who is able 
to navigate information in the context of biased media representations 
(Study V).  
• While transnationalism, as measured by the index variable that I 
constructed, appears in all integration clusters, it makes different con-
figurations with characteristic variables in each particular cluster. This 
shows that transnationalism interacts with segmented integration 
variedly both in terms of affected variables and in the nature of the 
effect (i.e. compensatory or amplifying) (Study V).  
• Members of the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster are physically 
mobile, and their personal and virtual cross-border ties are frequent and 
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mutually strengthening. Their transnational practices enable a collection 
of resources, such as economic/professional, cultural and civic, know-
ledge, skills and personal contacts that contribute to and enrich their 
local economic/professional position, political/civic courage and active-
ness. Transnational practices offer better possibilities for self-realization 
and self-expression to the members of this cluster. Transnationalism 
and local multi-dimensional integration are mutually reinforcing in this 
cluster (Study V). At the same time, a negative correlation between 
transnationalism and Estonian language use creates doubts about 
whether integration and transnationalism are always as mutually 
supportive as they could be when it comes to stronger social integration 
(Study V). 
• In the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster, transnationalism mani-
fests through the use of Russia-oriented (social) media, private cross-
border communications, the migration experience and strong geopoli-
tical allegiances towards Russia. In this case of segmented integration, 
the mediated transnationalism is extra-territorial and it supports neither 
the development of a local political-civic identity nor relations with the 
local majority, who are considered to hold opposite ideological alle-
giances. In the context of geopolitical tensions, their media menu is 
rather homogeneous and oriented towards one side (the Russian side) of 
the conflict. At the same time, their transnationalism is correlated with 
participation in civic organizations and economic involvement. Trans-
nationalism raises the diasporic extra-territorial allegiances among 
members of the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster, and supports 
their collective activities, which are also exercised on social media 
(Study V). At the same time, however, members of this cluster main-
tain local connection via economic and political involvement (Study 
V).  
• While members of the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster are in-
volved with Russian issues via everyday Russian media following 
habits, they have few direct personal contacts (Study V). Although they 
do not explicitly express their ethno-cultural attachments, such as the 
celebration of Russian hoidays, the following of international Russian 
media enables them to maintain a (virtual) bond with their historical-
cultural identity (Study V). Since they are regular (political) news 
followers of Russian, local Russian-language, Estonian language and 
also western channels, they have to manage with the ideologically 
diverse and turbulent media discourses in the context of geopolitical 
tensions. Their country-specific capital and political involvement as 
citizens supports their desire to be geopolitical neutral. They also hope 
to avoid internalizing the essentializing from media discourses when it 
comes to their own unique identity which is a mix of political, local and 
ethnic components. In the context of geopolitical tensions, transnatio-
nalism rather discourages their political self-expression and participa-
101 
tion in the local public sphere, and also makes their personal reproduc-
tion of ethnic identity more complicated (Study V). 
• The transnationalism of those belonging to the passive, weakly engaged 
cluster is supported by digital media use and private cross-border social 
media communications. As they are withdrawn from the public sphere, 
their institutional participation is minimal. They do not follow foreign 
media, and their picture of the diversity of societies is mediated by 
other individuals rather than by states or national/international media 
institutions. This is also supported by the cluster’s general low trust in 
institutions. In times of geopolitical conflict, they prefer not to follow 
the relevant media information (Study V).  
• Beyond geopolitical conflict, mediated transnationalism seems to 
generally support local integration. This is because it reinforces the type 
of social agency that is characteristic of certain forms of segmented 
integration (clusters) and creates common developing mutual relation-
ships between the members of the clusters. These relationships, in turn, 
enable social learning and the co-operative use of different types of 
social agency. Transnationalism could also be a compensatory pheno-
menon if there is insufficient access to political or economic resources 
or a lack of country-specific capital (Study V).  
 
To sum up, the combination of the aggregated index variables and cluster ana-
lysis in order to build a model for the empirical measurement of Estonian 
Russian-speaking migrant background populations was justified. This method 
illuminates the differences between groups. The internal heterogeneity of this 
group requires a comprehensive measurement for multidimensional courses of 
integration. Integration types are a way to structure minority population(s) in 
Estonia. In this work, the integration process was described as an intertwining 
of different processes, which are encompassed under certain domains of social 
life and are related to the agency of minority population(s).  
The results of this work confirm that integration takes place in a trans-
national reality and is dependent on configurations of resources (both their 
allocation and use) rather than the incremental increase of one particular 
(country-specific) resource. The active ethno-culturally engaged cluster has 
taken advantage of ethno-cultural and civic engagement resources; the dutiful, 
institutionally engaged cluster have used political and economic resources 
better; the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster is the most autonomous and has the 
best access to all relevant resources in order to successfully operate in society. 
The problematic cluster is the passive, weakly engaged cluster who lack subjec-
tive and objective access to the important resources. The results of this work 
indicate that segmented integration does not change with the change of genera-
tion; rather the structural mechanisms of society reproduce and help to sustain 
them. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna segmenteeritud  
integratsioon ja vahendatud hargmaisus 
2011. aasta rahvaloenduse kohaselt elas Eestis rohkem kui 180 rahvuse esin-
dajaid. Eesti muutus mitmerahvuseliseks riigiks pärast teist maailmasõda, kui 
Nõukogude Liidu rahvastikupoliitika suunas siia peamiselt vene keelt ema-
keelena kõnelevat, etniliselt ja geograafiliselt päritolult mitmekesist rahvast. 
Sisserännanud omandasid privilegeeritud staatuse mitmes ühiskonna sfääris ja 
õiguse kasutada ametlikus asjaajamises vene keelt. Seetõttu kujunes välja kahe 
rahvastikurühma ‒ eestlaste ja venekeelse elanikkonna struktuurne segregat-
sioon, mis on osaliselt säilinud siiani. Kuigi venekeelset elanikkonda ühendab 
ühine keel, on tegemist sisemiselt heterogeense rahvastikurühmaga, kes on Eesti 
ühiskonnas ja nii kohalike kui üleilmsete muutustega erisugusel viisil koha-
nenud. Käesolev töö pakub empiirilise mudeli, kirjeldamaks Eesti venekeelse 
elanikkonna peamisi lõimumisviise.  
Integratsiooni monitooringutes (Lauristin 2012, Rikman jt 2013) varem loo-
dud Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna lõimumise tüpoloogiad on kirjeldanud selle 
rahvarühma sisemist eristumist, lõimumise määra ja viisi eeskätt riigispet-
siifilise kapitali – kodakondsuse ja keeleoskuse suhtes. Käesolev doktoritöö 
arendab lõimumisviiside tüpoloogiat edasi mitmekesisemate tunnuste põhjal, 
võttes arvesse selle rahvarühma meedia kaudu vahendatud hargmaisust. 
Teoreetiliselt tugineb minu väitekiri käsitustele, mille kohaselt sisseränna-
nute lõimumine ühiskonda on mitmemõõtmeline ja -suunaline (Treas 2014). 
Töö lähtub segmenteeritud lõimumise käsitusest (Portes ja Zhou 1993), mis 
pakub alternatiivi assimilatsiooniteooriale. Kui assimilatsioonikäsituse järgi eel-
dab sisserännanute hea toimetulek sihtriigi ühiskonnas nii keele ja kodakond-
suse omandamist kui ka muudes elusfäärides enamusrühmaga sarnastumist, siis 
segmenteeritud lõimumise käsituses on hea toimetuleku taga erinevaid mehha-
nisme ja kohanemisviise on rohkem kui üks. Lõimumist iseloomustab ebaüht-
lase „tugevusega“ sidustumine ühiskonna eri struktuuridega. Rändetaustaga ini-
mesed on tegevad erinevates elusfäärides, nende sotsiaal-majanduslikud ja kul-
tuurilised ressursid varieeruvad ning seetõttu kujunevad nende kohanemise teed 
kvalitatiivselt erinevateks (Portes ja Rumbaut 2001, Alba ja Nee 2003). Minu 
uurimistöö täiendab segmenteeritud lõimumise käsitust hargmaisuse kui ühe 
olulise ressursi lisamisega analüüsi. Hargmaisus tähendab, et rändetaustaga ini-
mesed ja nende järeltulijad säilitavad kas kultuurilised, majanduslikud, poliiti-
lised vms liiki sidemed oma päritoluriigiga (Glick Schiller jt 1995). Meedia ja 
kommunikatsioonitehnoloogiate areng võimaldab edukalt säilitada, arendada 
või luua (uusi) piiriüleseid suhteid, olla mentaalselt „kohal“ ja osaleda geo-
graafiliselt kaugete ühiskondade elus (Vertovec 2004a). See omakorda võib 
kohalikku lõimumist toetada või pärssida. Ühelt poolt võivad hargmaised 
praktikad tugevdada sotsiaalset integratsiooni põhirahvuse ühiskonda (De Haas 
2005), teisalt aga alla suruda kuulumistunde kujunemist (Vasta 2010). Oma töös 
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olen eeskätt käsitlenud vahendatud hargmaisust, st suhete säilitamist ((vana)-
vanemate) päritoluriigiga erinevate meediakanalite kaudu (Vihalemm ja Leppik 
2014, Leppik ja Vihalemm 2017).  
 
Minu uurimuse eesmärk on selgitada Eesti rändetaustaga venekeelse elanikkonna 
segmenteeritud lõimumise viise ning vahendatud hargmaisuse rolli nendes. 
Segmenteeritud lõimumise ja vahendatud hargmaisuse empiiriliseks mõõtmi-
seks kasutasin peamiselt Tartu Ülikooli ühiskonnateaduste instituudi küsitlus-
uuringu „Mina. Maailm. Meedia“ ning enda tehtud kvalitatiivuuringu andmeid.  
Eesti kontekstis pole lõimumise ja hargmaisuse seoseid varem põhjalikult 
analüüsitud. Varasemates uurimustes on Venemaa mõju lõimituse aspektist pee-
tud kui mitte ohtlikuks, siis kindlasti mitte siinset lõimumist toetavaks. Käes-
olev väitekiri osutab, et venekeelse elanikkonna seas laialt levinud venekeelse 
ning Venemaa ja rahvusvahelise meedia jälgimine ja kommunikatsiooniprak-
tikad suhestuvad Eesti ühiskonda lõimitusega erinevalt.  
 
Oma doktoritöös olen püstitatud kolm peamist uurimisküsimust ning jõudnud 
väitekirja artiklites järgmiste tulemusteni: 
 
I. Millised on peamised segmenteeritud lõimumise viisid rändetaustaga Eesti 
venekeelse elanikkonna seas?  
 
Eristub neli peamist lõimumisviisi, mida esindavad järgmised lõimrühmad: 
• Multiaktiivne kosmopoliitne lõimrühm on suhteliselt tugevasti lõimitud 
kõikidesse ühiskonnaelu sfääridesse, teistest venekeelsetest edukamalt 
poliitilisse ellu ja majanduslikku sfääri. Rühma liikmeid iseloomustab 
hea eesti ja inglise keele oskus ning eestikeelse meedia tarbimine. 
Rühma liikmed on keskmisest nooremad ja kõrgema haridusega. Piisav 
inim- ja riigispetsiiline kapital võimaldab neil kaasa lüüa avalikes 
aruteludes ning algatada muutusi ühiskonnas, toetades samal ajal nende 
kosmopoliitset identiteeti (Uurimus II, V). 
• Institutsionaalselt lõimunute rühma iseloomustab kõrgem usaldus riikli-
ke institutsioonide suhtes ning stabiilne majanduslik olukord. Kuigi 
rühma liikmete seas on palju kõrgharidusega inimesi, napib neil eesti 
keele oskust ning see piirab nende poliitilist ja majanduslikku agentsust. 
Rühmas on keskmisest rohkem vanu inimesi, seetõttu on see lõimitute 
rühm põlvkonnavahetuse tõttu vähenemas (Uurimus I, II, V).  
• Etno-kultuuriliselt lõimunute rühma sotsiaalne agentsus väljendub 
kodanikuosaluses (selle eri vormides vabatahtlikust tööst kuni mitte-
tulundusühingute juhtimiseni) ning tugevas etno-kultuurilises identi-
teedis. Selle rühma liikmete poliitiline ja majanduslik sidustatus Eesti 
ühiskonnaga on nõrk. Paljudel on vene kodakondsus ning nad jälgivad 
peamiselt Venemaa meediakanaleid. Kuna sellesse lõimrühma kuulub 
ka nooremaid vanusrühmi, võib eeldada, et lõimrühm uueneb põlv-
konnavahetuse toel (Uurimus II, V). 
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• Nõrgalt lõimunute rühma kuulub nii vanemaid kui nooremaid inimesi. 
Seega jääb nõrga lõimumise probleem püsima ka põlvkondade vahe-
tudes (Uurimus V).  
 
 
II. Kuidas seostub meediatarbimine segmenteeritud lõimumise viisidega?  
 
• Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna meediatarbimist iseloomustab ulatuslik 
telesaadete jälgimine ning laialdane sotsiaalmeedia kasutamine. Tarbi-
tav meediasisu on sageli kujundatud sõprade-tuttavate soovituste järgi, 
kolmandiku venekeelse elanikkonna jaoks on sotsiaalmeedia peamine 
uudisteallikas (Uurimus III, IV, V). 
• Lõimrühmi eristavad uudiste jälgimise regulaarsus ja kohalikest sünd-
mustest informeeritus. Kursisolek Venemaal ja Ukrainas toimuva osas 
lõimrühmades ei erine (Uurimus III, IV, V). 
• Multiaktiivse kosmopoliitse lõimtüübi meediamenüü on mitmekesine 
nii allikate kui geograafilise ulatuse mõttes. Kursisolek erinevate poliiti-
liste ja kultuuriliste diskursustega uudismeedias suurendab nende enese-
kindlust meediatarbijana ja veendumust, et ollakse suuteline ära tundma 
propagandat ja vältima selle halbu mõjusid (Uurimus III, V).  
• Institutsionaalselt lõimunute jaoks on regulaarne uudiste jälgimine 
norm. Eelistatakse kohalikku ja rahvusvahelist venekeelset meediat. Po-
liitiline kriis võib tõugata neid Venemaa meedia tarbimise suunas, aga 
meediasisu tõlgendamist kujundab kohalik lõimitusest ja soov olla 
lojaalne kodanik (Uurimus V). 
• Etno-kultuuriliselt lõimunud tarbivad peamiselt Venemaa päritolu mee-
diat ja väiksemas mahus kohalikku venekeelset meediat. Meediasisu 
tõlgendamises kasutatakse nii Eesti ühiskonna kui Venemaa ühiskonna 
norme, kultuurilis-ajaloolisi teadmisi kui ka igapäevaelu kogemusi 
(Uurimus V). 
• Nõrgalt lõimunud jälgivad uudismeediat ebaregulaarselt ja tarbivad 
peamiselt meelelahutusliku sisuga meediat. Madal sotsiaalpoliitiline 
sidustatus ja ebaregulaarne päevauudiste jälgimine võimendavad teine-
teist ning tulemuseks on veelgi suurem isoleeritus avalikust meedia-
ruumist. Samal ajal kasutavad passiivselt lõiminud aktiivselt sotsiaal-
meediat – nad on nö teisesed tarbijad, kuna nende jälgitav meediasisu 
on kellegi kolmanda kujundatud (Uurimus III, V). 
 
 
III. Kuidas on vahendatud hargmaisus seotud segmenteeritud lõimumisega? 
 
• Hargmaisust toetab noorem iga ja Eesti kodakondsus, mis omakorda 
seostub tugevama majandusliku ja poliitilise sidustusega. Võõrkeelte 
oskus ja haridus on faktorid, mis võimaldavad mitmekesistada meedia-
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kasutust ja suurendada piiriülest personaalset kommunikatsiooni 
(Uurimus V). 
• Esimese põlvkonna sisserännanud praktiseerivad hargmaisust eeskätt 
läbi Venemaa uudis- ja suhtlusmeedia. Piiriülene personaalne suhtlus-
võrgustik ei ole suur. Vahendatud hargmaisust kohtab harvemini vähese 
eesti keele oskusega ja/või kontsentratsioonialadel elavate inimeste seas 
(Uurimus V). 
• Tugeva piiriülese meediatarbimisega auditooriumi liikmed on meedia 
osas kriitilisemad. Erinevates kultuuri- ja inforuumides liikumine toob 
kaasa rohkem võrdlusmomente, mistõttu tõlgendamispraktikad on 
mitmekesised ja varieeruvad (Uurimus III, V). 
• Poliitilise kriisi tingimustes on tugevasti hargmaise rühma meedia-
tarbimine geo-poliitiliselt mitmekesine. Samas tekitab erinevate ideo-
loogiliste vaadetega meediasisu jälgmine meediatarbijates väsimust ja 
tüdimust (Uurimus III, IV, V). 
• Multiaktiivne kosmopoliitne lõimrühm on füüsiliselt mobiilne, nende 
piiriülesed sidemed on sagedased ja vastastikku tugevdavad. Harg-
maised praktikad võimaldavad koguda majanduslikke ja kultuurilisi 
ressursse ning teadmisi, oskusi ja isiklikke kontakte, mis tugevdavad 
nende kohalikku majanduslikku positsiooni, suurendavad ühiskond-
likku ja poliitilist julgust ja aktiivsust. Hargmaisus ja kohalik lõimitus 
on üksteist tugevdavad, ehkki hagrmaisuse negatiivne seos eesti keele 
oskusega osutab, et see suhe ei pruugi alati olla vastastikku toetav 
(Uurimus V).  
• Institutsionaalselt lõimunud rühmas avaldub hargmaisus eeskätt Vene-
maa ja venekeelse meedia jälgimise näol, mis võimaldab säilitada ja 
arendada oma ajaloolis-kultuurilist identiteeti. Kuna lõimrühma liikmed 
on ka regulaarsed kohaliku (eestikeelse) meedia jälgijad, peavad nad 
geopoliitiliste pingete taustal hakkama saama ideoloogiliselt mitme-
suunalise meediadiskursusega. Tugev poliitiline sidustatus kodanikuna 
toetab soovi olla geopoliitilistes vaidlustes neutraalne. See tähendab, et 
poliitilise kriisi tingimustes võib hargmaisus pärssida nende poliitilist 
eneseväljendust ja osalust ning muudab nende etnilise identiteedi repro-
dutseerimise keerukamaks (Uurimus V).  
• Ento-kultuuriliselt lõimunute rühmas avaldub hargmaisus Venemaa-
suunalise (sotsiaal)meedia ja piiriülese isikliku kommunikatsiooni 
kaudu. Rühma iseloomustab geopoliitiline truudus Venemaale. Vahen-
datud hargmaisus ei toeta kohaliku poliitilise- ja kodanikuidentiteedi 
arengut ega suhteid põhirahvusega. Geopoliitiliste pingete taustal on 
meediamenüü pigem homogeenne ja orienteeritud ühele konflikti osa-
poolele (Venemaale) orienteeritud. Samal ajal seostub nende harg-
maisus kohaliku tasandi kollektiivsete tegevustega ja see hoiab neid 
ühiskonda sidustatuna (Uurimus V). 
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• Nõrgalt lõimunute hargmaisust toetab suhtlusmeedia kasutamine. Kuna 
nad ei jälgi välismeediat, siis on ühiskondade mitmekesisus nende jaoks 
vahendatud teiste inimeste kogemuste kaudu. Geopoliitilise pinge kon-
tekstis eelistavad nad asjakohast meediasisu mitte jälgida (Uurimus V).  
• Üldiselt toetab hargmaisus kohalikku lõimitust. Hargmaisus tugevdab 
sotsiaalset agentsust, mis on omane teatud segmenteeritud integrat-
siooni vormidele. Hargmaisus võib aga olla ka kompensatsioonimehha-
nism ebapiisava ligipääsu puhul majanduslikele või poliitilistele res-
surssidele või riigispetsiifilise kapitali nappuse puhul (Uurimus V). 
 
Kokkuvõttes võib öelda, et rändetaustaga elanikkonna eri gruppide lõimumine 
toimub hargmaises reaalsuses ja sõltub mitmekesistest ressurssidest, mitte üks-
nes riigispetsiifilise ressursi suurendamisest. Vahendatud hargmaisus on omane 
kõigile lõimumisviisidele, ent vastastikmõju avaldub kvalitatiivselt erinevalt.  
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